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ABSTRACT 
The existing scholarship on Chinese agricultural history and peasant economy 
always portrayed Chinese peasants as cultivators and equated agricultural 
commercialization as cash crop growing. Based on the field surveys made by the 
Chinese and Japanese investigators in the 1930s, this dissertation tries to correct the 
over-simplification of the Chinese peasant economy and describe how the peasants in 
Eastern Hebei made a living by a combination of agriculture, industry and commerce. 
By examining the ecosystem and calculating the grain production and 
consumption, it is found that the returns from farming were not even enough for the 
peasants own consumption. Eastern Hebei was a grain shortage area and the peasants 
there had to engage in non-farming activities to supplement their income and support 
their families. Besides engaging in traditional sideline production, the peasants in 
Eastern Hebei took the opportunities provided by the development of domestic and 
international trade and produced on a large scale for outside markets. The bristle 
processing in Fengrun county, paper making in Qian-an county and handicraft weaving 
in Baodi county are selected to show the importance of rural industry in the p)easant 
economy in Eastern Hebei. 
This study also finds that in the modem period, either forced by survival 
pressure or attracted by outside opportunity, more and more peasants in Eastern Hebei 
left their villages and found temporary or permanent jobs in the outside world. The 
xiv 
causes and consequences of the large scale emigrating—^"going to Manchuria"—are 
discussed in detail to show the importance of non-farming income in the peasant 
economy. 
The 1930s wimessed increases in state taxation, the civil war, the Japanese 
invasion and the world economic depressioiL These developments are discussed in 
terms of impact upon the peasants of the villages under consideration. It is found that it 
was harder for the peasants to make a living in that period. In conclusion, this study 
supports Fei Xiaotong's argimient that it was impossible for Chinese peasants to make a 
living on farming alone and the final solution for China's agrarian problem was 
diffused rural industrialization. 
I 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1938, in the preface to Fei Xiaotong's book Peasant Life in China, the 
prominent anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski foretold that Fei's book " will be 
counted as a landmark in the development of anthropological field-work and theory."' 
In the following years, the book was reprinted four times and became a classic in the 
study of Chinese rural life." It was immediately translated into Japanese, but no 
Chinese edition was published during the war. In the 1940s, although Fei Xiaotong was 
famous among the Chinese academic world, especially among the students of 
anthropology and sociology, few economists and policy makers paid attention to his 
field study and policy reconmiendations. In the three decades fi'om 1950 to 1980, the 
discipline of sociology was abolished and the discipline of anthropology was restricted 
to "national minorities' research" in China. Fei's work was little known by the new 
generation of Chinese and he was criticized as a "rightist" But Western scholars who 
studied China did not forget Fei Xiaotong and his works. In 1970, Ramon Myers listed 
Fei's study as representative of one of the theories on Chinese agrarian problems.In 
1981, R. David Arkush published a biography of Fei Xiaotong which faithfully recorded 
' Bronislaw Malinowski, preface to Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze 
Valley, by Hsiao-tung Fei (the new spelling is Fei Xiaotong) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 
1939, fifth impression in 1962), xiii. About Fei Xiaotong and his works, see R. David Arkush, Fei 
Xiaotong and Sociology in Revolutionary China (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1981). 
 ^ Peasant Life in China was first published in 1939, then reprinted in 1943, 1945, 1947 and 1962. It might 
have been printed more if Fei did not interfere. According to Arkush, in 1963, Fei wrote to the London 
publishers and asked them not to reprint his book and they agreed. Arkush, Fei Xiaotong, 111. 
^ Ramon H. Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 
(Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1970), 18-19. 
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Fei's work and carefully evaluated his contribution to the understanding of Chinese 
peasants. After 1980, as Fei re-emerged in the academic world and became one of the 
high leaders in China, his "rural industrialization" and "small town development 
theory" became popular in and outside of China. Because sociologists and economists 
usually focus their attention on contemporary problems, it becomes the historian's 
responsibility to evaluate and test Fei's early findings and proposals. By pursuing a 
case study of Eastern Hebei (the definition of Eastern Hebei will be explained in 
chapter 2), this study will support Fei's argument on the importance of sideline and 
rural industrial production in the Chinese peasant economy. As Fei's field study had 
already opened a window for outsiders to understand the Chinese peasants in the 1930s, 
this thesis aims to enlarge this window by focusing on another part of China and hopes 
to answer a question proposed by Fei more than fifty years ago: how did the villagers in 
interior China live on the land?"* 
Fei Xiaotong's interpretation of Chinese peasant economy 
In the preface to Fei Xiaotong's later works. Tang Tsou provided an excellent 
summary concerning Fei's interpretation of the Chinese peasant economy and 
recommendations for the treatment of the agrarian problems expressed in Fei's two 
books. As the summary is comprehensive, it is worth to quoting it here. 
Fei Hsiao-tung's Peasant Life in China (E. P. Dutton, 1939) is now a classic in the 
study of Chinese nual life. In this 5eld study of Kaihsienloing (Kaixian'gong), a village 
About the question, see Hsiao-tung Fei, Earthbound China: A Study of Rural Economy in Yurman, 
(Chicago ; University of Chicago Press, 1945), 297. 
J 
in his native Wujiang county, Jiangsu province, he developed the theme that, due to a 
huge population and the scarcity of cultivable land, Chinese peasants derived a 
substantial part of their income &om household sideline and handicraft industries. When 
these declined for one reason or another, the peasants' standard of living declined as 
well; some sold their land and left for the cities. 
Fei supported a '^ reasonable and effective land refonn" (p.286). He noted that 
a "reduction of rent and equalization of ownership" would provide "breathing space for 
the peasants'' (p.285). But he underscored his beh'ef that the final solution had to be 
sought in the revival and development of household sideline and rural industries; e.g., the 
breeding of silkworms, the production of cocoons, the reeling of silk threads, and the 
selling of raw silk. A fijrther step would be "the developmem of small-scale factories on 
the principle of cooperation" (p.286), in order to process agricultural produce or to 
make other products with locally available raw materials. 
These basic ideas and policy recommendations, formulated fifty years ago, have 
remained with Fei. In Earthbound China (University of Chicago Press, 1945), he and 
Chih-I Chang surveyed three villages representing different degrees of commercial 
evolution and varying distances fi'om large urban centers in the relatively 
underdeveloped southwestern province of Yunnan. In this book, Fei confirmed his 
earlier analysis of rural needs while developing the nuances in his detailed description of 
the socioeconomic life of these three villages. He was even more specific in advocating 
a return to the traditional principle of supplementing the &tnily income of the peasants 
with a "diffiised industry" (p.308); i.e., handicraft industries, small-scale rural 
cooperative factories, and workshops making machine parts. These decentralized 
woilcshops and faaories would be "established in villages or in centers near villages" 
(p.309). Such development would enable the peasants to share in the profits of China's 
industrialization and at the same time prevent the concentration of population in urban 
centers (p.311).' 
As R. David Arkush pwinted out, Fei Xiaotong was not the first or the only one 
who stressed the importance of rural industry in peasants' life at that time.® But 
undoubtedly, Fei's promotion of rural industry' has been the most enduring effort in 
twentieth century China. Because Fei's arguments were based on his own and his 
students' field studies, his findings impressed readers irrmiediately and few people 
doubted the reliability of his descriptions. But not all scholars agreed with his 
' Tang Tsou, forward to Rural Development in China: Prospect and Retrospect (Chicago; University of 
Chicago Press, 1989) vii-viii. 
 ^ AikasK, Fei Xiaotong, 170. 
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interpretation of the rural problems/ Besides his occasional miscalculations,® one 
often asked question was "what is the value of studies of small communities [four 
isolated villages in the two books], no matter how reliable, for a complex society such 
as China's?"' In other words, is Fei's finding representative of the whole peasant 
economy in China or is it only a particular phenomena in some southern villages. 
Another problem was the weakness of historical evidence to support some of Fei's 
conclusions. Arkush pointed out that "interestingly enough, the weakness of Fei's 
generalizations I think stemmed from his commitment to field work instead of long 
hours in the library."'® Besides a personal bias towards contemporary rural economic 
studies, the unavailability of books and libraries in China during the war and the fact 
that his books were finally written or translated in England or the United States, help to 
explain the lack of library research. However, almost at the same time that Fei did his 
field studies in southeast and southwest China, Japanese researchers conducted similar 
investigations in north China. But the Japanese never published any comprehensive 
studies at that time and their investigation reports will be the basic materials for this 
study. 
^ Jack M. Potter, Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant: Social and Economic Change in a Hong Kong 
Village (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968). See Chapter 7. 
* Arkush cited and annotated some miscalculations in one part of Fei's book. See Fei Xiaotong, 86. 




In China, the 1950s was a prosperous and highly productive decade for social 
scientists. Under the coordination of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica 
(now, the Institute of Economics is under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), 
three series of multi-volumes source materials on the Chinese modem economy were 
edited and published. The agricultural volumes were edited by Li Wen2dhi and Zhang 
Yoityi.'' These three volumes were not a simple collection of historical materials on 
agriculture. The selection of the materials and the detailed subtitles reflected the 
editors' opinions on the development of modem Chinese agriculture. As David Faure 
pointed out, by selecting the materials, the editors wanted to demonstrate that modem 
Chinese agriculture was a history in the decline of production and the deterioration of 
Chinese peasants' life. Commercialization and foreign invasion were two important 
causes for this situation.The Anti-Rightist Movement of the late 1950s and the 
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s interrupted scientific research and there was no real 
academic book on economic history published during the 1960s and the 1970s. From 
1980 on, research work has been restarted and two books on north China villages have 
" Li Wenzhi, ed., Zhongguo jindai nongyeshi aliao (Source Materials on the Agricultural History of 
Modem China, vol. 1: I840-19II) (Beijing; Sanlian, 1957); Zhang Youyi, ed., Zftonggi/y/nab/ 
nongyeshi ziliao (Source Materials on the Agricultural History of Modem China, vol. 2: 1912-1927; 
vol.3; 1927-193"^ (Beijii^: Sanlian, 1957). 
David Faure, The Rural Economy ofPre-Uberation China: Trade Expansion and Peasant Livelihood 
in Jiangsu and Guangdong, 1870 to 1937 (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1989), seethe 
"Introduction." 
6 
been published'^ These books are collections of essays dealing with specific topics 
and there are no comparisons or generalizations. Until now, the multi-volumes source 
materials on modem Chinese j^culture, handicraft and industry edited by the 
researchers at the Institute of Economics still represent the main opinion of Chinese 
scholars. For students of Chinese agricultural history, the three volumes still are the 
indispensable sources. 
In the Western academic world, the first book to deal with Chinese agricultural 
history was written by Dwight Perkins. This is a quantitative analysis book, no one 
could challenge his conclusion that for about five centuries, Chinese agricultural 
production only increased more or less according to the population increase. From 
1970 on, American scholars began to engage in regional studies. On north China 
villages and peasant economy, two books have been published: Ramon Myers The 
Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890-
1949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) and Philip Huang TTie Peasant 
Economy and Social Changes in North China (Stanford: Stanford Um'versity Press, 
1985). As the pioneer work on north China villages, Myers' book was full of data but 
lacks analysis. Huang researched the peasant economy and social change emphasizing 
" Cong Hanxiang, ed., Jindcd Ji-Lu-Yu xiangxun (Rural Ji-Lu-Yu in Modem Period) (Beijing; Zhongguo 
shehui kexue, 1995). Wei Hongyun, ed., Er-shi ship san-si-shi niandai jidong nongcun shehui diaocha 
yuyanjiu) (Investigation and Research on Eastern Hebei Villages, 1930s and 1940s) (Tianjin: Tianjin 
renmin, 1994) 
The researchers at the Institute of Economics are continuing to work on the project of compiling multi-
volumes economic history of modem China. They have already published sevei^ volumes, but no volume 
focuses on agricultural history. 
Dwight Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968 (Chicago; Aldine, 1969). 
7 
the advantages of managerial farming and agricultural involution. Myers mentioned the 
role of markets and conraiercialization,'® but both Myers and Huang focused on the 
agricultural sector and overlooked the importance of rural industry and commerce's 
influence on peasant life. 
Loren Brandt and David Faure's studies focused on south China,'^ and their 
conclusion about commercialization and Western impact on the Chinese rural sector is 
worth discussing. Both Brandt and Faure disagreed with the Chinese scholars' 
"pessimistic opinion" on Chinese agricultural history and argued that 
commercialization and international trade were more beneficial than harmful to the 
Chinese peasant Are Brandt's and Faure's conclusions suitable to north China's 
situation? A case study is needed to test it. 
Perhaps for the convenience in compiling, the editors at the Institute of 
Economics divided the Chinese economy into three fields; agriculture, handicraft and 
[modem] industry, but there was no generalization of the whole economy. Brandt and 
Faure talked about commerce and Western impact on agriculture, but they discussed 
little about the influence of rising cities and new Westem style industry on the rural 
sector. Myers and Huang did not even mention this influence. In north China, besides 
the capital—Beijing, there were new rising industrial centers, such as Tianjin and 
Tangshan, and there were new transportation facilities, such as railways and steam 
Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy, chapters 15 and 18. 
" Loren Brandt, Commercialization and Agricultural Development: Central and Eastern China, 1870-
1937 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1989); Yzme, The Rural Economy of Pre-Liberation 
China. 
8 
ships. There must have been some comiection between traditional agriculture and these 
new sectors, but no one has discussed this relation in detail-
As Eastern Hebei is wholly covered by the research of Myers and Huang and 
both of them utilized the same Japanese investigation materials, it is necessary to 
discuss their studies in detail. Compared with Huang's book, Ramon Myers' research 
included more asp)ects of village life in north China. He first described the social and 
economic conditions of four sample villages and then generalized and discussed his 
findings in other parts. Philip Huang thought that a short time fi^e was a major 
weakness of Ramon Myers' book.'^ While Myers' study suffers from too broad a 
research area and too many topics,'' it is, nevertheless, a pioneer work. There was 
perhaps no better way to introduce the Japanese materials to the world. 
As the title shows, Huang's book could be divided into two parts—peasant 
economy and social change. Although he devoted twice the effort to economic 
involution than to the social change, his major contribution to the understanding of 
Chinese rural society is not in the first topic but in the second one. He is the first 
scholar to use the Baodi county archives to reconstruct the social organization of the 
late Qing period. His first topic focused on the comparison of the so-called managerial 
farming and family farming. His conclusion was that managerial farming was superior 
Huang, The Peasant Economy, 47, footnote. 
As Cheryl Payer pointed out, "Myers presents his data and generalization in jerlcy and disconnected 
&shion which makes it difficult to follow the argument." He concluded that most of Myers' arguments in 
the book were "virtually unsupported." Cheryl Payer, "Was the Chinese Peasam Exploited? A Review of 
The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890-1949 by Ramon 
H. Myers." Journal of Peasant Studies, 2 (January 1975), 229-36. 
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to family farming in labor production because the former could add or decrease labor to 
reach the highest efficiency. Loren Brandt questioned this conclusion and pointed out 
that "having worked with the same data [as Philip Huang did], I am impressed by the 
great similarity, not the differences, in behavior between farm categories [that means, 
the managerial and family farms]." At the end, Brandt concluded that "rather than 
contributing sigm'ficantly to our existing knowledge of the social, economic, and 
demographic change of the period, this [Huang's] book seems more likely to muddy the 
water."^° Brandt's conclusion might be too extreme. Both written materials utilized in 
this study and the personal interview information support the argument that managerial 
farming was more productive than petty family farming. But Philip Huang 
misinterpreted the causes and exaggerated the differences. For example, in one chapter 
(chapter 8), he argued against earlier scholars' suggestions that more labor animals and 
fertilizer use were two reasons for the higher productivity of the managerial farming, 
but my reading of the same materials reveals a contrary conclusion; in Eastern Hebei, 
animal excrement and urine were the main source of organic fertilizer (there was little 
or no chemical fertilizer at that time) and only the rich peasants (most of them were 
managerial farmers) raised domestic animals, such as horses, oxen, donkeys and pigs. 
Thus, they had more fertilizer and a corresponding higher land productivity (see the 
discussion in chapter 3 of this study). In another chapter (chapter 9), Huang over-
stressed the family farmers' over-use or mis-use of their land and labor. At one point, 
^ Loren Brandt, book review of The Peasant Economy, in Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
35 (April 1987): 676. 
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he said that for higher returns the family farmers planted more cash crop [cotton] than 
others [according to Huang, this put the family farmers at a higher risk for crop failure}, 
at another point, he stated that to eam higher wages the family faraiers hired themselves 
out to the rich people [most of them were managerial farmers] in the busy seasons, 
resulting in the poor harvest of their own crops^'. Such analysis begs a question: is 
Huang's description unreliable or did the family farmers have a mental problem? 
Based on these misinterpretations of the selected materials, Huang exaggerated the 
different results of cash crop planting between the managerial farming and family 
farming. This exaggeration drew the extreme criticism of Brandt In fact, both Huang 
and Brandt stressed the impact of commercialization on agricultural production and 
peasant life. But Brandt (and David Faure) argued that commercialization and 
international trade benefited both rich and poor peasants and improved their living 
standard. To Brandt, "the real weakness in Huang's argument is his contention that 
conraiercialization benefited only a small segment of the rural population."" At this 
time, I am not sure whose argument is more reasonable, but it seems to me that Huang 
(and to some degree also both Brandt and Faure) gave too narrow a definition of 
commercialization in his study. 
To Philip Huang, the planting of the so-called cash crop, especially cotton, was 
the only criterion to measure the degree of commercialization. Using this criterion, he 
Huang, The Peasant Economy, 162, 156. 
^ Brandt, review of The Peasant Economy, in Economic Development and Cultural Change 35 (April 
1987): 678. 
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divided the agricultural villages into "relatively uncommercialized," "moderately 
commercialized" and "highly commercialized" categories. He talked about the 
important relationship between the ecological system and agricultural production, but 
he overlooked or ignored the different soil and watering conditions on peasants' (in 
different villages) decision of crop choice. It appears that the choice of crop for 
planting was totally determined by the peasants' preference or so-called market 
orientatioiL This choice produces variations: in the same county (Fengrun county), one 
village was "relatively uncommercialized" (Jiaojiazhuang), the other was "highly 
commercialized" (Michang). Huang did not explain the differences. The more 
contradictory example is that according to Huang, Shajing in Shunyi county and Xiaojie 
in Tong county (both near Beijing) were "moderately commercialized" villages but 
Longwo in Yutian county and Zhongliangshan in Changli county (neither of them was 
near a big city) were "highly conunercialized." The proper criterion to measure the 
commercialization of rural economy should be the percentage of cash income in 
peasant's total income or the percentage of purchased goods in total consumptiotL The 
later chapters of this study will show that the peasants in Shajing and Xiaojie received 
more cash income than the peasants did in Longwo and Zhongliangshan. From this 
px)int of view, the former two were more commercialized than the later two. 
It is true that Philip Huang pointed out that many family farms could not support 
their members on farming alone and he noted the importance of sideline production and 
rural industry in some villages, but he immediately warned the readers that "though the 
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handicraft industry certainly helped to snstain the small-peasant economy, we must not 
exaggerate its role. The fact that only five of my 33 villages had a developed handicraft 
industry cautions against imagining an economy in which almost all poor family farms 
drew on home industry for support"^ The problem is Huang used a narrow definition 
for "home industry." In his writing, only handicraft spirming, weaving, and straw 
braiding were "home industries." His stress was on the wage income of the hiring out 
farming laborers, but to many villagers, this income was much less than other non-
farming employment earnings. In Huang's description, the peasants seemed to be 
farmers and the peasant economy was composed of farming plus a little home industry. 
The following chapters will show this description about Chinese peasants is not 
complete, at least for the peasants in Eastern Hebei. 
Research area and the basic sources 
The question—why research on north China and use the same Japanese 
investigative materials again?—has been raised several times by colleagues in the course 
of this study. To most, the publications of Myers and Huang provide enough data to 
understand north China peasants and there is no need to study the Japanese 
investigation materials agaiiL Besides the above listed shortcomings and the need for 
additional research on the peasant's life in China, there are the issues of the sample 
villages being truly representative and the need to consider dub-regional differences. 
^ Huang, The Peasant Economy, 196. 
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An examination of the Eastern Hebei region, see Figure 1-1, illustrates the last two 
points. As Figure 1-1 shows, Philip Huang's research area covered the lowland areas of 
Hebei and northwest Shandong (Myers' research area is larger than Huang's, it included 
the two provinces), but among his 33 investigated villages (Myers studied fewer 
villages), 22, or 66 percent of the total, are located in a small part of the research area— 
Eastern Hebei, which he called northeastern Hebei in his study. Were the sample 
villages properly representative of the whole research region? Even if the answer is yes, 
we should not ignore the sub-regional differences. The ecological systems were 
different from Eastern Hebei to Central or Southern Hebei. According to Philip Huang, 
the sown-area-to-cultivated-area figure (in other words, the index of double-cropping) 
was 116.3 in northeastern Hebei (Eastern Hebei), 139.3 in central Hebei and 143.7 in 
southern Hebei in 1949."'* In the modem period, as two seaports (Tianjin and 
Qinhuangdao) were opened in Eastem Hebei, modem transportation systems and new 
industries were also developed there. These facts made Eastern Hebei a unique 
economic sub-region which is worth a separate study and the emphasis of Japanese 
investigations in the 1930s on this area makes this study possible. 
Both Ramon Myers and Philip Huang introduced the Japanese investigation data 
on north China and Huang also gave a critical assessment of these materials.^ The 
following provides a basic discussion of the origins of the Eastem Hebei investigations 
Huang, The Peasant Economy, 58. 
" Myers, The Chinese Peascmt Economy, Chapter 3; Huang, The Peasant Economy, Chapter 2. 
Figure l-l, Philip Huang's research area and the Mantetsu surveyed vill£^es 
(Adapted from Map 2.2 in Huang, The Peasant Economy, p.45.) 
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by the Japanese. At the end of 1935, the Japanese military intelligence created an 
investigative corps to study village conditions in the area controlled by the so-called 
Eastern Hebei Autonomous Federation for Joint Defense Against Communism 
(discussed in Chapter 2). The 30-man corps included seven intelligence agents 
assigned by the army, researchers of the Mantetsu (the short name for the Japanese 
South Manchuria Railway Company) research staff, and nine Japanese students 
studying in China under Mantetsu auspices at the time. The thirty investigators were 
divided into 14 squads and investigated 16 counties in Eastern Hebei from April 22 to 
May 15, 1936. They first gathered basic information about the county at the county seat 
and then investigated one, two or more villages in each county. The result was 
published in four books in the same year, the most important one was Report on the 
Investigation of Actual Conditions in 25 Villages in Eastern Hebei (2 vol.). 
In 1937 four villages in four Eastern Hebei counties—Dabeiguan in Pinggu, 
Xifanzhuang in Baodi, Michang in Fengrun and Qianlianggezhuang in Changli—were 
selected for in-depth study by five-man investigating teams. The teams spent four 
weeks in the field, from February 16 to March 17, 1937, gathering detailed statistical 
information on each household in 16 categories, including landownership, wage labor, 
croppings, marketing, taxes, capital equipment, and income and expenses. The three 
studies on three of the villages were considered satisfactory and published in three 
volumes. The fourth village, in Baodi, was deemed to require further investigation and 
the survey was never published. 
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From 1937 to 1939, one of the four villages—Michang in Fengrun—had been 
selected for consecutive investigation to understand the peasant economy. A resident 
Chinese researcher was sent there to keep detailed records for the sample families. The 
result was published in three volumes of statistical data. 
The last but most detailed village investigation was pursued by the combination 
of Mantetsu investigators and academic researchers from the law faculty of Tokyo 
University and the economic faculty of Kyoto University. Between November 1940 
and December 1942, they focused on six villages in North China. Two of them, 
Shajing in Shunyi county and Houjiaying in Changli coimty, are located in Eastem 
Hebei. The results were first printed in more than 100 separate reports and then 
published in six large volumes in the 1950s. Three of the six volumes dealt with 
Shajing and Houjiaying. 
Other Japanese materials included independent reports on specific economic 
issues, such as cotton producing in Xiaojie village in Tong county, the special trade 
(smuggling) in Eastem Hebei, and the tariff problem between Eastem Hebei and 
Manchuria. 
Some Chinese investigators also produced a high quality report on the economic 
situation in Eastem Hebei. In 1935, The Beining (Beijing-Liaoning) Railway Company 
organized a team to survey the economic conditions along the railroad. At that time, 
the company had already lost control of the railroad to the Japanese beyond 
Shanhaiguan. The investigation only covered Beijing to Shanhaiguan railway section in 
17 
the Eastern Hebei area. The result was published in six volumes. This investigation 
provided detailed information about products, marketing and population movements in 
Eastern Hebei. Myers listed this report in his bibliography but Huang did not mention it 
in his book. 
Besides the above listed sources, county gazetteers (local history), contemporary 
studies and the Maritime Custom Reports (for Tianjin and Qinhuangdao for the years 
from 1870 to 1937) have been consulted for this study. Interviews were also conducted 
with several elderly residents in Eastern Hebei. Their recollections about the 1930s in 
particular are used to check the written materials. 
A few words about the time frame and the thesis orgam'zation 
As most historians admit, it is difficult to give a specific year for the beginning 
of economic development in one area. Although Tianjin was opened as treaty port in 
I860 and the Custom Office was established there in 1864, the countryside would be 
penetrated by foreign goods and the peasants would feel the impact of Western 
competition only in later years. So, this research selects 1870 as the beginning year of 
study. Of course, to explore the origins of some economic system or political events, 
sometimes pre-1870 must be considered. Like most discussions on pre-1949 Chinese 
economic history, this study will end in 1937. As the evidence below will show, the 
Manchuria Incident of 1931 and the establishment of Manchuguo had already changed 
the economic situation and affected peasants' life in Eastem Hebei. The Japanese 
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invasion of North China in 1937 and the out break of a war of resistance formally 
declared the end of an old period. The survey materials made by Japanese investigators 
in the early 1940s will be used to demonstrate this violent change. 
Because few Chinese peasants left any record of themselves (most of them 
could not write or read), there are no vivid descriptions about the peasant life in this 
research area The investigation reports were fiill of numbers and statistics but lack 
narratives. From these materials, I have been compelled to show the economic changes 
in this area. It may be boring to read too many tables, but in economic history, the 
numbers, especially percentages, are more reliable than "many," "few" and other 
adjectives in describing incomes and expenses. 
As the title shows, this thesis tries to show how the peasants in Eastem Hebei 
made their living. The central part—chapters 3,4 and 5—will deal with agricultural 
production, rural industry and conunerce respectively. Then chapter 6 discusses the 
questions asked by all students who research modem Chinese economic history: What 
was the effect of imperialism or the foreign economic invasion? Was the peasant living 
standard improved or lowered? What were the main causes for this change? The 
conclusion (chapter 7) will summarize what this research has discovered and provide 
some observations concerning the modem Chinese peasant economy and the re-
emergence of rural industry as critical factors in the peasants' livelihood. Before 
dealing with all these issues, the ecological setting of Eastem Hebei must first be 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE ECOSYSTEM OF EASTERN HEBEI: 
ITS GEOGRAPHY, CLIMATE AND POPULATION 
As Philip Huang pointed out, "a historian of court politics, or of gentry ideology, 
or of urban development, does not necessarily have to take into account climate, 
topography, water, and the like. But the historian studying the people of an agrarian 
society can ill afford to overlook these features, for the natural envirormient is what 
shapes the life and orders the day of the peasant"' Peter C. Perdue also found that "in 
every Chinese region, physiographic features of the landscape—topography, climate, 
water supply, and soil quality—condition the forms of agriculture production."" In pre-
1949 China, it was the natural condition, or ecosystem as Philip Huang called it, not the 
human being, that decided the agricultural calendar, cropping portfolio, and to some 
degree, the peasant's living standard. Huang's own description about the ecological 
setting of north China generally describes the natural condition of Eastern Hebei/ but 
as a sub-region of north China, Eastern Hebei had its own ecological features, these 
features determined the economic development of Eastem Hebei. 
' Huang, The Peasant Economy, 53. 
^ Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500-1850, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), 25. 
^ Philip Huang, The Peasant Economy, 53-66. 
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The location of Eastern Hebei 
Eastern Hebei, or Jidong {Ji is the abbreviated name of Hebei province and 
dong means east), was the regional name for the area which was located east of the 
Nankou-Beijing-Tianjin railway line, south of the Great Wall and north of the Pohai 
Bay. Its geographical location is between 116°-120'' east longitude and 38°55'-40®45' 
north latitude. It included the following twenty-one counties; Changping, Huairou, 
Miyun, Pinggu, Tong, Sanhe, Xianghe, Baodi, Ninghe, Xinglong, Zunhua, Ji, Yutian, 
Fengrun, Loan, Leting, Qian-an, Lulong, Changli, Funing and Linyu (see Figure 2-1). 
An additional county Xianglong was created in the early 1930s and since its jurisdiction 
prior to 1930 was under Ji, Zunhua and other counties, it is excluded from this study. 
As a regional name, Jidong, or Eastern Hebei, was well known all over the 
country in the late 1930s and the 1940s. But during the Qing (1644-19II) and early 
Republic periods (1912-1935), this area was popularly called Jingdong (literally 
meaning east of Beijing), the counties in this area belonged to different prefectures or 
circuits. In the spring of 1933, under the threat of Japanese military invasion, the 
representatives of China and Japan signed the "Tanggu Truce" which ruled the area east 












Figure 2-1, Counties in Eastern Hebei 
area" (Chinese troops had to withdraw from this area)."* At the end of 1935, under the 
Japanese military authority's instigation, Yin Rugeng, a puppet of the Japanese, 
established the so-called Eastern Hebei Autonomous Federation for Joint Defense 
Against Commum'sm at the Tong county seat^ From that time on, Eastem Hebei 
became an often-mentioned administrative and geographic name in the newspapers and 
among the people. 
Eastem Hebei's location gave its economy an important impact. Historically, 
the Great Wall was not only a defense fortification to prevent nomadic people's 
invasion but also a natural line of division between agricultural and stock-raising 
regions. Slmnhaiguan, or the Shanhai-gate, was called the Number One Gate under 
Heaven. It was the beginning of the Great Wall in the east. For a long time, it was the 
main gate to Manchuria. Traditionally, Han-Chinese called Manchuria as Guandong, or 
East of Shanhaiguan. The local people of Eastem Hebei called the area north of the 
Great Wall (in the Republic period, it belonged to Jehol province) as Kotxwai (in 
Chinese, Kou means pass), or Outside of the Passes, because there were many passes on 
* About the Tanggu Truce, TIME had the following report: "Officers of the Nationalist Government and 
Japanese met secretly at Hwaiju [Huairou?], 30 mi. north of Peiping, and agreed verbally to the following 
terms; 1) Chinese forces would remain south, Japanese north of an imaginary line from Yenking 
[Yanqing], 45 mi. northwest of Peiping, through Tungchow [Tongzhou], 13 mi. east, to Ningho [Ninghe], 
30 mi. northeast of Tientsin [Tianjin], 2) Chinese 'volunteer corps' in the war area would be disbanded, 
Chinese promised to suppress anti-Japanese boycotting and other activities. 3) Japanese troops would 
withdraw to the Great Wall as soon as convinced that Chinese had h'ved up her part of the bargain." 
TIME, 5 June 1933, 17-18. 
' About the "Eastem Hebei Autonomous Federation,'' TIME had the following report: "Last November 
[November, 1935], without the use of a single regiment, Japan's Major General Kenji Doihara set up a 
pro-Japanese 'autonomous government' in eastem Hopei known as the Autonomous Federation for Joint 
Defense Against Communism. Its head was a twerpish-looking young man known as Yin Ju-keng [Yin 
Rugeng], whose only flash of independence is a stoh'd refusal to allow himself to be photographed with his 
two Japanese advisers." TIME, 11 May 1936, 25. 
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the Wall, such as Nankou, Gubeikou, Xifengkou and Yiyuankou. Through these passes, 
people traveled and goods were transported back and forth throuth the Great Wall. The 
geographical location gave the people of Eastern Hebei an advantage in emigrating to 
Manchuria and in handicraft production because its nearness to the market beyond the 
Great Wall. But nearness to Beijing and Manchuria also brought Eastern Hebei an 
unexpected disaster—^the enclosing of land by the Manchus in the early Qing period. 
The problem of baimerland 
After the Manchus conquered China proper and established capital at Beijing, 
the Shunzhi Emperor (reigned from 1644 to 1661) immediately granted land to his 
followers—^those Manchus and Mongols who followed him as he entered China proper. 
At first, he just gave the so-called "[late Ming] official estates without owners" 
(supposedly the owners had died in the dynastic transition war) and "waste land without 
owners" to Manchu princes, nobles and soilders. But these so-called un-claimed lands 
were far short of the need and the Manchus began to enclose Han-Chinese's property 
giving it to the new comers. Historically, these enclosed lands were called bannerlands 
because the Manchus were organized into an Eight-banner system and were called 
bannermen {qiren, the Han-Chinese were called minren, or commoners). As Philip 
Huang has noted "bannerland loomed especially large in the capital province of Zhili, 
acccounting for 17,600,000 mu in 1657, compared with 42,700,000 mu of privately 
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owned land, or roughly 29 percent of the total arable.'^ Because Eastern Hebei was 
near Beijing and was located on the corridor between China proper and Manchuria, all 
twenty-one counties had bannerland in their jurisdictions. According to Ju Zhendong's 
research, there was more than 6,000,000 mu of bannerland in Eastern Hebei (see Table 
2-1)- That means 35 percent of the bannerland in Zhili, or 14 percent of the total 
bannerland in the whole country, was located in Eastern Hebei. 
Ju Zhendong got his source from Qing governmental archives which might be 
smaller than the actual mu for the following two reasons; First, the enclosing was very 
Table 2-1, Mu of bannerland in Eastem Hebei 
County Acres (mu) County Acres (mu) 
Tong 393,535 Lulong 349,326 
Sanhe 345,831 Luan 421,667 
Baodi 264,624 Qian-an 314,523 
Changping 263,014 Funing 278,429 
Shunyt 256,194 Changli 265,941 
Huairou 192,436 Leting 297,283 
\Cyun 239,728 Linyu 486,455 
ri 275,560 Fengrun 302,678 
Xianghe 254,235 Zunhua 356,413 
Ninghe 165,027 Yutian 247,825 
Pinggu 165,438 Total 6,138,162 
Source: Ju Zhendong, Hebei qidi zhi yanjht (A Study of Bannerland in Hebei) in Xiao Zheng, ed., 
Mingguo 20 niamkd dalu tudi wenti ziliao (Materials on the Land Question in the Mainland During the 
1920s), no.75, (Taibei: Chengwen, 1977), 39616-39619. 
® Huang, The Peasant Economy, 87. 
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crude in the seventeenth century, there was no serious measurement Second, the 
governmental land figures were most likely the taxing-mu which was larger than the 
actual mu. If the land given to the bannermen "voluntarily" by the private owners 
(doiixian) was included, the total bannerland mu should be larger and the percentage of 
bannerland in the total mu of cultivable land in Eastem Hebei should be higher. Table 
2-2 shows the mu of bannerland and its percentage in two Eastem Hebei counties. 
Table 2-2, Bannerland and its percentage in Ji and Fengrun counties (unit: mu) 
County Bannerland Commoner's land Total Percentage of bannerland 
Ji 427,804 7,063 434,868 98% 
Fengrun 1,079,749 71,153 1,150,964 94 
Source: y/rrianzA/(Ji Gazetteer) (1944), vol.5. Taxes; Fengrtmxianzhi (¥eaff\m Gazsxxee.t) (\92\\ wo\. 
I, Land tax. 
As Table 2-2 shows, in the early Qing period (especially in the Shunzhi reign), 
almost all cultivable land in Eastem Hebei was granted to bannermen by the 
government or given to them by the Han-Chinese "voluntarily." To pacify the deprived 
Han-Chinese, the Manchu rulers ordered the magistrates in other counties to survey the 
un-claimed or could-be-opened lands and give them to those who lost their lands to the 
bannemien. Because most of those "compensated lands" (jbabudi) were located far 
away, few peasants went there to claim them. Most of the peasants in Eastem Hebei 
had to become tenants on the land which was owned by themselves earlier, this made 
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the peasants' life harder in this area than in other areas. Leting Gazetteer described this 
situation for its peasant as followings. 
Ledng county &ces Pofaai Bay in the southeast and bad the Luan river in the northwest 
[the river changed its course in later years], the little fertile land was enclosed and given 
to the bannermen in the Shunzhi period. The privately owned land (commoners' land or 
miruS) was only about 20 percent of the total cultivable land and almost all of them were 
easily waterlogged or sandy dunes. By one year's hard work, the harvest was one dou 
per mu. Most peasants had to make their living by cultivating the banneriand as tenants. 
In the good harvest years, the peasants hardly managed to keep their families from 
starvation [after paying the rents]. If there was a drought or flood, the harvest was not 
enough to pay the cost. Because the custom of "rent deposit" or "rent-borrowing" 
(paying rent in advance), the rent had already been paid but there was little or no 
harvest, many tenants got into trouble in such a way.' 
Under the governmental rule, the banneriand could not be sold to Han-Chinese, 
but the bannermen always sold their lands to their tenants or others under the name of 
"borrowing money by mortgaging the banneriand" or "receiving the rent for the coming 
years." In the eighteenth century, Qianlong Emperor (reigned 1736-1796, d. 1799) 
utilized the governmental money to buy back the banneriand mortgaged or sold by the 
bannermen and put this land under governmental control. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, to raise money for suppressing peasants rebellions or resisting 
foreign invasions, the Qing govenmient tried to lift the ban on banneriand marketing 
and let the cultivators pay taxes to the state directly, but until 1889, only about half 
million mu in the whole country changed registration from barmerland to private land.® 
In 1907, the ban of baimerland-selling was lifted forever, but this problem of 
batmeriand was not so easily solved as Philip Huang noted "by the end of the Qing 
 ^Leting xianzhi (Leting Gazetteer), vol.2. Geography, Custom. 
^ The government opened and closed the banneriand market three times in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. See Li Wenzhi, ed.. Source Materials on Agricultural History, 1: 201. 
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[1911], except for the estates of the imperial clansmen, almost all bannerland had been 
sold to private owners, and what remained had became virtually indistinguishable from 
private land-"^ In Eastern Hebei, the government tried to sell the bannerland but the 
peasants did not want or simply had no money to buy back their ancestors' properties 
which were taken by the Manchus. An example illustrates how the local government 
dealt with this problem. 
The [Shunyi] Governmental Property Bureau (guanchanju), firstly named [governmental 
property] Investigation Bureau {qingchaju), was established in 1916 to deal with the 
eight-items of bannerland rems. Before 1928, the bureau ordered the original tenants 
[meaning the present cultivators] to buy the bannerland at the price of 13 dollars per 
silver rent tael [that means the tenant could buy the land on wfu'ch he paid I silver tael 
rent a year for 13 dollars]. After 1928, the bannerland was sold at the prices of 2, 3, or 
4 dollars per mu. After the tenant bought the land and became land owners, he should 
pay 0.04 tael per/w per year as land tax.... From 1916 to 1931, 5,495 silver taels of 
the bannerland rem was sold and the land totaled 54,240 mu. There was still 33,984 mu 
registered as bannerland and the Bureau still encourage the tenants to buy the land.'° 
Just as enclosing the land in the early Qing period brought disaster to the 
peasant, so too did selling of barmerland. In Qianfengbei village in Shunyi county, a 
reporter found that "every day one could hear the news that those who had no money to 
buy back the bannerland were arrested and put into prison." He also found that because 
there were many barmermen in Hebei village [in Shunyi county], the percentage of 
barmerland in that village was so high that many peasants had to borrow money to buy 
back the "goverrmietal property" in 1926 as the government ordered. But, 
"unfortunately, in the following years, either flood or drought made the harvest poor, 
but the taxes and levies were increased so much that the land prices dropped 
' Huang, The Peasant Economy, 98, footnote. 
Shunyi xianzhi (Shunyi Gazetteer) (1933), vol.6. Taxes and levies. 
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dramatically. The peasants were falling into heavy debt and many were forced to 
bankruptcy. More than one hundred households which have not bought all the land 
they cultivated but had already sold all that they just bought"'' 
In Baodi county, the governmental officials colluded with the landlords to 
exploit the tenants in bannerland selling in the early 1930s: 
As in other counties in Hefaei province, part of the land of the big landlords was 
bannerland. After the establishment of the Governmental Property Bureau, these lands 
were treated as governmental property. But as these lands were controlled by the big 
landlords now, it is impossible to confiscate them. Then the Bureau officials negotiated 
with the landlords and devised a mutually beneficial policy: the Bureau would declare 
certain part of the landlords' land as 'bannerlands' and confiscate them, then the Bureau 
would order the landlords to buy it back. But, as they agreed, the landlords would plead 
that they have no money to buy the land and would like to give up the ownership of the 
land—it is true that few landlords have enough savings to buy all their bannerlands. 
Then, the Governmental Property Bureau ordered those tenants who cultivated the 
bannerland to pay the deed tax and take the lands as private lands. If the tenants were 
unable to pay the money, the offidals utilized ill^al forces, such as sending policemen 
to arrest the tenams. Last year [1932], hundreds poor tenants were put into prison by 
Daodi county authority on such pretexts. Most tenants were forced to buy the 
bannerlands by all means, some of them had to sell their wives or daughters to get the 
needed money The price was 3 or 4 dollars per mu. The Bureau divided what they 
received fi'om the tenants with the landlords who claimed they owned the sold lands. 
Generally, the govemmern got four-tenths and the landlords got the rest. Some people 
might argue that after buying the land, the tenants became land owners and could make a 
living on the lands easier than cultivating other's land. The reality was not so sweet for 
the tenams, as afanost all money which the tenams used to buy the land was borrowed on 
high interests (some were borrowed by putting their will-be-bought lands as security). 
Now, they &rmed their own lands and paid no more rents, but, on the one hand, they 
had to pay high imerest debt and land taxes and other sur-charges. On the other hand, 
as an owner-tenant, the oflScials, local tyrants and evil gentry treated them as land­
owners and thought they could be pressed for more money, thus all kinds of levies on 
the lands were increased. As a result, in the first year after they got the land, if it was a 
good harvest, they could manage to meet their expenses. [In the following years,] if the 
harvest was poor or the prices for the grains dropped, they fell into trouble immei'ately 
and at last had to sell their lands to the creditors at a much lower price. But, usually, the 
CTeditors did not accept the land [as a paymem for the debt], the peasants were forced to 
seD their children or draft animals to pay the debt. 
" Zhang Youyi, ed.. Source Materials on Agricultural History, 3: 743. 
Ibid., 7A1-1A2. 
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In Zunhua county, the enraged peasants destroyed the Governmental Property 
Bureau in 1930. According to Yang Si, a native of Zunhua and a participant of the first 
protest demonstration, the peasants in Zunhua were so poor that they just had no money 
to buy back what they cultivated. But the officials accused those who had not bought 
the bannerland of being bandits and put some of them in the prison, this led to the 
protest and the destruction the governmental building. The incident was described as 
following; 
The governmental property bureau was established in Zunhua in 1924 or 1925, its 
responsibility was urging and supervising the peasants to buy the ownership of former 
bannerlands. But the peasams did not want to "buy" those lands which they had already 
owned and cultivated, the excuse is very simple: they had no money. But the bureau 
officials did not care about this &ct. They first past»i up a notice and ordered the local 
constables to ask the peasants to go to the bureau to buy the land. As few peasants 
responded to the governmental order, the bureau b^an to intimidate the peasants and 
oflfered to reward those who reported the names of those who cultivated ljut did not buy 
the bannerland. This intimidation &iled again. Then, the bureau felt it was necessary to 
use force. They first arrested the local constables and village heads, then began to arrest 
those who cuhivated the bannerlands. This forced the peasants to respond. In March of 
1927, about 2,000 peasants demonstrated in the county seat, the magistrate promised to 
transfer the peasants' demand to the provindal government and the peasants returned 
home peacefully. But the next day, the magistrate declared that the peasants had been 
stirred up by the communists and the leader of the demonstration was executed. In the 
summer of 1930, the peasants demonstrated again, they yelled "down with the people's 
enemy—^the head of the governmental property bureau—Huang Shengjie!" But they did 
not touch any property in the bureau and the magistrate promised to suspend the selling of 
bannerland temporarily. In early 1931, the peasams rose up again, this time the angry 
peasants destroyed the offices of the governmental property bureau. 
It is impossible to answer the question of how much bannerland was sold and 
how much land was still cultivated by peasants as governmental tenants. But it is 
certain that in this violent political and social change period (1900-1937), some people, 
especially the local strongmen, such as former bannerland rent collectors and landlords. 
TaKongPao (Dagong Daily), 11 February 1931, 3. 
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increased their landholdings enormously by buying the low-priced governmental land 
and many others just changed their status from bannerland tenants to state or other 
private landlords' tenants. Table 2-3 shows that until the early 1930s, how the 
barmerland system affected the land ownership and land taxes in Shunyi county. 
Table 2-3, Land taxes and rents in Shimyi county, 1930s 
Land description 
Private land iPUiangdi) 
Fonner bannerland {Oican liangdi) 
Newly registered land {Shengkedi) 
Governmental land (Gongcan zudf) 
Registered former rent land (Shengke zudii) 
Registered former bannerland (Xin shengkedi) 
Newly registered private land (A7n shengliangdi) 
Land sold to the fonner tenants iJJu dianlimgdi) 
Fonner rented land (Got liangdi) 
Total 
Mu Taz or rent (tael) Rate (tael/mu) 
"63^653 Toss 0.0163 
1,530 33 0.0216 
63,404 1,526 0.0241 
143,681 5,717 0.0398 
20,955 837 0.0399 
142,335 5,618 0.0395 
11,912 500 0.0420 
78,556 1,277 0.0163 
54,240 2,289 0.0422 
580,266 i 8,832 00325"" 
Source; Shunyixianzhi (Shunyi Gazetteer) (1933), vol. 6, Taxes and levies. 
As Table 2-3 shows, in Shunyi county, only about 13 percent of the total taxed 
land (75,565 mu in 580,266 mu) was originally private land, the other 87 percent was 
fonner barmerland or governmental land. In the early 1930s, although the bannerland 
had already been sold to commoners and became private land, the tax rate was different 
as Table 2-3 shows. Generally speaking, the land tax (sometimes it was still called 
governmental land rents) was heavier on the former barmerland than on the original 
private owned land. The village investigation material supports this generalization. In 
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Lujiazhai village, Zunhua county, land tax on one mu up-grade commoner's land was 
0.138 yuan, on mid-grade was 0.069 yuan and on the low-grade was 0.023 yuan. But 
on the former bannerland, the taxes on the same grades were 0.29,0.21 and 0.08 yuan 
respectively. It is no doubt that land enclosing in the seventeenth century and 
bannerland selling in the early twentieth century still hurt the peasants in Eastern Hebei 
in the 1930s. 
The soil condition and climate in Eastern Hebei 
As part of the great North China Plain, most of Eastern Hebei is level and is 
under 100 meters above the sea level. But in the north area along the Great Wall, there 
are mountains which belong to Yanshan, or Yan-mountain range. In fact, the Great 
Wall was built on the ridges of these mountains. The topography of the eastern section 
of Eastem Hebei was described by the Custom Officials at Qinghuangdao as: 
With the exception of the narrow strip of low-lying land along the sea. North-east Chihii 
is almost entirely mountainous. Between the first range, wiiich rises behind 
Shanhaikwan [Shanhaiguan], and the sea there is but a narrow interval of plain, some 5 
miles wide. At Chinwangtao [Qinghuangdao] the open country has expanded into a 
plain some 12 miles broad, grading near the hills and along the track of the railway into 
low, cultivated downs.... The mountain ranges run, roughly, fi-om the north-east to the 
south-west, and at Lwanchow [Luan county seat] the low country finally broadens out 
into the Great Chihii Plain. 
Several rivers, such as Chaobei, Jiyun and Luan, originate north of the Great 
Minami Manshu tetsudo kabushiki kaisha (Mantetsu), Kito chiku noson jittai chosaban. Kilo chiku 
jurokuko ken kensei gaikyo chosa hokokusho (Report on the investigation of general conditions of the 
sixteen counties in Eastem Hebei) (Tianjin, 1936), 169. 
" China, Imperial Maritime Custom, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open 
to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Province, 1902-11, 
144. 
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Wall and flow southward to the Bohai Bay. The silt soil is good for agriculture, but in 
some low located counties, such as Baodi, Yutian and Ninghe, the rivers always flooded 
and the crops were waterlogged. The coastal plain was too sandy and saline for plant 
growing (see Figure 2-2). In the nineteenth century, the coastal residents made a living 
on salt-boiling or fishing. In the twentieth century, some of the coastal land were 
opened for fanning and the salt-makers changed to farmers. 
In north China, the climate, especially the time and quantity of rainfall, had 
more effects on agricultural production than the soil conditions. George B. Cressey, an 
American professor of geography who visited China in the early 1930s, wrote that "the 
soil [in north China] is more or less a constant, but the weather is not. Man lives on the 
earth, but his life depends even more on the atmosphere. With adequate rain, the land 
produces rich harvest; without it the plain is a parched semidesert. Rainfall is the key 
to prosperity. Each village has its rain god, and tablets which are supposed to bring 
precipitation are found in many temples."'® Unfortunately, for north China the amount 
of rainfall is not only precariously low but is subject to wide fluctuations, in both 
amount and time. Droughts in May and June are especially serious (see Figure 2-3). 
As Figure 2-3 shows, there was little precipitation in winter and spring. Spring 
drought always delayed planting. June was the last period for spring planting, but as 
Figure 2-4 shows, rainfall in June fluctuated widely from year to year, sometimes it was 
less than 10 mm which inevitably meant crop failure. The rainfall was concentrated in 
George B. Cressey, China's Geogrcqjhic Foundation: A Survey of the Land and its People, (New York; 
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Figure 2-2, Topography of Eastern Hebei 
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Figure 2-3, Monthly average rainfall in Tianjin (1891-1925) 
July and August, and plenty of rain and high temperature was good for the plant 
growing, but heavy rains at this time always flooded the river banks and waterlogged 
the low crop fields. Once again, George Cressey's description about the north China 
perfectly fits Eastern Hebei; "Too little rain means crop failure and famine, while 
excessive rain brings flood and also famine. Often the rainfall is so concentrated that 
the otherwise dry watercourses overflow and great shallow lakes develop in the 
interstream depressions. Since the land is so flat, drainage is slow and these water 
bodies may remain for months."'^ 
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Figure 2-4, Rainfall in June in Tianjin (1891-1925) 
According to later statistics for Tangshan area (including Fengnin, Zunhua, 
Luan, Qian-an, Lulong, Leting, Changli, Funing and Linyu counties), in the 517 years 
from 1470 to 1986,48 years were heavy flood years and 130 were light flood. The two 
added up to 178 years and composed 34.4 percent of the total years. On average, 2.9 
years had a flood year. Besides the flood, there was 33 years of serious drought and 116 
years of light drought, the two added up to 149 years and composed 28.8 percent of the 
total years. On average, 3.4 years had a drought year. In the 517 years, only 190 years, 
or 36.8 percent of the total years, had normal precipitation, the other 327 years, or 63.2 
percent of the total, experienced flood or drought disaster.'® The "spring drought and 
Wei Hongyun, ed.. Investigation and Research on Eastern Hebei Villages, 138. 
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summer flood" is typically reflected in the weather condition in 1930. Ta Kong Pao, 
the most popularly read newspaper in north China, was full of the news of "drought and 
flood" here and there in the page of "local reports." On July 5, 1930, the report from 
Changli read that "from the spring to summer, there has been little rainfall in this area. 
The sun burned the land every day and the temperature is high. The crops turns to 
yellow and many fruit trees died in the orchards. In the past week, many peasants 
offered sacrifices in the temples and prayed for rain. More than half of the 800 villages 
in Changli county built the alters and prayed in front them, but the sky is still clear and 
there is no rain until now. The peasants are very pitiful"" Even if the Jade Emperor 
(the Chinese peasant thought the Jade Emperor controled the rainfall in the Heaven) 
answered the peasants' prayers, the rainfall would be too late to save the spring crops. 
But the drought was not the only disaster that year for the Eastern Hebei peasants. One 
month later after they prayed for rain, they blamed the Jade Emperor for too much of it. 
On August 12, it was reported that the heavy rain caused flood in Jiyun river and more 
than 200 villages in Baodi county were submerged. On the same day, Luan county 
reported that even in the elevated areas, the flood water inundated one's legs and in the 
low villages the flood was so high that the peasants had to live on the roofs of their 
houses."" The natural conditions, especially the fluctuation of rainfall, made 
agricultural production precarious in Eastern Hebei. hi the years that flood or drought 
destroyed the crops, rural industry or working outside the village provided the only 
TaKongPao, 5 July 1930, p.2. 
^ Ibid., 12 August 1930, p.2. 
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income for the peasants. It is no surprise that the heavily waterlogged Baodi county 
was the center of handicraft weaving in Eastern Hebei (discussed in chapter 4). 
Population and total grain production: A supply and demand analysis 
There was no scientific land survey and population census in pre-1949 China, 
thus it is difficult to get the exact land and population data. Table 2-4 summarizes the 
figures collected by the Eastern Hebei Anti-commum'st Government to show the land 
size and population of Eastern Hebei in 1937. 
In Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), Eastern Hebei was composed of three parts. The 
seven counties (Linyu, Funing, Changli, Leting, Qian-an and Luan) located in the most 
eastern section belonged to Yongping Prefecture. The three centrally located counties 
(Zunhua, Yutian and Fengrun) belonged to Zunhua Sub-prefecture. The remaining 
eleven counties in the west part were supervised by Shuntian Prefecture which 
administered the counties around Beijing. According to one statistic, in 1883, the 
population in the twenty-one counties in Eastern Hebei (at that time, there was no 
Xinglong coimty) was 4,253,700."' By 1936, the population was 6,254,126 (see Table 
2-4), that means in about half a century, the net population increase was 2,000,426, or 
47 percent of the 1883 figure. As almost all cultivable land was already utilized as farm 
land in this area by mid-m'neteenth century, the population increase deteriorated the 
land-man ratio. As Table 2-4 shows, in 1936, on average, each household had only 
Huang, The Peascait Economy, 323-324, Table B2 and Table B3. 
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Table 2-4, Land and population in Eastern Hebei, 1936 
County Acreage (mu) Household Population Person/household Mu/household 
Tong 1,089,799 55,188 360,849 6.54 19.75 
Zunhua 298,710 50,610 302,570 5.98 5.90 
Ji 1,057,125 41,261 285,471 6.92 25.62 
Miyun 278,430 26,302 132,809 5.05 10.59 
Yutian 554,002 52,990 335,133 6.32 10.45 
Sanhe 745,420 39,173 239,085 6.10 19.03 
Shunyi 591,886 32,500 163,825 5.04 18.21 
Pinggu 211,473 13,660 65,155 4.77 15.48 
Huairou 150,000 11,000 86,130 7.83 13.64 
Xinglong 47,260 4,702 46,856 9.97 10.05 
Luan 2,097,886 100,257 911,572 9.09 20.93 
Fengrun 1,579,584 87,120 676,133 7.76 18.13 
Linyu 197,026 32,761 195,690 5.97 6.01 
Changii 1,553,443 80,680 407,018 5.04 19.25 
Funing 366,550 47,494 262,348 5.52 7.72 
Leting 636,607 45,999 339,490 7.38 13.84 
Qian-an 500,000 59,450 368,850 6.20 8.41 
Luiong 224,919 22,434 162,453 7.24 10.03 
Baodi 1,585,600 57,097 325,084 5.69 27.77 
Changping 635,858 43,380 233,127 5.37 14.66 
Ninghe 600,000 40,006 212,034 5.30 15.00 
JGanghe 714,190 24,576 142,444 5.80 29 06 
Total 15,715,768 968,640 6,254,126 6.46 16.22 
Source; Toyo jijo kenkyukai, Idto soran (General Information of Eastern Hebei) (Tokyo, 1936). 
about 16 mu land which was not large enough to support a family with 6.46 members. 
It is difficult to determine how many people in Eastern Hebei lived on fanning, 
because as in today's China, many rural people had more than one occupatiorL A 
farmer might also work as craftsman and do business as a merchant At the same time. 
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it is also difiScuIt to decide if a rural household belonged to agricultural, commercial, 
industrial or other occupational categories because fanners, merchants and industrial 
workers might live in the same household. In 1936, the Japanese investigators tried to 
find how many households engaged in different industries. Their findings are shown in 
Table 2-5. 
Table 2-5, Percentage of households according to occupation division, 1936 
County Agriculture Commerce Industry Others 
Baodi 97.36% 
Zunhua 93.18 2.89% 1.64% 2.29% 
Miyun 90.21 
Pin^ju 88.39 
Ninghe 69.04 2.14 26.67 2.15 
Changli 63.34 
Jflanghe 61.89 2.07 18.35 17.69 
Fengrun 60.61 9.90 11.40 18.10 
Leting 39.01 13.67 1.68 45.61 
Funing 33.17 8.91 4.46 53.46 
• Linyu 26.18 24.45 31.21 18.16 
Source; Mantetsu, Report on the Investigation of General Conditions of the Sixteen Counties in Eastern 
Hebei, see "land and population" section for each county. 
The Japanese investigators did not tell us what criterion they used to divide the 
households into the four professional categories. But, it is obvious that in the three most 
eastern located counties (Leting, Funing and Linyu), more people engaged in non-
farming work than in agriculture. This might be related with their nearness to 
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Manchuria or found jobs in the port city. Precarious agricultural conditions and low 
land productivity were the main reasons that so much peasants had to find non-farming 
works in Eastern Hebei. 
Compared with other parts of north China, Eastern Hebei had a shorter growing 
season (about 180 days) and the index of double-cropping was very low (116.3 in 
Eastern Hebei, 139.3 in central Hebei and 143.7 in southern Hebei). Although it was 
located in the winter wheat-kaoling region according to John L. Buck's division,^ 
winter wheat had little importance in peasants' cropping portfolios. The main crops in 
this area were sorghum, maize, millet and beans. According to statistics for 1939, the 
cropping distribution of Eastern Hebei was arranged as follows (see Table 2-6). 
Besides the main grain crops. Eastern Hebei also produced some cash crops, 
such as cotton, peanut and sesame. Under the traditional farming technology and often 
re-occurring natural disasters, the land productivity was low. According to the same 
statistics made in 1939, the total production of the main grain crops (sorghum, maize, 
millet and beans) in Eastern Hebei was 7,523,148 shiP In 1939, the total population in 
Eastem Hebei was 7,164,208.""^ On average, each person only had about one shi 
unprocessed grain. No matter how many kilograms a shi contains, it is obvious that one 
shi was far short to sustain an individual life. 
^ John L. Buck, Land Utilization in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), 27. 
^ Wei Hongyun, ed.. Investigation and Research on Eastem Hebei Village, 159, Table 18. 
Shin-min-kai, Kito chiku fusoku ryokoku chosaf^  (Investigation of Grain Shortage in Eastem Hebei) 
(Beijing, 1939). 
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Table 2-6, Percentage of main crops planted in Eastern Hebei, 1939 
County Sorghum Maize MiUet Beans Total 
Luan 31.85% 18.69% 15.57% 8.80% 74.91% 
Fengrun 24.15 23.99 22.20 15.73 86.07 
Tong 13.27 45.39 17.44 11.05 87.15 
Changii 37.67 14.87 9.71 15.21 77.46 
Leting 59.62 8.17 14.74 5.17 87.70 
Qian-an 27.01 5.64 29.14 17.29 79.08 
Zunhua 2.58 31.01 28.07 4.13 65.79 
Baodi 68.68 11.12 6.62 8.63 95.05 
ri 2.34 11.16 43.54 21.63 78.67 
Yutian 51.84 14.90 8.25 9.74 84.73 
Funing 34.60 4.46 28.71 3.57 71.34 
Linyu 21.51 8.43 18.94 11.82 60.70 
Ninghe 82.06 0.72 0.18 0.24 83.20 
N/Gyun 5.18 5.63 58.66 1.04 70.51 
Sanhe 14.92 31.43 34.24 4.66 85.25 
Lulong 24.04 10.90 19.36 13.68 67.98 
Shunyi 14.99 4.03 20.16 19.73 58.91 
Xianghe 22.18 45.90 22.42 6.70 97.20 
Pinggu 16.16 14.58 24.21 4.17 59.12 
Changping 23.47 30.48 30.64 7.98 92.57 
Huairou 15.27 16.23 23.23 11.96 66.69 
Xinglong 6.22 56.75 25.76 8.69 97.42 
Average 31.15 17.61 20.29 11.04 80.09 
Source: Wei Hongyun, ed.. Investigation and Research on Eastern Hebei Villages, 158, Table 17, re-
edited by the author. 
Table 2-7 clearly shows that Eastern Hebei was a grain shortage area. Among 
the 22 Eastern Hebei counties, only Luan and Ji had a little grain surplus after their own 
consumption. The other twenty counties had to import grain from other areas. On 
average, about 29 percent of the grain consumed in Eastern Hebei was imported. 
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Table 2-7, Grain production, consumption and shortage in Eastern Hebei 
1938-1939 (unit: ton) 
County Production Consumption Shortage(-) or surplus (+) Percentage of shortage 
Linyu 9,900 28,000 -18.100 -64.64% 
Funing 33,100 43,100 -10,000 -23.20 
Changii 42,970 45,200 -2,230 -4.93 
Qian-an 10,900 24,500 -13,600 -55.51 
LuJong 4,650 7,750 o o 
'7 
-40.00 
Luan 56,500 55,100 +1,400 +2.54 
Leting 13,300 19,200 -5,900 -30.73 
Fengrun 82,600 100,600 -18,000 -17.89 
Ninghe 3,300 47,000 -43,700 -92.98 
Yutian 24,200 29,400 -5,200 -17.69 
Zunhua 24,700 34,900 -10,200 -29.23 
Ji 18,400 17,600 +800 +4.55 
Xinglong 1,750 2,920 -1,170 -40.07 
Sanhe 9,200 13,900 -4,700 -33.81 
Pinggu 2,500 3,700 -1,200 -32.43 
Tong 25,680 31,300 -5,620 -17.96 
Baodi 14,300 25,500 -11,200 -43.92 
?Ganghe 14,300 17,800 -3,500 -19.66 
Shunyi 11,600 18,200 -6,600 -36.26 
Huairou 6,200 12,700 -6,500 -51.18 
Miyun 12,100 15,600 -3,500 -22.44 
Changping 19,360 24,000 -4,640 -19.33 
total 441,510 617,970 -176,460 -28.55 
Source; Shin-min-kai, Investigation of Grain Shortage in Eastern Hebei. 
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Are the local governmental statistics reliable? The field survey materials 
gathered by the Japanese will be used to check the governmental statistics. Compared 
with village level information, it is easy to find that the percentage of main crops of the 
governmental statistics is correct but the statistics of grain production is a little low (see 
Table 2-8 and Table 2-9). 
Table 2-8, Percentage of main crops in six Eastern Hebei villages, 1936 
Village, County Sorghum Maize Millet Beans Total 
Lujiazhai, Zunhua 32.60% 10.80% 25.30% 6.00% 74.70% 
Xiaoying, Miyun 20.00 10.20 30.00 10.00 70.20 
Houyansi, Xianghe 7.00 50.00 15.00 15.00 87.00 
Xiaoxinzhai, Pinggu 17.00 14.10 44.00 15.30 90.40 
Huzhuang, Pinggu 25.00 16.67 25.00 8.33 75.00 
Jigezhtiang, Ji 48.90 13.20 6.00 8.20 76.30 
-Average 25.08 19.16 24.22 10.47 78.93 
Source: Japanese investigation materials, see report on each village. I use the information of the Western 
part of Lujiazhai to represent ±e entire village. 
In the seven surveyed villages, the total main grain (including sorghum, maize, 
millet and beans) production was 2,369,970jin or 1,184,985.5 kg. Excluding 10 
percent of the production as seed and feed for domestic animals, on average, each 
person had about 283.89jin or 142 kg of grain for a year. Of course, even this 
per-capita grain holding which is much higher than the governmental statistics but not 
enough to keep one from starvation. Thus, even in the villages, the population had to 
buy some foodstuffs for consumption. In fact, for a long time. Eastern Hebei imported 
grain firom Manchuria or other parts of China. For example, in 1931, the Lulong 
Gazetteer recorded that "the harvest [of one year] is only six-tenth of what people 
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Table 2-9, Grain production and per-capita share in seven Eastern Hebei villages 
1936 (unit: jin) 
Village, County Population Production Seed and feed Grain per-capita 
Lujiazhai 1,171 297,045 2,974 251.13 
^Qaoying, Miyun 927 436,000 43,600 423.30 
Houyansi, ?Qanghe 1,809 580,500 58,050 288.81 
Jigezhuang, Ji 658 184,620 18,462 252.52 
Xiaoxinzhai, Pinggu 890 368,400 36,840 372.54 
Huzhuang, Pinggu 1,170 228,500 22,850 175.77 
Xiaojie, Tong 983 274,905 27,491 251.69 
Total 7,608 2,369,970 210,267 283.87 
Source: Japanese investigation materials, see the report on each villages. I convert the grain unit from 
dou or dan to jin according to each village's weight equality. If the source material did not explain the 
weight of the local dou, I assume 1 dou contains 20 Jin. 
Note; The figures for Xiaojin village were for the year of 1935. 
consumed, the other part of the foodstuffs is imported from other provinces."^ We can 
find similar records in other Eastern Hebei county gazetters. 
As a grain shortage region. Eastern Hebei had to produce non-grain products, 
such as cotton, peanut and fruits, as exports to balance its trading with other parts of 
China. But one should not exaggerate the importance of cash crops in Eastern Hebei 
peasants' planting portfolios and their effects on peasants' social and economic 
structure.*^ 
" Lulong xianzhi (Lulong Gazeneer) (1931), vol. 10. 
^ As Loren Brandt pointed out, Philip Huang exaggerated the dififerentiation of productivity between the 
managerial farmers and petty peasants. Huang argued that cash crop planting stimulated the 
commercialization of agricultural production and the polarization of the peasant class. 
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Cash crop planting in Eastern Hebei 
As a production and consuming unit, the peasant family was always trying to 
produce all they needed on their small farms. It is no surprise to find that besides the 
main crops, the peasants also produced cotton, sesame, peanut and other non-grain 
crops for their own consumption. Part of these crops were sold to the outside markets. 
In the period under investigation (1870-1937), as transportation was improved and new 
seeds were introduced, the percentage of land devoted to cash crop cultivation may 
have increase a little compared with that in the former decades. 
In the nineteenth century, native cotton had already been planted in Eastern 
Hebei. In Leting and Sanhe counties, cotton and cotton products (cloth and thread) 
were exported to Manchuria and Jehol. But the spread of American-seed cotton 
planting in Eastern Hebei was the development of the twentieth century. According to 
the investigation in Donghongyapo village, Fengrun county, the peasants began to plant 
cotton in the late Qing period (after 1895). At that time, the government announced the 
prohibition on the planting of poppy—^the most important cash crop in the nineteenth 
century—and foreign missionaries brought and spread American cotton seed to the 
peasants there. The former poppy land was transformed to cotton land." The Custom 
Officials at Tianjin noticed this change in land use in their report. "The outstanding 
feature of the export trade is the great advance made in the shipments of raw cotton 
Mantetsu, BCito chiku noson jittai chosaban, Kito chiku nai nijugo noon jittai chosa hokokusho (Report 
on the investigation of actual conditions in 25 villages in Eastern Hebei) (here after cited as Mantetsu, 
Report on the 25 villages in Eastern Hebei), 2:47. 
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during the year 1910 and 1911,... but the increased production is mainly due to the 
substitution of cotton for poppy cultivation since the prohibition of the later. Ten 
years later, the Custom officials reported again, "cotton cultivation received a 
considerable impetus in recent years owing to the development of the spinning industry 
in North China and the demand for raw cotton in Japan and elsewhere. As the profit to 
be derived from cotton-growing is nearly double that realized by raising Kaoling 
[sorghum] or wheat, the people are more and more taking to cotton cultivation."^' By 
the early 1930s, three cotton growing areas were developed in Hebei. According to the 
same Custom report, "cotton produced in Hepeh [Hebei] may be classified into three 
kinds according to its districts of production, viz., Hsiho [Xihe, or West River in central 
and southern Hebei], Yuho [Yuhe, or Royal River, which means the Grand Canal] and 
Tungpeiho [Dongbeihe, or Northeastern River, which means Jiyun and Luan Rivers in 
Eastern Hebei], among which the Hsiho varity predominates both in quantity and in 
quality."'® 
Compared with the conditions in central and southern Hebei, the soil and 
climate in Eastern Hebei were not favorable for cotton growing. Besides the short 
growing season, the main obstacles to cotton planting in Eastern Hebei were high 
saline-alkali in the soil and waterlogging in the summer. Although cotton could bring 
high profit for the cultivators, its planting still had little importance in peasants' 
^ C.I.M.C., Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 200. 
ClMXl.., Decennial Reports, 1912-21, 154. 
C.IM.C., Decennial Reports, 1922-31, .353. 
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cropping portfolios. Table 2-10 shows that in 1936, only about 6.56 percent of the total 
land was devoted to cotton growing—^the real percentage should be a little lower 
because some grain crops were interpianted, the total planting mu should be bigger than 
the total land mu. In the twenty-two counties, Pinggu, Fengrun, Lulong, Qian-an and 
Zunhua devoted more than 10 percent of its cultivable land to cotton planting, the 
figures for the later three counties were questionable because all of them located along 
the Great Wall, the land was poor and not fitted for cotton growing. In fact, the 1930s 
investigation materials also showed that only Pinggu and Fengrun were important 
counties for cotton production in Eastern Hebei. But even in Fengrun, cotton planting 
was limited to the southern part of the county."'' Table 2-11 shows the cotton acreage 
and yields in Fengrun county from 1930 to 1935. 
According to the interviews with the peasants made in Fengrun county, under 
the fair condition of precipitation, 100 jin of unginned cotton (seeded cotton, which 
could produce about 30 jin of ginned cotton) was the normal yield per mu. As the soil 
was fertile in Fengrun county and the peasants could buy pig hair and bean-cakes for 
use as fertilizers there, thus, the yield per mu was a little higher than that in other 
Eastern Hebei counties. 
Cotton planting did bring higher returns compared with other crops, but planting 
was mainly determined by the ecological conditions, not by the preference of the 
In Fengrun county, cotton was produced in the area south of the Beining Railway line. Xuanzhuang 
was the producing center, the peasants there could use the water in Xi River to irripte the cotton land. 
Mantetsu, Chosabu, Kita shina menka chosa shiryo (Investigation materials on cotton production in north 
China), 47. 
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Table 2-10, Mu of cotton land and its percentage in the total cultivable land 
in Eastern Hebei, 1936 
County Total land (mu) Cotton land (mu) Percentage 
Tong 1,089,799 36,051 3.31% 
Zunhua 298,710 37,216 12.46 
Ji 1,057,125 11,419 1.08 
Miyun 278,430 8,974 3.22 
Yutian 554,002 29,421 5.31 
Sanhe 745,420 34,615 4.64 
Shunyi 591,886 2,660 0.45 
Pinggu 211,473 31,497 14.89 
Huairou 150,000 1,443 0.96 
Xingiong 47,260 792 1.68 
Luan 2,097,886 169,002 8.06 
Fengrun 1,579,584 207,473 13.13 
Linyu 197,026 1,982 1.01 
Changli 1,553,443 68,632 4.42 
Funing 366,550 71,450 19.49 
Leting 636,607 43,850 6.89 
Qian-an 500,000 61,428 12.29 
Lulong 224,919 61,238 27.23 
Baodi 1,585,600 74,340 4.69 
Changping 635,858 4,362 0.69 
Ninghe 600,000 42,205 7.03 
Xianghe 714,190 31,078 4.35 
Total 15,715,768 1,031,128 6.56 
Source; About the total land mu, see Table 2-4 in this study. About the cotton land mu, see Hebei sheng 
mianchan gaijin hui, ed., Hebei sheng mianchan diaocha baogao, 1936 (Report on the Investigation of 
Cotton Production in Hebei, 1936). 
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Table 2-11, Cotton planting and yield in Fengrun county, 1930-1935 
Year Acreage (mu) Yield (ginned cotton, Jin) 
1930 65,000 1,060,000 
1931 70,000 1,627,000 
1932 180,000 10,080,000 
1933 193,480 9,725,900 
1934 214,800 3,800,000 
1935 212,000 5,500,000 
Source; Mantetsu, Investigation Materials on Cotton Production in North China, 48-52. 
Note: The yields for the years from 1930 to 1934 are questionable, they were cited from Chinese Cotton-
mill Owners Association's estimates, but the acreage and yield for 1935 are reliable, they were derived 
from the Japanese investigators' field study. 
cultivators. In other words, the peasants had few choices in their crop-planting. The 
cases in Longwo and other villages will show how the location and soil conditions, not 
the peasants' preferences, determined the cropping portfolio in Yutian county. 
In the initial investigation in 1936, Longwo and its neighboring six villages were 
chosen as the representatives of cotton planting and cloth weaving villages in Eastern 
Hebei. Longwo, located near the market town of Woluoku, suffered little flood 
disaster. Xiaowangzhuang, Oongxiaochenzhuang, Xixiaochenzhuang, 
Xiaojiangzhuang, Mengxinzhuang and Zhimafeng are located \2 Ii northeast of 
Longwo. Because these six villages were located a little lower and often faced the 
threat of waterlogging, the peasants there planted less or no cotton, most of the land was 
devoted to water-resistant sorghum planting. Table 2-12 shows the percentage of land 
devoted to different crops in the peasants' cropping portfolio. 
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Table 2-12, Percentage of different crops in seven villages in Yutian county 
Village Cotton Sorghum Soybean Wheat Others 
Longwo 54.20% 28.50% 8.60% 8.60% 
TGaowangzhuang 13.50 59.20 14.30 8.60% 4.30 
Dongxiaochenzhuang 25.60 51.20 10.30 12.80 
Xixiaoxhenzhuang 25.70 57.10 14.30 2.90 
Xiaojiangzfauang 14.20 65.50 10.20 10.20 
Mengxinzhuang 16.00 49.50 6.90 13.80 13.80 
Zhimageng 65.80 8.10 16.10 10.00 
Average 20.40 52.70 10.20 8.30 8.40 
Source; Mantetsu, Report on the 25 villages in Eastern Hebei, 2:21. 
As Table 2-12 shows, in Longwo village, more than half of the cropping land 
was devoted to cotton planting, but in the nearby Zhimafeng village, no cotton was 
planted at all. The investigators also found that the price for cotton growing land was 
twice that for the land which could only plant sorghum. Generally, the cotton growing 
land was not leased out to the tenants but cultivated by the land owners."" All these 
facts contradict Philip Huang's argument that the poorer peasants had a less well-
balanced cropping patterns." 
Besides cotton, peanut and fruits were exported from Eastern Hebei. The 
nearby big cities (Beijing, Tianjin and Tangshan) and Manchuria provided a good 
maricet for these products. According to one investigation made in the early 1930s, in 
Mantetsu, Report on the 25 Villages in Eastern Hebei, 2: 26. 
Philip Huang's argument was that the poorer peasants devoted too much or too little land to cash crops 
than the managerial iarmers did. In Huang's view, it was the &nners, not the natural condition, that 
determined what should be planted on the limited land. See Huang, The Peasant Economy, 161-165. 
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the Beijing market, most of the peanuts sold there came from the surrounding counties. 
Shunyi was the number one among these providers/^ 
After Qinghuangdao was opened to foreign trade in 1990, peanuts were 
exported from there to Manchuria and foreign countries. The Custom Officials 
reported that "from the statistics published in the Annual Reports, it will be seen that 
the export of groundnuts was greatly affected by the European War [the first World 
War], dropping to 3,572 piculs in 1916 , which is about one-tenth of what was exported 
in 1915.... The closing of the European market during the war did not, however, 
impede its growing, the farmers easily finding a market in Manchuria for their produce 
after meeting the demand for oil-pressing locally. The groundnuts grown in the 
Lwanhsien district [Luan county] are claimed as being superior to those produced in any 
other district; the crop for 1921 is estimated at 140,000 piculs or 40 percent increase 
on the pre-war crops. 
Historically, the mountain areas along the Great Wall in the northern part of 
Eastern Hebei produced many kinds of nuts and fresh fruits, such as walnuts, chestnuts, 
pear, peaches and apples. Sometimes the merchants of Tianjin went to the producing 
area personally or sent their representatives there to buy fruits. In the archives of 
Jianjin Chamber of Conmierce, a merchant complained that he was over-charged by the 
tax collectors when he was buying pears in Qian-an county. Among nut and fruit 
" Feng Hefe, ed., Zhongguo jingji Ivnwen ji OE(.esearch on Chinese Economy), 276-277. 
c.i.m.c., Decennial Reports, 1912-21, 124. 
^ Tianjin dang-an guan, ed., Tumjin Shanghai dang-an huibian (Archive materials of Tianjin Chamber of 
Commerce) (Tianjin: Hanjin renmin, 1989-1996), I: 1480. 
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producing counties in Eastern Hebei, Changii was famous for its pears and apples. Once 
again, the Qinhuangdao Custom Reports provide a contemporary observation; "with 
the exception of the above [walnuts, pears and strawberries produced near 
Qinghuangdao], practically all the fruit brought to the port for sale locally or for 
exportation comes from the Changii Hills and vicinity The Changii pears are of 
several kinds, some of which are very good. They are the fruit most exported from 
here, large quantities being sent away every year by steamer. Two decades later, the 
Customs Officials at Qinhuangdao reported again: 
The most important development around Changii has been the great increase in &uit 
orchards. It is claimed by those who have watched this development that the friut 
industry of Changii has developed during the past half century. Until recently, however, 
most of the fruit was grown on hillside terraces or other poor land. In the past five years 
many young orchards have been set on good farmland, an indication that the income 
from fruit is suflScient to justify giving up grainland for fruit.^* 
It is true that new orchards were developed and fmit products were increased in 
the twentieth century, but as in cotton production, one should not exaggerate this new 
development and its importance in the regional economy. Until the 1930s, for most 
peasants, fhiit production was a sideline business, the fruit trees were grown on the 
mountain sides or on the borders of grain fields. The few fhiit orchards were located in 
the hillsides or poorly terraced land. Both Zhongliangshan and Qianlianggezhuang in 
Changii county, two villages the Japanese investigators chose as fhiit producing 
representatives, and Philip Huang labeled them as "highly commercialized villages," 
C1}A.C., Decemial Reports, 1902-11, 165. 
C.I.M.C., Decennial Reports, 1922-31, 328. 
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were located in the Changli Hills. In Houjiaying, another Japanese investigated village 
in Changli county, fruit production was so unimportant that the investigators did not 
mention it in their reports. Compared with cotton production, operating fruit orchards 
was an isolated phenomena or sideline production in Eastern Hebei. There was no 
"specialized fruit-producing family" at that time.''' 
Grain production could not meet their own consimiption, cash crops had little 
importance in their cropping portfolio and could not be expected to meet the cash needs 
for grain buying. How could the peasants in Eastern Hebei manage to make a living in 
such a situation? The Custom Officials in Tianjin noticed that no matter whether the 
family farm was large or small, all faraiers could not make a living on farming alone. 
The average yearly receipts of Arming &inily working on a land less than 50 mou [mu] 
are S271; over 50 mou, $417, and over 100 mou, $779; while their respective estimated 
expenditure is $302, $468, and S870, leaving a deficit to them in each and every case. 
They had to eke out their living by undertaking a secondary or side industry, such as 
hand-weaving, braiding, fbwl-&rming, stock-raising, bee-keeping and silkworm-
breeding, which bring them a little surplus profit, after making up the deficit, of say $28, 
$20, and $7 for each family, in the ^ove order. From this it may also be deduced the 
greater that the area of land worked the less the profit gained. This paradox lies in the 
feet that fermers working on larger traas of land are oftentimes called on to pay more 
taxes than those on smaller ones and that their expenditure for the maintenance of the 
ferm and cost of living is fer higher.'"' 
The figures given by the Custom Officials might be unreliable, but their 
observation that farming alone could not support a family is accurate for Eastem Hebei. 
As the above analysis shows, the natural condition (soil and climate) was not favorable 
"Specialized [cash crop production] family" is a new name for those who produce one or two cash 
crops, such as cotton or fruit, for the market in the 1980s and 1990s. For these faniilies, the income from 
cash crops are more important than that from grain productions. 
c.i.m.c., Decennial Reports, 1922-31, 354. 
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for agricultural production in Eastern Hebei. As population increased and the land-man 
ratio deteriorated. Eastern Hebei had to depend on more imported grain to keep its 
people from starvation.'" Rural industry and working outside the village were more 
important for the peasant economy in Eastern Hebei than in other parts of north China. 
To understand this importance, agricultural production and fanning return will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
After the land reform and collectivizadon in the 19S0s, large scale water conservancy and land-leveling 
projects changed the agricultural topography of Eastern Hebei, rice, wheat and com instead of sorghum, 
millet and beans became the main crops there. In the 1990s, some former grain shortage counties began to 
export rice and other products. 
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CHAPTER 3. LITTLE RETURN FROM THE LAND; 
INVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURE 
In discussing the peasant economy in north China, Philip Huang pointed out that 
as the population increased, peasants put more and more labor into the limited land. 
The result was that although the total production increased, the production of labor, also 
considered as marginal returns by some, was decreasing. He called this phenomena of 
increasing output and decreasing labor productivity as "agricultural involution."' His 
research focused on the managerial farms and he concluded that the managerial farms 
had a higher level of output per labor day than the family farms did.' But in north 
China villages, less than 5 percent of households could be called managerial farms and 
they farmed less than twenty percent of the total farming land. To evaluate the 
productivity of agriculture, all the farming classes, not only the managerial farmers, but 
also landlords, owner-peasants, owner-tenants and tenants require consideration. This 
chapter will argue that as a business, farming brought little return on the capital 
investment and labor input. But, as peasants had few alternatives, they still worked on 
the land and managed to make a living by a combination of farming and other sideline 
production. 
' Huang, The Peasant Economy, Chapter 1. 
^ Ibid., .9. 
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Land distnbution and tenancy in Eastern Hebei 
As table 2-4 shows, on average, a household had 16.22 mu of land, which was 
too small to support a family of six to seven persons. This situation of too little land for 
too many people was made worse by the unequal land distribution among the farming 
households. For more than one thousand years, Chinese peasants struggled to get and 
keep their own lands. The periodic peasant rebellions, such as the Li Zicheng Rebellion 
in the late Ming and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) in the late Qing, were both 
related to land problems. It is true that compared with the situation in south China, 
especially with that in the Yangtze Delta, there were more owner-cultivators and fewer 
tenants in north China. But this is not to say that the land was more equally distributed 
among the cultivators. 
The governmental statistics might overlook the inequality of landownership 
distribution in Eastern Hebei. According to Hebei provincial governmental statistics 
(see Table 3-1), in the early 1930s, there were few landlords and tenants in four Eastern 
Table 3-1, Percentage of households according to landownership 
in four Eastern Hebei counties, 1930s 
County Landlord Owner-peasant Owner-tenant Tenant 
Sanhe 90.00% 8.00% 2.00% 
Baodi 5.00% 55.00 20.00 20.00 
Shunyi 0.19 66.90 30.00 2.90 
Pinggu 80.00 10.00 10.00 
Average 1.62 72.53 17.18 8.67 
Source: Wei Hongyun, ed.. Investigation and Research on Eastern Hebei Villages, 142, Table 2. 
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Hebei counties. Totally, more than 70 percent of the farming families worked on their 
own lands as owner-peasants. This data gives the impression that land was more or less 
equally distributed among the farming households. But if a close look at the village 
level is made, the governmental data is questionable. In their village investigations 
made in the 1930s, the Japanese investigators paid special attention to the question of 
landownership and farm scales. Their findings make it possible to reconstruct the 
picture of land distribution in Eastern Hebei. Table 3-2 shows the percentage of owner-
peasant, tenant and part-tenant, and year-laborer families in the investigated villages. 
Among the twenty investigated villages, in only nine villages are the owner-peasant 
households more than the non-owner-farming households. On average, more than half 
of the households had to work either as tenants at least part of the time or as farming 
laborers to support their families. 
To arrive at a more accurate information about the land ownership distribution. 
Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 list the percentage of households and the percentage of land 
holding according to how much land each household held. These tables show that on 
average, about 10 percent of the households which had more than 30 mu of land could 
be called rich peasants or landlords, totally, they held nearly 60 percent of the total 
cultivable land. About 20 percent of the households were small peasants who held 10 
to 30 mu each, as a group, they held about 30 percent of the total land. The other 
approximately 40 percent of the households which had less than 10 mu each totally 
held about 13 percent of the total land. The remaining 30 percent of the households 
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Table 3-2, Percentage of owners, tenant and part-tenant and year-laborers 
in twenty Eastern Hebei villages, 1930s and early 1940s 
Village and county Owner-peasant Tenant and part-tenant Year-laborer 
Huzhuang, Pinggu 89.00% 6.40% 4.60% 
Jiaojiazhuang, Fengrun 79.80 14.60 5.60 
Longwo, Yutian 75.00 21.40 3.60 
Zhongliangshan, Changli 69.10 26.40 4.50 
Zhimafeng, Yutian 67.10 3.90 28.90 
Jigezfauang, Ji 65.60 22.20 8.50 
Baizhuang, Leting 59.80 40.20 0 
Houjiaying, Changli 53.40 46.60 0 
Houyansi, Xianghe 51.00 38.20 10.80 
Dabeiguan, Pinggu 49.00 40.80 10.20 
Xiaoying, \Gyun 45.00 55.00 0 
Shajing, Shunyi 44.80 22.40 32.80 
Xiaowangzhuang, Yutian 41.30 32.90 25.80 
Qianlianggezfauang, Changli 39.30 43.80 16.90 
Donghongyapo, Fengrun 39.20 48.60 12.20 
Xiaojie, Tong 30.40 62.20 7.40 
Binggezhuang, Funing 29.20 70.80 0 
Huzhuang, Ninghe 25.90 61.60 13.00 
VGchang, Fengrun 14.90 71.50 13.60 
Heitingzhuang, Linyu 13.20 76.30 10.50 
Average 49.10 40.29 10.45 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on each village. Cited and re-edited from Huang, The Peasant Economy, 314-
320, Table A1-A7. 
were landless families in the villages, except a few households engaged in industry or 
commerce, most of them had to make a living as tenants or fanning laborers. 
Both Ramon Myers and Philip Huang agree that landownership was very 
unequally distributed in north China, but they disagree on the trend of land 
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Table 3-3, Percentage of households according to land holding 
in Eastern Hebei villages, 1936 
Village and county 30 mu and more 10-30 mu Less than 10 mu Landless 
Jigezhuang, Ji 10.16% 26.57% 28.91% 34.38% 
Huzhuang, Pinggu 7.33 28.91 52.75 11.01 
Jiaojiazhuang, Fengrun 8.67 32.14 41.33 17.86 
Lujiazhai, Zunhua 9.40 27.73 43.07 19.80 
Asuwei, Changping 15.68 35.30 25.49 23.53 
XIaoxinzhai, Pinggu 9.41 16.47 49.41 24.71 
Leijiazhuang, Luan 2.56 15.52 35.90 48.72 
Houyansi, lUanghe 17.19 71.07 30.93 7.81 
Longwo and others, Yutian 5.89 17.32 31.69 45.10 
Baizhuang, Leting 16.54 28.22 33.07 21.77 
Zhongliangshan, Changli 16.93 25.38 27.69 30.00 
donghongyapo, Fengrun 8.99 22.48 29.21 39.33 
Xiaoying, NCyun 14.87 14.36 34.87 35.90 
Wanggezhuang, Funing 6.66 20.00 63.33 10.00 
Huzhuang, Ninghe 23.38 33.76 6.50 36.36 
Binggezhuang, Funing 5.37 26.78 27.67 40.18 
Heitingzhuang, Linyu 6.74 15.73 15.73 61.80 
Total average 9.88 23.25 36.25 30.64 
Source: Nakanishi Isao, "Kahoku noson keizai no gaikyo: Kito chiku no tochi bunpai," Mantetsu chosa 
geppo, 18,4 (April 1938), 23. 
concentration or de-concentration in the modem period and its causes. Ramon Myers 
argued that in the twentieth century, as the money inflated and the real land price 
dropped, some poor peasants bought back their formerly mortgaged lands and the land 
ownership was more equally distributed in the 1930s than in the earlier decades.^ 
^ Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy, Chapter 14. 
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Table 3-4, Percentage of landholding according to how much land they held 
in Eastern Hebei villages, 1936 
Village, county 30 mu and more 10-30 mu Less than 10 niu 
Jigezhuang, Ji 51.85% 33.62% 14.53% 
Huzhuang, Pinggu 29.85 43.57 27.39 
Jiaojiazfauang, Fengnin 44.88 40.31 14.81 
Lujiazhai, Zunhua 52.43 33.88 13.69 
Xiaoxinzbai, Pinggu 67.40 18.40 14.20 
Leijiazhuang, Luan 36.56 34.49 28.95 
Houyansi, ^anghe 52.40 38.17 9.43 
Longwo and others, Yutian 47.30 35.88 16.82 
Baizhuang, Leting 52.83 35.06 12.12 
Zhongliangshan, Changli 63.57 28.83 7.60 
Donghongyapo, Fengrun 46.09 33.08 11.85 
Xiaoying, Miyun 76.23 13.81 9.87 
Wanggezhuang, Funing 56.30 22.96 20.74 
Huzhuang, Ninghe 74.32 23.82 1.86 
Binggezhuang, Funing 50.45 38.01 12.54 
Heitingzhuang, Linyu 83.32 12.43 4.25 
Total average 57.39 29.35 13.26 
Source: Nakanishi Isao, "Kafaoku noson keizai no gaikyo: kito chiku no tochi bunpai," Mantetsu chosa 
geppo, 18.4 (April 1938), 24. 
Philip Huang emphasized that under the development of commercialization of 
agriculture, few peasants profited from cash crop cultivation and increased their land 
holdings, but more small peasants failed in the cash crop planting because of its higher 
risk and thus lost part or all of their lands to become tenants or fanning laborers. The 
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result was the polarization of the rural classes."* Myers mainly drew his samples from 
the late 1930s and the 1940s. It was an unusual period because of war against the 
Japanese and the civil war, so the findings in this period should not be used to represent 
the trend in the twentieth century. Generally speaking, Philip Huang's argument of 
polarization might be right but the cause should not be solely placed on 
commercialization. Compared with the former decades, more and more households had 
less or no land holdings, the main reason was that of population growth without a 
corresponding increase in cultivable land. Under the equal division of family property 
among the male descendants, even without natural calamities and human disasters, the 
former landlords or rich peasants could become small peasants, even landless farming 
laborers, after several generations. Figure 3-1 shows the land holdings of a Zhang clan 
in Dabeiguan village, Pinggu county, which demonstrates the process of land division 
and concentration. 
As Figure 3-1 shows, the fourth branch of the Zhang clan (Zhang Chun's 
descendants) was prosperous in population. Zhang Chun might be glad to have so many 
grandsons and great-grandsons, but equal division of property among the male 
descendants left most of them with little land to live on, some of them had to leave the 
village to make a living in the outside world. Compared with the fourth branch, the 
third branch (Zhang Fang's descendants) was more prosperous in property than in 
descendants. Fewer brothers made it possible for them to keep the land under the 
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Figure 3-1, Equal division of land in the Zhang clan in Dabeiguan village, Pinggu county 
(Source; Mantetsu, Report on Dabeiguan, p. 10) 
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family head's management By the time of the Japanese investigation (1936), the two 
cousins of Zhang Cailou and Zhang Zhonglou were no. I and no.2 landlords in the 
village. Unquestionably, inheriting was the first fact in the determination of land 
holding in pre-1949 China, it had the same role in Eastern Hebei. 
Of course, there was land buying and selling in the villages. As Philip Huang 
pointed out, in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, some peasants "got rich 
by hard farming" and enlarged their farms. But, compared with other land-buyers, these 
new rich were few in number and their percentage of land bought in the land market 
was very low. It is true that commercialization did stimulate land buying and selling 
and gave impetus to the polarization of land holding in Eastern Hebei, but this 
commercialization was not the same as Philip Huang use of the term. In Huang's book, 
commercialization means "cash crop planting," especially cotton cultivation. Here, 
commercialization includes the development of commercial activity and development 
of rural industry. If fact, the non-farming income was the main source of capital supply 
in the land market (going to Manchuria to do business and the rise of new merchant-
landlords in Houjiaying village, Changli county, will be discussed in Chapter 5). Table 
3-5 shows the land buying by Liu Lihetang (Liu family cooperation, named Lihetang) in 
Kaiping town, Luan county. 
The Lius had no land before 1880, they accumulated their wealth probably by 
trading or office holding (Kaiping was a market town, after 1870, it developed fast as 
modem style coal mines were opened there). From 1880 on, they began to buy in land. 
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Table 3-5, Land buying by the Liu Lihetang, 1880-1922 
Year Buying cases Land bought (mu) Mu per case 
1880 n J 55.99 18.66 
1881-1885 16 482.06 30.13 
1886-1890 9 279.76 31.08 
1891-1895 69 940.57 13.03 
1896-1900 15 139.08 9.27 
1901-1905 49 1,080.46 22.05 
1906-1910 113 833.02 7.37 
I9II-1915 63 412.33 6.54 
1916-1920 82 747.24 9.11 
1921-1922 3 12.66 3.16 
Total 422 4,983.14 11.81 
Source: Li Vfeazid, ed.. Source Materials on Agricultural History, I: 199. 
They not only bought privately owned land (including bannerlands originally owned by 
individual bannermen), but also bought governmental wasteland {guanhuang) and 
governmental renting land {guanzhutian, which was leased to the tenants). As the 
compiler did not distinguish the private and governmental land in the source table, it is 
impossible to calculate the percentage of governmental land -which might be larger per 
piece but lower in price—in the total purchasing. But, close examination reveals that in 
the twentieth centurj' (except the first five years fi-om 1901 to 1905) the average size of 
each purchase was much smaller than that in the nineteenth century. This indicates that 
the land holding of the peasant family became smaller and smaller. This trend was 
expressed more clearly in the investigation material of Dabeiguan village, Pinggu 
county (see Table 3-6). 
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Table 3-6, Average landholding per household and percentage of 
owner-peasants in tree generations in Dabeiguan village 
Generation Decades Landholding (nnt) Owner-peasant Owner-tenant 
Grandpa's generation 1890s or before 119 
Father's generation 1910s 40 70% 30% 
Present generation 1930s 24 50% 50% 
Source: Mantetsu, Kho nosonjittai chosaban. Dcdniji kito noson jittai chosa hokokusho: tokeihen. Dai 
ichiban: Heikoku ken (Report on the Second Investigation of Actual Conditions on Eastern Hebei 
Villages; Statistical Volume. First Group: [Daiieiguan Village] Pinggu County) (here after cited as 
Mantestu, Report on Dabeiguan), 6-7. 
Assuming twenty years is a generation. Table 3-6 shows that in late nineteenth 
centuiy, the average land holding per household was more than 100 ma In the 1910s, 
the average land holding declined to about 40 mu. By the time of the Japanese 
investigation (1936), on average, each household only had 24 mu. The reason is 
simple; population growth without a proportionally increase in land. As more families 
owned too little or no land, they had to rent land from the few who had more land than 
they could farm. The result was that in the 1910s, about 70 percent of the total 
households were owner-farmers, but one generation later, only half of the households 
were classified as owner-farmers. 
The unequal distribution of landownership means that some households had too 
much and others had none or not enough land to cultivate for their family members. At 
the same time, the fragmented strips of land owned by a family also made it 
inconvenient and inefficient for the owner to farm. Eastern Hebei peasants solved these 
66 
problems by renting nearby land and leasing out the surplus or far-located land 
(especially those located in other villages). Through this renting in or leasing out 
tenancy, the farmed land was redistributed among the cultivators more rationally. 
Ramon Myers pointed out that; 
The land tenure system must be considered as a system to equalize land use by informal 
agreement. It fimctioned to enable peasants with little land to fenn and those who could 
not farm their land efficiently to earn income by leasing it. Because a peasant's &rm 
consisted of many small plots haphazardly located about the village, he found it 
advantageous to rem a nearby plot from another who found it too difficult or 
inconvenient to &rm. In many instances this meant poorer peasants rented inferior land, 
and the wealthier peasants &rmed their superior land more efficiently.^ 
It is true that many peasants in Eastern Hebei leased out or rented in lands (as 
table 3-2 shows, about 40 percent farming households in Eastern Hebei rented part or 
all of their farming lands), but Ramon Myers might exaggerate the farming land 
redistributing role of tenancy. In fact, tenancy could not "equalize land use" in pre-
1949 China. Table 3-7 shows the percentage of households according to how much 
land they farmed 
Comparing tables 3-3,3-4 and 3-7, it can been seen that through leasing and 
renting, farm land was a little more equally distributed among the farming households 
than the ownership was distributed. About 11 percent "large scale" farmers (each 
farmed 30 mu or more) farmed 43 percent of the total land, compared to about 10 
percent of the rich peasants (each owning 30 mu or more) who had 57 percent of the 
cultivable land. Due to population pressure, however, there was little land that could be 
' Ramon Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy, 48. 
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Table 3-7, Percentage of households and land farmed according 
to the size of farms 
30 mu and more 10-30 mu Less than 10 mu 
Village and county Household Land Household Land Household Land 
Jigezhuang, Ji 15.47% 51.85% 40.48% 33.62% 44.04% 14.53% 
Xiagezhuang, Pinggu 7.67 23.92 68.04 
Jiaojiazfauang, Fengrun 10.92 36.86 46.05 49.99 43.03 13.15 
Lujiazhai, Zunhua 11.45 45.19 40.35 40.47 48.20 14.34 
Asuwei, Changping 12.50 12.50 46.15 46.15 41.35 41.35 
Leijiazhuang, Luan 7.14 39.74 23.81 31.67 69.05 28.59 
Longwo and others, Yutian 9.18 37.43 32.14 42.16 58.67 20.41 
Baizfauang, Leting 20.69 57.20 39.08 31.12 40.23 11.67 
Zhongb'angshan, Changli 21.91 49.09 52.38 44.93 25.71 5.98 
Donghongyapo, Fengrun 15.39 40.95 46.15 44.44 28.47 14.61 
Xiaoying, Nfiyun 17.94 56.19 45.51 34.85 36.55 8.94 
Wanggezhuang, Funing 6.12 15.89 59.18 71.66 34.69 12.45 
Binggezhuang, Funing 8.70 27.03 54.34 56.58 36.96 16.39 
Balizfauag, Luan 4.05 18.27 20.23 40.21 75.72 41.51 
Tatal average 11.09 42.56 35.55 42.08 53.36 15.36 
Source; Nakanishi Isao, "Kahoku noson keizai no gaikyo: kito chiku no tochi bunpai," Mantetsu choso 
geppo, 18.4 (April 1938), 37.46. 
leased out to the famihes needing land, about half of the households still farmed less 
than 10 mu per family. Most of them were part- or full-tenants. 
In Eastem Hebei, the land was rented yearly. The poor people always 
approached the prospective landlord through a middle-man after the autumn harvesting 
but before the spring planting. The amount of rent was decided by the location and 
productivity of the land. Generally speaking, the rent was always 10 percent of the 
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contemporary value of the rented land*^ People rented land by oral agreement and there 
was few written contracts. 
There were three kinds of rent agreements or rent-paying styles. The first one 
was share-cropping, the harvest was shared by the landlord and the tenant They often 
divided the products equally. The second kind was fixed rent-in-kind, the amount of 
product paid as rent was decided when the rent agreement was reached. The last one 
was fixed-cash rent pajang. The tenant was required to pay part of the cash-rent before 
using the land and pay the rest after the harvesting. In the nineteenth century, as 
commerce was undeveloped, the share-cropping and fixed rent-in-kind were popular 
options. By the 1930s, fixed cash-rent paying became the main rent paying style. This 
was the result of commercialization and the insistence of the landlords. Fixed cash-rent 
paying made it possible for the landlords to have a fixed income regardless of the 
harvesting and the commercialization made it possible for the peasants to sell their 
products and for those who lived on cash-rent to buy what they needed at the markets. 
Was it worth working on the farms—regardless of whether one owned or rented 
the land? To answer this question, other investigation materials must be analyzed 
because the first Japanese investigation in 1936 for 25 villages included little 
® Beming tielu yeoman jingji diaocha baogao (Report of the Beining Elailway Economic Survey Team) 
(Beijing, 1936), 417; Mantetsu, Tenshin jimusho chosaka, Kita shim ni okeru mensakuchi noson jijo: 
kahokusei tonken chogcd son (Report on the conditions of cotton-growing area in north China; Xiaojie 
village, Tong county, Hefaei province) (here after cited as Mantetsu, Report on Xiaojie), 8-60. To support 
his argument that returns for managerial &rmers were much higher than what the landlords got from their 
leased lands, Philip Huang underestimated the returns on leased out lands. Yearly rent income was only 
about 5 percent of the land value in Michang village (Huang, The Peasant Economy, 173) should be 
regarded as an exception. 
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information about household income and expense. Before dealing with that problem, 
another element of agriculture will be discussed—^the working animals and the farming 
tools. 
Few working animals and simple farming tools in Eastern Hebei 
As about half of the peasants in Eastern Hebei farmed less than 10 mu of land, it 
is no surprise to learn that most of the farmers there raised no working ammals, such as 
horse, mule, donkey or ox. Table 3-8 gives the numbers of the households and working 
animals and households in nine Eastern Hebei villages. 
Table 3-8, Households and working animals in nine Eastern Hebei villages 
1935-1936 
Village and county Households Working animals Working animal/household 
Xiaoying, Miyun 199 121 0.61 
Jigezhuang, Ji 128 35 0.27 
Xiagezhuang, Pinggu 518 426 0.82 
XiaoxinzfaaL, Pinggu 170 65 0.38 
Huzhuang, Pinggu 218 133 0.61 
Longwo and others, Yutian 199 77.5 0.39 
Baizhuang, Leting 124 23 0.19 
Zhongiiangshan, Changli 130 27 0.21 
Xiaojie, Tong 131 45 0.34 
Total 1,817 952.5 0.52 
Source: Mantetsu, rqjort on each village. 
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The Japanese investigators selected Xiaoying village in Miyun county as a case 
study to show domestic animal raising in the peasant economy in Eastern Hebei. Table 
3-9 shows that in Xiaoying village, most landlords and owner-peasants raised one or 
more working animals, about half of the owner-tenants had one donkey or mule. Few 
tenants and tenant-laborers raised their own working animals. The reason for many 
peasants having no working animals was obvious; it was too expensive to buy and raise 
a working animal. According to the investigation, the prices for an ox, mule or donkey 
were 30-35 yuan, 35-65 yuan and 20-30 yuan respectively in 1936.^ Not including the 
labor cost, the feed (stalks and beans) for the animals for one year is shown in Table 3-
10. 
Table 3-9, Domestic animal raising in the farming households in Xiaoying village 
1936 
Farming group Households Land (mu) Working animals Pigs Mu/working animals 
Landlords 14 746 30 63 24.87 
Owner-peasants 10 434 19 36 22.87 
Owner-tenants 92 1,522 40.5 155 37.59 
Tenants 7 146 2 10 73.00 
Tenant-laborers 22 176 2.5 15 70.0 
Total 145 3,025 94 279 32.18 
Source; Mantetsu, Tenshin jimusho chosaka, Miyun ken shoeison xianghe ken houyanji noson chosa 
hokoku (Report On the Investigation of Actual Conditions of Xiaoying Village in Miyun County and 
Houyansi Village in Xianghe County) (here after cited as Mantetsu, Report on Xiaoying or Report on 
Houyansi), 106-107. 
' Mantetsu, Report on Xiaoying, 113-114. The price of a donkey was half of the price for a mule. 
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Table 3-10, Cost of working animal raising in Xiaoying village, 1936 
Working animai Beans Qin) Stalks Oin) Salt (jin) Total cost (yuan) 
Ox 200 5,000 13 34.30 
Mule 1,500 3,000 5 66.50 
Donkey 750 1,500 2.5 33.25 
Source: Maiaexsa, Report on Xiaoying, 108-110. 
Note; The cost for raising donkey was half of that for raising a muJe. 
What was the importance of domestic animal raising in the peasant economy? 
Philip Huang argued that there was little or no differentiation in animal use in 
managerial farming and family farming because those who raised no draft animals 
could share animals with those who raised or rented work-teams from others. The 
Japanese investigators found many reports of animal-sharing or renting in their 
investigations.' In Eastern Hebei, as in other parts of China, under the population 
pressure, there was neither public green land for animal grazing nor surplus grain for 
animal raising. Most farm work was done by human labor instead of animal labor. For 
example, the weeding work was done by men or women, using small hoes, instead of 
cultivation by animal power as in the Western World. The animal power was mostly 
used in plowing and transportation. Under this situation, even with half of the farming 
families raising no working animals, there was no animal power shortage in planting 
and harvesting. But, the ox, mule or donkey not only provided draft power, it also 
* Huang, The Peasant Economy, Chapter 8. 
' Mantetsu, Report on the 25 Villages in Eastern Hebei, especially on Baizhuang and Heitingzhuang. 
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contributed in fertilizer making in China. Philip Huang has already pointed out that 
"the other main benefit of maintaim'ng more farm animals was the added fertilizer they 
produced. As is well known, dung was generally mixed with earth and garbage (in a 
ratio of 3:7) to make compost"^" But he argued against Asachi Keiji's analysis that 
more animals raised in the managerial farms contributed to their higher land 
productivity because more compost was produced and spread on the land.'' Huang's 
evidence came from his calculation about how much land farmed by per um't of draft 
animal ("donkey equivalent" as he termed) for the managerial farms and that for the 
whole village. No matter how accurate his calculation was, his conclusion was 
questionable because he disregarded a simple fact: as animal dung was the main 
or only source for compost making, where did these small peasants who raised no 
animals get their fertilizer? In pre-1949 China, chemical fertilizer was out of the reach 
for the peasants in Eastern Hebei, only a small number of peasants in a few isolated 
villages could buy pig hair or bean-cake (the sideline products of bristle-processing and 
oil-pressing industry) as fertilizer. Michang village in Fengrun county was one of these 
lucky villages because it was near Hetou—a bristle processing and transportation 
center. Unfortunately, Philip Huang choose Michang as an example to demonstrate 
there was no differentiation in fertilizer use and land productivity between managerial 
farmers and small peasants. To demonstrate the relationship of land productivity and 
fertilizer use, new materials and more research are needed. 
Huang, The Peasant Economy, 147. 
" Ibid., 153. 
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Compared with the importance of animal raising and animal power use in 
agricultural productivity, farming tools had little or no effect on the peasant's economy 
in Eastern Hebei. In fact, only a few investigators in the 1930s included farming tools 
in their calculation of fanning expenses and incomes. The reason is that the farming 
tools were very primitive and they comprised very little of the peasants' total 
investment. Generally, the small peasants only had several simple tools which were 
necessary in farming but had little money cost For example, a poor peasant who 
fanned 6 mu in Yutian county had only a sickle, a pick and a hoe, the total value for 
these three tools was 0.65 yuan. The only farming tool for another poor peasant who 
farmed 3.6 mu was a sickle priced at 0.1 yuan. The reason is simple: for these small 
peasants who fanned less than 10 mu, it was not economical to buy a set of all kinds of 
farming tools. They could share or bonow tools from each other when planting or 
harvesting. Even for the managerial farmers, they also used the same simple farming 
tools and paid no attention to innovating their farming technology. Liu Jintan, a 
managerial farmer who had 110 mu of land and hired four year-laborers in Longwo 
village had 73 pieces of farming tools, the total value of which was 85.46 yuan. If the 
price of transportation equipment, grain containers, grain or cotton processing 
implements (i.e., a cart, 40 yuan; 30 grain bags, 16 yuan; a stone mill, 4 yuan and a 
cotton gin, 16 yuan) were excluded from the total value, the money value for the 40 
Mantetsu, Report on the 25 villages in Eastern Hebei, 35-38. 
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pieces of real fanning tools was 15.46 ynan. It was less than the price for 1 mu of 
land. 
Since there were few working animals, the fanning tools were primitive and 
simple, and there was no large scale cooperation, farming in Eastern Hebei in the 1930s 
had changed little from that in the nineteenth century or before, it was a continuation of 
traditional agriculture. The Custom officials at Tianjin observed that 
The agricultural methods have shown little advance on the primitive forms of centuries 
ago, and no modern machinery of any kind has been employed in cultivation. ... The 
only power employed, besides human labor, has been supph'ed by animals, and these, 
unfortunately, were commandeered on many occasions by the troops for military 
operations during the strifes which occurred in nearly every year of the decade [1920s]. 
The productivity of the land was thus reduced to a minimum. ^  
Agricultural calendar and labor supply 
Besides land, working am'mals and farming tools, human labor was the other 
important element in agricultural production. In Eastern Hebei, the growing season is 
only about 180 days, thus agricultural production is a seasonal activity, hi the long 
winter season, the earth is frozen and the farmers can do nothing in the fields. To 
determine if there was a labor shortage or surplus, the agricultural calendar and labor 
supply need an examination. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the main subsistent crops in Eastern Hebei were 
sorghum, maize, millet and beans. Besides the grain crops, in some villages, people 
also produced wheat, cotton and peanuts, mostly for the market. These were the main 
Ibid., 35-38. 
C.I.M.C., Decennial Reports, 1922-31, 352. 
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Table 3-11, Planting and harvesting schedules in Miyun and Linyu counties, 1930s 
VCyun county Linyu county 
Crops Planting Harvesting Planting Harvesting 
Sorghum 4/IS S/TS 9/15 loTlS 4/10 S/To 9/1 9  ^
MiUet 4/15 5/15 9/15 10/15 4/1 4/30 9/10 10/10 
Maize 4/15 5/15 8/15 9/15 4/1 5/20 9/1 9/20 
Beans 5/15 5/31 9/15 10/15 4/10 5/20 9/20 10/20 
Somce; Reportof the BeinmgRailway Economic Stirvey Team, A\9, 1659. 
Note; All b^inning and ending dates are approximate. 
cash crops in this area. Table 3-11 shows the planting and harvesting schedules of the 
main crops in two Eastern Hebei counties. 
As table 3-11 shows there is little difference in the schedules between the two 
counties. In reality, as a sub-region of north China, there was little timing difference in 
agricultural activities in the twenty-two counties. Almost all of the farmers in this area 
began to plant in April and ended harvesting in October (except for cotton). This 
uniformity eliminated the possibility of transitional working from one place to another 
in busy seasons. The field survey material showed that except for a few year-laborers 
who came from other counties, most of the day-laborers were hired from the same or 
nearby villages of the employers. 
Before discussing how much labor was needed to work on one mu of land, it is 
necessary to unify the labor and work units. According to the Beining Railway 
economic survey team's investigation, the local people regarded an adult male as a full 
laborer and the work completed by an adult male in one day as a labor-day-work. In the 
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Table 3-12, Labor-day needed to farm on 4 mu of land 
in Fengnm and Luan counties, 1930s 
ECinds of work Labor-day needed 





Transporting tlie harvest 4 
Threshing 4 
Total 27 
Source: Report of the Beirting Railway Economic Survey Team, 1360, 1431. 
1930s, in both Fengnm and Luan counties, peasants used four mu as a farming land unit 
for a laborer. They thought fanning on the four mu of land for the main crops needed 
the following work days (see Table 3-12). 
Table 3-12 shows that fanning four mu of land needed twenty-seven labor-days. 
Thus, working on one mu required 6.75 labor days. Theoretically, if a farm laborer 
worked 200 days a year, he could farm about 30 mu of land. But in fact, because the 
labor-need in agriculture was not equally distributed and the workable days were 
limited to specific activities such as planting, weeding and harvesting, the workable 
land for a farm laborer is less than 30 mu. In Lujiazhai village, Zunhua county, the 
villagers told the investigators that an adult male laborer could farm 10 mu of land. 
Mantetsu, Tenshin jimusho chosaka, Junka ken rolasai noson Jittai chosa hokoku (Report on the 
investigation of actual conditions of Lujiazhai village, Zunhua county), 164. 
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As about half of the farms in Eastern Hebei were less than 10 mu and almost all 
families had at least one adult male laborer, so most households had more labor than 
their family farming needed. But for the rich peasants, especially the landlords who had 
more than 50 mu of land, even though they hired year-laborers to live and work along 
with their family members, in the busy season, they still felt a shortage of labor. Figure 
3-2 shows the labor-day distribution for three kinds of production models in Michang 
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Figure 3-2, Labor-days distribution in Michang Village, Fengrun county 
(Source; Mantetus, Report on Michang for 1937) 
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As Figure 3-2 shows, the agricultural season began in March and the labor need 
increased as the spring planting began in April. In the three months of June, July and 
August, the peasants weeded and cultivated the sorghum, millet, maize, beans and 
cotton, the labor need still increased. The labor need reached its highest peak in 
harvesting time, September and October. In November, as the harvest ended and the 
winter came, little labor was needed in the field. The three months of the winter 
season—^December, January and February—saw little or no labor need as the earth was 
frozen. The chart also shows that for the tenants, the labor need was equally 
distributed. The highest labor need was in July but it was a little higher than twenty 
labor-days only, there was no need for them to hire help hands. The owner-tenants 
needed about sixty labor-days from May to October (the investigators did not explain 
why 90 labor-days were needed in August, I treat it as exceptional), if the family had 
two adult males, it might be enough for them to do the work. But if the family had only 
one adult male laborer, it had to hire month or day laborers in the busy months. The 
owner-peasants demanded more labor than their families could supply (assuming the 
family had two adult male laborers and could supply sixty labor-days each month), so 
most of them hired year-laborers to work on the land. As the labor need still increased 
from May to October, they sometimes hired day-laborers, especially in the harvesting 
season. In 1937, on average, the owner-peasants hired three year-laborers and one 
month-laborers, the owner-tenant employed one year laborer (0.7 year-laborer and 0.3 
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month-laborer), the tenants used no year- or month-laborer.Besides the above long-
term laborers, the owner-peasants, the owner-tenants and the tenants employed 72,27 
and 24 day-laborers (labor-days) respectively.'^ 
The above analysis supports a conclusion: in Eastern Hebei, the labor surplus or 
shortage was relative to different production groups. For the owner-j)easants, especially 
for the large-scale land owners, they had to employ outside laborers, such as year and 
month laborers, plus some day-laborers in the busiest months. For the tenants, because 
their farms were too small, although they some times also employed day-laborers (for 
labor exchange), they always felt there was not enough land to work on and they had to 
find outside employment for their surplus labor, especially in the slack season. In 
reality, in Eastern Hebei, the year-laborer could only work ten months in a year. They 
always were employed firom March to December (from fifteenth day of the first month 
to the fifteenth day of the eleventh month in the Chinese lunar calendar).The poor 
people had to find odd jobs in the winter to supplement their family income. 
Agricultural production: A cost and return analysis 
As a business, farming brought little or no return for the farmers. According to 
the Japanese investigation, after one year's hard work, for almost all peasants, the 
Mantetsu, Hokushi jimukyoku chosabu, Noka keizai chosa hokoku: Hojm ken sosochirt michangson 
(Report on the investigation of peasant household economy; Michang village, Fengrun county) (here after 
cited as Report on Michang for 1937 or Report onKiichangfor 1938), for 1937, p.3. 
"ibid., 70. 
Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 117. 
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Table 3-13, Farming cost and income in Michang village, 1937 
Peasant group Gross-income Production-cost Net-income 
Owner-peasant (7 households average) 1,172.74 754.69 418.05 
Owner-tenant (3 households average) 360.07 385.27 -25.21 
Tenant (4 households average) 124.77 169.91 -45.14 
Total (14 households average) 699.17 508.45 190.72 
Source; Mantetsu, Report on Michang for 1937, 27. 
harvest was not enough to support one's family. Table 3-13 shows how disappointing 
the fanning result was for the peasants in Michang village, Fengrun county. 
In Michang village, except the owner-peasants (most of them were landlords or 
rich peasants), the owner-tenants and the tenants (most of them were middle and poor 
peasants) got no return for working." In Xiaojie village, Tong county, the peasant got a 
little return from farming but it was far less than what the peasant needed for living. 
Table 3-14 shows the agricultural income and family expenses for eleven sample 
households. 
If farming did bring negative income for peasant families as Tables 3-13 and 3-
14 indicate, how could the peasant economy continue to run in such a negative 
situation? A close look at the investigators' calculations suggests that their analysis was 
questionable. They used the capitalist cost and return booking model to analyze 
Chinese peasant economy. By this method, they exaggerated the farming cost for the 
" Owner-peasant, owner-tenant and tenant were the terms used by the Japanese investigators. They called 
these who owned eighty percent or more of then* &nned lands as owner-peasants, those who owned less 
than twenty percent of their feimed lands as tenants, the rest were called owner-peasants. 
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Table 3-14, Agricultural income and family budget in Xiaojie village, 1935 
(um"t: yuan) 
Gross-&ming Total-farming Net-ferming Total Living Family 
Household income cost income income cost balance 
Household I 2,468.16 2,139.50 328.66 531.16 687.70 -156.54 
Household 2 801.49 567.37 234.12 234.12 257.78 -23.66 
Household 3 300.67 162.67 138.00 138.00 207.88 -69.88 
Household 4 205.02 232.63 -27.61 7.39 180.22 -172.83 
Household 5 183.72 118.86 64.86 64.86 176.61 -111.75 
Household 6 490.52 281.74 208.78 208.78 333.19 -124.41 
Household 7 263.56 215.72 47.84 47.84 195.16 -147.32 
Household 8 141.43 95.01 46.42 46.42 95.50 -49.08 
Household 9 184.80 95.46 89.34 89.34 90.80 -1.46 
Household 10 289.95 184.42 105.53 153.53 133.53 20.00 
Household 11 166.38 149.73 16.65 16.65 113.25 -96.60 
Total 5,495.70 4,243.11 1,252.59 1,538.09 2,471:62 -933.53 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on Xiaojie, 222-228. 
Note: "Total income" included net-farming income and non-farming income, such as remittance from 
outside employees and rent from leasing land. 
peasants. Table 3-15 shows how they calculated the production cost for the Michang 
peasants. In their calculation, the "farming cost" included the cost for fertilizer, feed 
for domestic animals, seeds, labor cost for draft animals, depreciation of fanning tools, 
paying for the hired laborers, rent and taxes. The percentage of these categories in the 
total cost is presented in Table 3-16. 
82 
Table 15, Farming cost in Michang village, 1937 (unit: yuan) 
Peasant group Farming-cost Family-labor-cost Total cost 
Owner-peasant (7 households average) 644.41 110.28 754.69 
Owner-tenant (3 households average) 239.52 145.76 385.27 
Tenant (4 households average) 93.96 75.95 169.91 
Total (14 households average) 400.37 108.07 508.45 
Source: Mantetsu, Report of Michang for 1937, 2-25. 
Table 3-16, Percentage of fertilizer, hired-labor, rent and taxes 
in fanning cost in Michang village, 1937 
Peasant group Fertilizer Hired-labor Rent Taxes Miscellaneous 
Owner-peasant 25.40% 50.90% 1.40% 8.90% 13.40% 
Owner-tenant 34.70 28.30 19.50 5.90 11.60 
Tenant 32.30 8.40 47.00 1.10 11.20 
Total-average 27.10 45.20 6.70 8.00 13.00 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on Michangfor 1937, 2-25. 
Note: As in Table 3-13, the ferming cost percentage were the average for the three peasant groups 
respectively. 
Table 3-16 shows that for all peasants, about thirty percent of the farming cost 
was spent for fertilizer, but the cost for hired-labor and rent were different for the three 
groups. For the owner-peasants, half of the farming cost was used to hire farming 
hands. For the tenants, the main cost was paying the rent. As most of these costs were 
paid in cash, there was no question about the farming cost, the problem lies in the 
"family-labor-cost" in Table 3-15. 
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According to the investigators, the family-Iabor-cost equaled the amount of 
calculated family adult male labor work-days multiplied by labor-day price (SO.45 in 
1937). Obviously, this was not the real cash paid to the family laborers but a "supposed 
labor cost". Table 3-17 shows the net-farming income after the family-labor-cost is 
deducted from the production cost 
Table 3-17, Net farming income after deducting "family-labor-cost" 
in Michang village, 1937 (unit: yuan) 
Peasant group Gross-farnimg-income Farming-cost Net-fanning-income 
Owner-peasant 1,172.74 644.41 528.33 
Owner-tenant 360.07 239.52 120.55 
Tenant 124.77 93.96 30.81 
Total average 699.17 400.37 298.80 
Source; Mantetsa, Report on Michang for 1937, 25. 
Comparing Table 3-17 with Table 3-13, we find the secret for peasant economy. 
This secret is that when engaging in agricultural production, most peasants (especially 
the owner-tenants and the tenants) did not calculate their family labor as a production 
cost. If they equated their family labor to cash cost according to market labor price as 
the Japanese investigators did, they would get a negative income for their year's work. 
In reality, under the population pressure, family labor was not worth the marketing 
labor price. As the famous Russian peasantologist A. V. Chayanov pointed out, 
peasants tend to think of their household's total labor input for the year as a single unit. 
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and of the year's harvest after production expenses as a single lump-sum labor product 
or net income.Philip Huang also realized that "it is difficult to assign a value to the 
family's own labor and to deduct that value from the year's net income to arrive at 
something akin to a net profit.""' 
Similarly, the total income and budget of Xiaojie village (Table 3-14) needs to 
be adjusted. In Xiaojie, about 95 percent of the living-cost was spent for food, clothing 
and heating, and spending on food alone composed 78 percent. This means there was 
little or no waste in the peasant's expenditures and it was impossible to reduce the 
living cost any further. The problem lies in the "total income". As the total income 
was determined by "net-agricultural-income", it should be re-checked. According to 
the investigators' explanation, the "net-agricultural-income" was the result of gross 
agricultural income deducted by farming cost which included the cost for seed, 
fertilizer, paying for hired labor, feeding for domestic am'mals, rent, taxes, cost for land 
use and interest on borrowed money. Because the borrowed money was not used for 
agricultural production, it should not be included in the farming cost. Also, in reality, 
there was no paying for land use if the land was owned by the farmers. After deducting 
the interest on borrowed money and cost for land use from the farming cost. Table 3-14 
could be adjusted as Table 3-18. 
Comparing Table 3-18 with Table 3-14, it is clear that although the cost for land 
use and interest on borrowed money were deducted from the farming cost, thus 
Cited from Huang, The Peasant Economy, 187. 
Ibid., 187-188. 
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Table 3-18, Adjusted agricultural income and family budget 
in Xiaojie village, 1935 (unit: yuan) 
Gross-agricultural Fanning Net-agricultural Total Living Family 
Household income cost income income cost balance 
Household I 2,468.16 1,263.00 1,205.16 1,407.66 687.70 719.96 
Household 2 801.49 466.87 334.62 334.62 257.78 6.84 
Household 3 300.67 145.67 155.00 155.00 207.88 -52.88 
Household 4 205.02 187.63 17.39 52.39 180.22 -127.83 
Household 5 183.72 82.86 100.86 100.86 176.61 -75.75 
Household 6 490.52 253.74 236.78 236.78 333.19 -96.41 
Household 7 263.56 187.72 75.84 75.84 195.16 -119.32 
Household 8 141.43 50.01 91.42 91.42 95.50 -4.08 
Household 9 184.80 93.46 91.34 91.34 90.80 0.54 
Household 10 289.95 180.42 109.53 157.53 133.53 24.00 
Household 11 166.38 129.73 36.65 36.65 113.25 -76.6-
Total 5,495.70 3,041.11 2,454.59 2,740.09 2,471.62 268.47 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on Xiaojie, 222-228. 
increasing the family net agricultural income, there was still seven households whose 
living expenses surpassed their total income. To find who had a negative balance and 
what caused these short incomes, the II households are divided into three groups as the 
Japanese investigators did for the sample households in Michang villages." Their 
average net agricultural incomes are presented in Table 3-19. 
Comparing Table 3-19 with Table 3-17, it is easy to find that the amount of 
peasant's net agricultural income was determined by how much land he owned. On 
average, the income of the owner-peasant was several times of that for the tenant. 
 ^About the criterion, see note 19 in this chapter. 
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Table 3-19, Average net agricultural income for 11 households in Xiaojie 
1935 (unit: yuan) 
Gross-agricultural Farming Net-agricultural 
Peasant group income cost income 
Owner-peasant (3 households average) 1,137.03 593.29 543.74 
Owner-tenant (5 households average) 280.97 159.94 121.03 
Tenant (3 households average) 226.59 153.84 72.75 
Total (11 households average) 499.61 276.46 223.15 
Source; Mantetsu, Report on Xiaojie, 222-228. 
To evaluate the returns for farming as a business, it is assumed that land was the 
only investment and net agricultural income was the only return for the year. Using 
those assumptions. Table 3-20 shows the results. 
The Japanese investigators did not explain how they calculated the land value, 
especially for the rented land, but the result of Table 3-20 is clear. For the owner-
peasant, the yearly income from farming (net agricultural income) was only about 
Table 3-20, Average returns of agricultural investment in Michang, 1937 
Land-^rmed Land-value Net-agri.-income Return from 
Peasant group (mu) (yuan) (yuan) investment 
Owner-peasant 72.72 4,606.42 528.33 11.47% 
Owner-tenant 26.73 921.02 120.55 13.09 
Tenant 13.15 263.50 30.81 11.69 
Total average 45.85 2,575.86 298.80 11.60 
Source: Maxx&sa, Report on Michang for 1937,4,6-1,22. 
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twelve percent of the land value. That means it was only a little higher than the income 
of rent if they leased the land to others (as noted earlier, the rent often was ten percent 
of the contemporary land value). To check this conclusion, the fanning return in 
Xiaojia village can also be examined (see Table 3-21). 
Table 3-21, Farming return for owner-peasant in Xiaojie, 1935 
Land-owned Land-value Net-agri.-income Return from 
Household (mu) (yuan) (yuan) investment 
Household 1 251 9,530 1,205.16 12.65% 
Household 8 16 580 91.42 15.76 
Total 267 10.110 1,296.58 12.82 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on Xiaojie, 204. 
Table 3-21 shows that the return for agricultural investment was about twelve 
percent of the land value for household 1 (a managerial farm as Philip Huang called), it 
was a little higher than the rent income—Household I leased 11 mu middle-grade land, 
the land value was 450 yuan, the rent was 52.50 yuan, or 11.67 percent of the land 
value^—but much less than the interest on the lending of money. In Hasten Hebei, the 
yearly interest on the lending money was always 20 percent or higher. The same 
household in Xiaojie (Household 1) borrowed 2000.00 yuan in an emergency (the 
household was robbed by bandits), the yearly interest was 20 percent At this time, it is 
difficult to know the return from investment in commerce or industry. But compared 
 ^Mantetsu, Report on Xiaojie, 204, 223. 
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with leasing land and lending money, farming brought less and uncertain returns for the 
farmers because the rent and interest was pre-fixed and had to be paid regardless of the 
natural or man-made disasters. 
If farming brought little return for the owner-peasants, it brought no return for 
the tenants except a little pay for their labor at a price much lower than the market 
price. The farming result of the four tenant households in Michang is summarized in 
Table 3-22. 
Table 3-22, Tenant farming returns in Michang, 1937 
Net-farming income Household-labor-days Worth-per-labor-day 
Household (yuan) (day) (yuan) 
Household 11 -7 184 -0.04 
Household 12 72 240 0.30 
Household 13 42 206 0.20 
Household 14 14 71 0.20 
Average 30.24 175.25 0.17 
Source: Huang, The Peasant Economy, 186, Table 11.1, Table II.2. 
Note: Net Arming income is gross agricultural income deducted by the cost of fertilizer, rent, wages for 
hired laborers, taxes and miscellaneous expenses. 
In 1937, the cost for daily labor was about 45 cents a day (about half of it was 
paid in cash as wage and the other half for boarding). But on average, the tenant got 
less than 20 cents per day for their labor on the rented land. As Philip Huang pointed 
out, it simply means that they worked for less than the market wage. He asked why 
these families continued to put in labor even when the marginal product of that labor 
89 
sank below market wages and why didn't they simply give up their farms and hire out.^"* 
The following two chapters will show that the peasants in Eastern Hebei did try to find 
jobs outside of farming and non-farming income was important to support their families 
and to sustain the p)easant economy. 
Huang, The Peasant Economy, 189. 
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CHAPTER 4. SUPPORTING AGRICULTURE WITH SIDELINE PRODUCTION; 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL INDUSTRY 
The last chapter showed that the income from farming was not only low but also 
not enough to support the families for many peasants in Eastern Hebei. As the 
cultivable land was limited and the return from land was low, the rich tried to find other 
ways to invest their surplus money. At the same time, the poor peasants who had little 
or no land wanted to find any kind of work for their unused labor. The surplus of the 
capital (for the rich) and labor (for the poor) made the development of sideline 
production and rural industry possible. This chapter will explore the typical sideline 
production and rural industries in Eastern Hebei. 
Sidelines of agricultural production: Domestic animal raising, fruit production, fishing, 
and grain processing 
When mentioning sideline production (fiiye), people always first think of 
domestic animal raising, such as raising and selling pigs, chickens and eggs. It is true 
that in the 1980s many Chinese peasants made a fortune and became "ten thousand 
yuan families" by specializing in domestic animal or fowl raising. Even in the 1960s 
and 1970s, under the commune system, when there was no free market, pigs and eggs 
still brought a little pocket money for the peasants. But the investigation materials of 
the 1930s reveals that besides providing draft power and fertilizer, domestic animal 
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raising brought little return and had little effect on peasants' incomes. The reason was 
simple: as a grain shortage area, people did not have enough to eat, thus there was little 
left for domestic animals and fowl raising. Table 4-1 shows the farming sizes and 
numbers of domestic am'mal raised in two Eastern Hebei villages. 
Table 4-1 reveals that the number of domestic animals raised in one household 
was related to how much land one farmed. For the landlords and rich peasants—^those 
Table 4-1, Farm size and domestic animal raising in Lujiazhai and Xiaojie, 1930s 
Farm-size Households Draft-animals Pigs Chicken 
Western part of Lujiazhai, Zunhua county, 1936 
>100 mu 2 4 21 13 
50-99.9 mu 2 3.5 9 14 
15-49.9 mu 17 19 51 51 
<15 mu 39 14.25 25 31 
0 mu 11 0 0 2 
Sub-total 71 40.75 106 111 
Xiaojie, Tong county, 1935 
>100 mu 2 7 12 10 
50-99.9 mu 12 15 18 25 
15^9.9 mu 36 17 20 64 
<15 mu 81 6 8 57 
0 mu 33 0 0 7 
Sub-total 164 45 58 165 
Source: Mantetsu, ^ e/7orr on Z,tf/7acto/, 116-119: Report on Xiaojie, 9 9^9. 
Note: Draft animals include ox. horse, mule and donkey. In Western pan of Lujiazhai. two or four 
families raised one donkey together, so one family had half (0.5) or a leg (0.25) of a donkey. Besides the 
animals listed above, in Western part of Lujiazhai, there were 91 goats and two sheep belonged to three 
households. There were also 22 ducks. 
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who fanned more than 50 mu of land, each had at least one draft animal, raised two or 
more pigs and several chickens. For the middle peasants who farmed 15 to 50 mu of 
land, in Xiaojie, only about half of them had draft animals. In Western part of Lujiazai, 
each middle peasant family had its own donkey. They also raised some pigs and 
chickens. For the poor peasants who farmed less than 15 mu of land, few of them had 
their own draft animals. In Western part of Lujiazai, two or four poor peasant families 
raised one donkey together, each of them had one half or a quarter ("one leg," 
according to the peasants) of a donkey. In Xiaojie, 81 poor peasant households only 
had 6 donkeys and raised 8 pigs, meaning more than 90 percent of the them neither 
raised draft animals nor pigs. Obviously, the poor peasants could not expect to 
supplement their family incomes by animal raising. Even for the rich peasants and 
landlords, pig raising brought little return for the investment. All the Chinese and 
Japanese investigation reports reveal this fact. 
According to the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team's report, in 1935, in 
Sanhe county. 
The peasants who raise pigs for sale first bought small ones which weighed about 30 to 40 
jin and cost 3 yuan each. They fed the pigs with beans, barley, bean-cakes (after pressing 
the oil) and chaif. Each day a pig was fed about one and hniSsheng (a Chinese container 
which contained about 2 jin of grain) worth a little higher than 0.1 yuan. After 100 days' 
feeding, the pigs grew to about 80 jin and could be sold at the market at the price of 10 to 
12 yuan each. The total cost (about 14 to 15 yuan) was higher than the money return, but 
the peasants could use the waste as fertilizer.' 
In Luan county, the Chinese investigators found that "the number of peasants 
who raise pigs are dependent on the [grain] harvests. If the harvest is good, [there was 
' Report of the Beining Rcdlway Economic Survey Team, 524-525. 
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surplus grain], more people would raise pigs the following year. If the harvest was 
poor, few peasant raised pigs. The beans used to fatten a piglet to 80 jin for sale cost 
about 7.2 yuan, but the pig only could sell for 8 yuan at the local market Few people 
had interest in pig raising."" 
The Japanese investigators collected similar data in Xianghe county in 1936. In 
Hoityansi village, among the 293 families who engaged in agriculture, only 15 or 16 of 
them raised 5-10 pigs each. Most likely, they were rich peasants or landlords. 
According to the investigation, in Houyansi, 
The price for the piglet which was two months old was about one yuan. After 10 months 
raising, it could weigh 100 jin and seD for 12 to 13 yuan. But in this period, the cost of 
the feed materials was about 11.5 yuan ( 1,000 jin of distillers' grains cost 9 yuan and 5 
dou of black beans cost 2.5 yuan), plus the one yuan for buying the piglet, the total cost 
was 12.5 yuan which did not even include the labor cost and other feeding materials. The 
peasants made it clear that raising pigs brought no return and only those who had 
distillers' grains and surplus beans could raise some pigs.^  
In Eastern Hebei, Fengrun coimty produced more pigs than other counties did. 
In the early 1930s, it raised more than 190,000 pigs each year. For other counties, less 
than 100,000 pigs were raised.In this area, about half of the fat pigs was consumed by 
the peasants themselves, the other half was sold and transported to Beijing, Tianjin and 
Tangshan. Table 4-2 presents the statistics of pigs transported by Beining Railway. 
Compared with pig raising, chicken raising had even less importance in 
peasants' economy in Eastern Hebei. Besides some eggs collected by the peddlers and 
- Ibid.. 1234 
 ^Mantetsu, Report on Hovycmsi, 114. 
See Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1357, and other parts about each counties' 
productions. 
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Table 4-2, Number of pigs transported to the cities by railway, 1934 
Boarding station Number of pigs Destination 
Xugezhuang, Fengnm county 10,505 Tianjin, Tanggu 
Tangshan, Lujin county 11,000 Tianjin 
Leizhuang, Luan county 42,000 
Shimen, Luan county 30,000 Tiaiyin, Qinhuangdao 
Anshan, Luan county 43,000 Tianjin, Qinhuangdao and Shanhaiguan 
Houfengtai, Changli county 10,000 Tianjin, Qinhuangdao and Shanhaiguan 
Source: Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1196, 1218, 1234, 1523, 1530, 1534. 
Note: Some of the pigs boarded on the stations in Luan county come from surrounding counties. 
sold in the cities, there was no large scale fowl buying and selling. In conclusion, the 
shortage of grain and the limitation of markets (few people could afford to consume 
meat and chicken in the 1930s) determined that domestic animal and fowl raising had 
little importance in agricultural production. Thus, few peasants could depend on it for 
increasing their income. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, fruit production was limited to the mountain area 
along the Great Wall. In this area, the land was poor for grain production, but the 
climate and soil was good for fruit tree growing. Both dried and fresh fruits were 
exported from Zunhua, Qian-an, Changli and other northern counties. Japanese 
investigators paid special attention to this "special production" in their investigations. 
They chose Lujiazhai in Zunhua and Zhongliangshan in Changli as two sites to smdy 
the importance of fruit production in this area. But it was the Chinese investigators 
who made an effort to show the total amount of fruit production. Table 4-3 presents 
their findings. 
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Table 4-3, Estimated firuit production in three counties, 1934 (unit: jin) 
Description of fruit Zunhua county Changli county Linyu county 
Apples 200,000 200,000 44,000 
Pears 700,000 980,000 2,059,000 
Peaches 50,000 450,000 524,000 
Apricots 70,000 330,000 713,000 
Hawthorns 80,000 
Chestnuts 1,000,000 400,000 
Wahiuts 150,000 600,000 109,750 
Grapes 1,000,000 
Crabapples 800,000 
Source: Report of the Beirring Railway Economic Survey Team, 1286-87, 1670-71,661-62. 
For most of the peasants, fruit was a sideline production. Most of the fruit trees 
grew wildly on the boarders of the farm lands or on the moimtain sides. There were few 
peasants specializing in fruit producing. In Lujiazai, only one gentleman-farmer named 
Yi Fuqing had a fruit orchard which produced grapes, apples, peaches, pears, apricots 
and other fruits. He was named a model farmer by the local government in the 1930s. 
How much income did fruit production bring for the peasants? Japanese 
investigators provided some statistics for Zhongliangshan village in Changli county. 
This village had 130 households, 667 residents and about 2,000 mu of cultivable land in 
1936. The kinds of fruit trees, growing area and values of production are listed in 
Table 4-4. 
On average, one mu of fruit orchard produced 2.24 3aian, it was less than grain 
harvesting. But as most of the fiiiit trees were grown on less fertile or uncultivable 
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Table 4-4, Fruit production in Zhongliangshan, Changli county, 1936 
Kinds of ftuit -Area (mu) Number of trees Product (jin) Value (yuan) Income/mu (yuan) 
Pears 265 2,650 53,000 480 1.81 
Peaches 150 6,000 30,000 475 3.17 
Apricots 80 800 16,000 152 1.90 
Total 495 9,450 99,000 1,107 2.24 
Source; Mantetsu, Kho chiku noson jittai chosaban, kito chiku ncd noson sangyo tokubetsu chosa 
hokokusho (Report on the Investigation of Rural Industries in Eastern Hefaei) (here after cited as Mantetsu, 
Report on Rural Industries), 92, Table 1. 
lands, fruit production did bring a little extra income for the peasants. In the 1930s, 
some of the fruits produced in Eastern Hebei was exported to the cities or Manchuria. 
Table 4-5 shows the amount of dried and fresh fruits exported from Eastern Hebei by 
Beining Railway. 
Table 4-5, Dried and fresh fruits exported from Eastern Hebei, 1934 
Boarding railway station Amount or kinds of friut Destination 
Leizhuang, Luan county 200 tons of chesmuts and other fruits Tianjin, Shanghai, Japan 
Tangshan, Luan county Dates, chestnuts, walnuts and others Tianjin, Qinhuangdao 
Shimen, Changli county 490 tons of walnuts and other fruits Tianjin 
Anshan, Changli county 692 tons of walnuts and other fruits 7 
County seat, Changli 3,300 tons of all kinds fiiiits Tianjin, Manchuria 
Zhangjiazhuai  ^Changii 70 tons Tianjin 
Beidaihe, Funing county 100 tons of hawthorn Manchuria 
Source: Report of the Beining Railwqy Economic Survey Team, 1234, 1263-66, 1532, 1523, 1529-30, 
1538, 1541. 
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As fresh fruit was easily spoiled and the market was limited (again, few people 
had the means to buy fruit for their families in the 1930s), fruit production was kept as a 
sideline production. It could bring a little pocket money, but its importance should not 
be exaggerated in peasant's budgets in Eastern Hebei.^ 
Unlike fruit production centered in the northern area, fishing was limited to the 
residents who lived along the Pohai coast or near the big rivers. For those who had no 
farming lands but boats and nets, fishing was their main occupation. Table 4-6 shows 
the number of fishing households and the estimated harvests. 
Table 4-6, Fishing households and harvests along the Pohai Bay, 1934 
County Fishii  ^households Quantity or value of harvests Marketing area 
Mnghe 3,000 70,000 yuan Tianjin 
Fengrun 400 150,000 yuan Tangshan, Tiai^in 
Luan 180 11,120,000 jin of fish, shrimp and crab 9 
Leting 120 3,670,000 jin of fish, shrimp and crab 0 
Changli 400 7 
Funing 30 244,800 piculs of fish and shrimp 0 
Linyu 150 37,200 yuan Outside of Linyu 
Source: Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1130, 1372, 1435, 1577, 1611, 1642, 
1664. 
Note: In Ninghe county, the households included those who fishing on the inland rivers. 
' In the 1980s and 1990s, Changli, Lulong and other Eastern Hebei counties became the fiiiit production 
centers again. Many peasants made money from this industry at this time. 
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For those who lived on the coast and made fishing their main occupation, they 
divided the fishing area among themselves and prohibited other people fishing there. 
Some times they hired hands fi'om those who h'ved near sea but had no rights to fish on 
the fishing area or had no equipment such as boats or nets. 
Compared with those dependent on the sea, fishing in the inland rivers was a 
sideline production for the peasants who lived on either side of these rivers. Besides 
family consumption, peasants also sold their fishing harvests fi-om the rivers in the local 
markets. Some merchants collected fish, shrimp and crabs in these markets and resold 
them in Beijing or Tianjin. According to the investigation, each year there were about 
700 tons of fish, 300 tons of shrimp and 350 tons of crabs transported to Beijing, 
Tianjin and Tangshan by train or boat from the Jiyun River basin.^ 
The harvest of fishing depended on nature's decision, few efforts were made to 
increase the quantity of fish in the waters. Only in Tong county, about twenty 
households raised fish in human-dug ponds. The fingerlings were bought from Tianjin 
or Cangzhou (a small city located southwest of Tianjin). Each year about 50,000 to 
60,000 jin of fish were harvested and sold in Beijing. The income was about 5,000 
yuan.^ This artificial fish-raising should be regarded as an exception. Large scale fish-
raising did not spread in Eastern Hebei until the 1980s. 
To make the agricultural products more valuable, the peasants also engaged in 
® Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1182-83. The total amount included some sea 
products in the coast area. 
' Ibid., 555. 
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some primitive grain processing industries, such as oil-pressing and distilling. Besides 
providing oil and wine for the local markets, part of the product was transported into 
the cities, or exported to foreign countries. The oil pressing shops were always located 
in the county seats or large market towns. They were operated by rich peasants or grain 
merchants. Table 4-7 shows the number of oil-pressing shops, the estimated quantities 
and values of the products in several Eastem Hebei counties. 
Table 4-7, Oil-pressing industry in some Eastem Hebei counties, 1934 
County Ofl-pressing shops Oil produced (jin) Value (yuan) Outside market 
Mlyun 25 375,000 75,000 Beijing 
Shunyi 88 300,000 50,000 
Tong 4 30,000 11,000 
Zunhua 70 1,000,000 Beijing 
Fengrun 17 
Qian-an 100 Shandong 
Source: Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 26,479, 556, 1298, 1378-80, 1480. 
Oil-pressing was a seasonal industry. The owners of the oil-pressing shops 
always bought the raw materials—peanuts, sesame, soybeans and cotton seed—in 
autumn and pressed in the two or three months of winter. The Chinese investigators 
gave an example to demonstrate the cost and profit for peanut oil pressing in Fengrun 
County. According to this investigation, the cost for producing 30 jin of peanut oil was 
5.5 yuaiL The cost included 5 yuan for 100 jin of raw peanuts, 0.1 yuan for peanut 
purchasing [100 jin] tax, 0.4 yuan for labor. The products could bring in a little higher 
100 
than 6 yuan in the local market, which included 4.6 yuan for the 30 jin oil, 1.4 yuan for 
the 40 jin of peanut cakes and about 0.1 yuan for the peanut shell. Totally, producing 
30 jin of peanut oil could get about 0.5 yuan net income.^ According to the same 
investigation, in Fengrun county, there were more than 10 peanut-oil pressing shops. 
They consumed about 13,000 jin of raw peanuts and produced 3,900 jin oil per day.^ If 
they worked three month a year, they could produced 351,000 jin oil and earned about 
5,850 yuan. 
Like the oil-pressing industry, distilleries were operated by the rich peasants and 
the merchants, the poor men could only sell their labor at the oil-pressing shops or 
distilleries to get a little money besides boarding. Although wine was not a necessity 
for living, it was consumed by both the rich and the poor, especially at weddings and 
holidays. Maybe it was the only luxury good for the peasants in Eastern Hebei. The 
local gazetteer compilers complained that drinking was a bad habit, it not only wasted 
grain but also caused troubles.Like the peanut or sesame oil, part of the wine 
distilled in Eastem Hebei was sold at Beijing, Tianjin and Tangshan. 
Besides getting the wine, the distillers got the grains left over which could be 
used to feed pigs. Similarly, the Chinese investigators recorded the cost and return for 
three distilleries in Xianghe county. The total investment was 30,000 yuan. They 
* Ibid., 1380. 
' Ibid., 1378-1379. 
Qian-an xianzhi (Qian-an Gazetteer), (1903), vol. 8, customs; Luan zhouzhi (Luanzhou Gazetteer), 
(1896), vol. 8, customs. 
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employed about 80 workers, besides providing boarding, the average wage for a worker 
was 6 yuan per month. Each year the three distilleries produced about 850,000 jin of 
wine, which was valued at about 89,000 yuan. The 21,500 piculs of raw materials cost 
64,500 yuan. The gross income was 24,500 yuaiL If the distilleries worked six months 
a year, the total wage and boarding cost would be about 5,760 yuan (assimiing boarding 
cost for a worker was 6 jman per month). If we deduct 3,000 yuan (10 percent of the 
total investment) as depreciation charge for the investment, the net income for the three 
distilleries was 15,740 yuan, or 50 percent of their total investment The return was 
much higher than that derived from farming.'' 
As oil-pressing and distilling required some investment for equipment and 
capital for buying raw materials in the autumn, they were a rich man's sideline or main 
production. The only poor man's grain processing industry was bean curd making. It 
was a family industry and required little investment—a small stone grinding mill, a 
boiling pan and several dou of beans were what they needed to begin the bean curd 
making business. Through one night's hard work by family members, the head of the 
family could take the bean curd by a shoulder px)Ie to sell or exchange bean curd for 
beans in the surrounding villages. Unlike the oil-pressing and distilling industries 
which were centered in county seats and market towns, bean curd was made in most 
villages. Lujiazhai village had 202 households, in which there were two households 
that made bean curd. Both of them were owner-tenants. One farmed 7.5 mu (owned 
" Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1051. 
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1.5 mu) and the other fanned 18 mu (owned 13 mu).'' There was little value added to 
the product by this grain processing. The difference between cost and income might lie 
in the bean curd makers' mght working and day travel-selling. 
The above analysis shows that under the limitations of raw material availability, 
transportation and market, domestic animal raising, fhut production, fishing and grain 
processing were limited to a small scale and the income was distributed among an 
equally small number of rich peasants. The poor peasants could not expect to increase 
their incomes by these sideline productions or industries. 
Local resources and local industries; Reed weaving, basket and paper making 
In the western part of Eastern Hebei, along the Jiyun and its tributary rivers, 
there were many ponds and marsh lands which were suitaable for reed growing. The 
peasants utilized these reeds to weave mats and baskets or other utensils for exporting. 
Jehol and Manchuria were the main outside markets for these products. In north China 
and Manchuria, reed mats had important uses. Besides spreading on the earth-bed 
(kang), the reed mat could be used to contain grain and cotton, or be used to put on the 
bottom of a salt transporting cart or to put over the salt stacks to protect them from rain. 
The Jiyun river basin was one of the two reed weaving centers in north China (the other 
one was around the Baiyangdian lake in central Hebei). Table 4-8 shows the estimated 
reed mats woven in Eastern Hebei in the 1930s. 
Mantetsu, Report on Lujiazhai, 76-77. 
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Table 4-8, Reed mats woven in some Eastern Hebei counites, 1934 
County Products (piece) Outside market 
Shunyi 180,000 Jehol 
Tong 18,000 Sanhe, ?Ganghe and Wuqing 
Xianghe 100,000 
Ninghe 250,000 Tianjin, Manchuria 
Ji 40,000 
Yutian 200,000 Manchuria 
Fengrun 450,000 Manchuria 
Source: Report of the Beining Raihvay Economic Survey Team, A19, 558, 1646, 1130, 1150, 1330, 1357. 
Note: The product for Fengrun was 400,000 to 500,000 pieces. 
The above statistics might be a little lower than the actual production. 
According to the same investigation, the mats produced around Lutai railway station in 
Ninghe county were exported by train or boat to Manchuria. The total weight exported 
each year was about 6,000 tons. As 100 pieces weighed about 1.1 tons, 6,000 ton 
equals about 550,000 pieces. In 1930, the local price for one piece was about 1 yuan, 
thus the exporting value of reed mat in Lutai area should not be less than half million 
yuan. Xugezhuang was another important reed mat exporting railway station. The 
mats woven in Xinjuntun, Hancheng, Jingjiatun and Dongfengtai (all in Fengrun 
County) were brought in there and then transported to Manchuria. Each year about 
2,100 tons of mats was exported. Using the same calculation and price as for those in 
Lutai, the exporting value should be about 200,000 yuan. 
Report of the Seining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1185. 
1195 
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After 1931, as Manchuguo levied heavy taxes on the products brought in from 
China proper, the reed mat production and export in Eastern Hebei declined 
dramatically.'^ In Ninghe county, in the prosperous years, about 1,400 households 
engaged in reed mat weaving, each year they produced more than 400,000 pieces (in 
1934, only 250,000 pieces, see Table 4-8). In Yutian county, Liimancang was the 
center of reed mat marketing. In the 50 villages around this market, 1,500 households 
engaged in mat weaving. In the mid-1920s (1924-25), the yearly product was 700,000 
to 800,000 pieces. Around 1934, the product declined to less than 200,000 pieces.'^ 
Including the mats exported to Jehol (there are no statistics for this exporting), it 
would not be overstating to argue that in the 1920s more than a million pieces of reed 
mats was exported from Eastern Hebei and about one million yuan was brought in by 
this industry. As the raw material (reed) had no or little cost for the weavers, the one 
million yuan could be regarded as a net income for the weavers. 
Like the reed mats, baskets (made from reeds and all kinds of twigs) were 
important fanning tools and utensils in north China (including Jehol and Manchuria). 
They were not only used to transport and contain the solid materials such as compost 
fertilizer, grain and fresh fruits, but were also used to transport and contain liquids such 
as oil and wine. As the raw materials could be obtained from reed, willow, mulberry 
and trees or bushes along the river beds or on the mountain sides, basket making was 
Manchuguo was the name for the government established in Manchuria in 1932 under the Japanese 
protection, the head of the government was the last emperor of Qing Dynasty, Pu-yi. 
Report of the Benring Railway Economic Survey Team, 1129-30. 
" Ibid., 1330-31. 
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Table 4-9, Basket makmg and exporting in Eastern Hebei, 1934 
County Quantity (piece) Value (yuan) Outside market 
Miyun 35,000 10,000 F&iairou 
Shunyi 81,000 Surrounding counties, Beijing 
Pinggu 33,000 9,600 Surrounding counties 
Sanhe 31,000 Xianghe, Wuqing 
Zunhua 360,000 
Qian-an 1,700,000 109,000 Jehol 
Lulong 1,150,000 13,000 Jehol and Baoding 
Leting 1,000,000 150,000 
Source: Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 427, 479, 508, 558, 1046, 1279, 1478, 
1499, 1575. 
Note: The produa for Zunhua county was 30,000 per month. 
more popular than reed mat weaving in Eastern Hebei. Table 4-9 lists the amount of 
products along with estimated values where available. 
Besides exporting baskets, some counties also exported raw materials for basket 
making. In Luan county, about 3,592 tons of twigs was transported to Tianjin and 
Xugezhuang.'^ In Qian-an county, the barked mulberry twig was exported because the 
peasants there had no skill or time to make baskets as they were occupied in paper 
making.Table 4-10 shows the quantity and value of mulberry twigs exported to 
Manchuria from Qian-an county. It is clear that after Manchuguo levied heavy taxes on 
imported goods from China proper in 1933, the mulberry twig exporting quantity and 
Ibid., 1233. 
" Mantetsu, Report on Rural Industries, 26. 
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Table 4-10, Mulbery twigs exported from Qian-an to Manchuria, 1930s 
Year Quantity Qin) Value (yuan) 
___ 2,120,000 20,440 
1932 1.380,000 15,030 
1933 360,000 4,650 
1934 510,000 5,500 
1935 310,000 3,150 
Source; Mantetsu, Report on Rural Industries, 27. 
value declined dramatically. But in Qian-an, the most important rural industry was 
neither basket making nor twig exporting but paper making. 
The Luan river flows across Qian-an from north to south and flooded frequently. 
To prevent wind blowing and flood erosion, people planted mulberry, willow and other 
trees on banks of the river. For a long time, the mulberry bark was used to make paper. 
The product was mainly sold in Manchuria. The Custom officials at Qinhuangdao had 
the following report in regard to paper making in Qian-an: 
The most notable manii&cture in this prefecture [Yongping prefecture] is that of paper, 
at Tsienan [Qian-an]. The people of that district are largely engaged in this industry. 
The paper is known under the name of sai^-pi-chih, from its being made from the inner 
bark of the paper mulberry (Broussonetia papyrifera). The process of manufecture is as 
follow; twigs are cut off from the tree and soaked in a stream for a certain number of 
days, until the bark can easily be stripped ofi  ^then the inner skin or bark is removed and 
put to soak again, a certain quantity of lime being added to the water, and from the pulp 
thus made the paper is manufectured. Paper cuttings imported from the South are added 
to the local material after they have first been reduced to pulp. The following figures 
show the quantity of paper cuttings imported here for this purpose: 1909, 195 piculs; 
I9I0, 188 picuis; 1911, 76 piculs. This paper is tough and is much used for papering 
windows. Its principle market is Manchuria. A few shipments have been sent to 
Shanghai, but it could not compete with the southern manufectures, owing to the cost of 
transport.^ " 
Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 183. 
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Unlike the basket making, paper making was not a poor man's sideline business. 
It was a kind of shop manufacturing industry. To open a paper making shop, it required 
some equipment, such as a grinding mill, mold pond and baking house. According to 
the Yon^ing Prefecture Gazetteer which was compiled in Kangxi period (1662-1722), 
"Sanli River has its fountainhead at south of Xiaozhai village, it flows southward about 
three li east of the [Qian-an] county seat.... Along the river, [from the county seat] to 
Xujia-ai and Lugoubo, there were about forty villages, all of them had some paper 
making factories. The people soaked and washed the mulberry bark in the river and 
used it to make paper. The products were sold in the two capitals [Beijing and 
Shengjing, or Mukden, in Manchuria]. Many merchants came to Qian-an to do business 
in paper marketing and got rich. The returns from paper making was several times of 
that from farming on the land.""' 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, Li Xianting (1861-1943), a native of 
Qian-an, went to Korea twice to leam the skill of Korean paper making. When he 
returned home, he opened a paper making factory and produced high quality papers. 
The Custom ofiScials reported that "imitation Korean paper has been made from wood-
pulp, fibers of sunflower roots being added to give strength. The inventor is said to 
have spent all his possessions in working out a process for the manufacture of this 
paper. His effort has been rewarded with success, and he is credited with a fortune. 
This factory—Hsin Chi Paper Factory of Tsienan district—has been granted the 
Wei Hongyun, ed.. Investigation and Research on Eastern Hebei Villages, 260. 
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privilege of single duty treatment"^ The new technology spread quickly among the 
paper makers. By the early 1930s, there were more than twenty factories producing 
Korean style paper, 600 shops still made old style Chinese papers and another 100 
shops produced a new kind of Chinese paper.^ 
In the 1930s, although a few factories introduced modem machines, such as 
steam engines and pumps, most of the work still had to be done by hand. The elder 
people remembered that around 1933, there were 18 large scale paper making factories 
and about 1,100 family run workshops. The factories and shops employed about 6,000 
workers. In the busy season, an additional 10,000 or more women were engaged in 
supplementary works, such as baking paper in the hothouses or drying paper in the air.^^ 
The elder people might exaggerate the number of workshops. A journalist who 
visited Qian-an in 1930 reported that there were a little more than 200 paper making 
shops in Qian-an.^ The Beining Railway Economic Survey Team also found that there 
were about 200 workshops in Qian-an in 1935, among them 28 were large scale 
factories. The value of products was 185,000 yuan, it was 30 percent of that produced 
in 1933. But the production of 1933 was only 40 percent that of 1931. Thus, the 
production value might have been about 1.5 million yuan in 1931. This calculation is 
confirmed by the findings of the Japanese investigation (see Table 4-11). 
 ^C.I.M.C., Decennial Reports, 1912-2 J, 128. 
^_Wei Hongyun, ed.. Investigation and Research on Eastern Hebei Villages, 261. 
"ibid., 261. 
" TaKongPao, 12 December 1930, p.4. 
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Table 4-11, Quantity and value of paper exporting from Qian-an to Manchuria 
Chinese-paper Value Korean-paper Value Total value 
Year (pack) (yuan) (pack) (yuan) (yuan) 
1931 37,000 1,110,000 5,000 300,000 1,410,000 
1932 25,000 1,050,000 5,100 300,000 1,350,000 
1933 20,000 500,000 4,800 288,000 788,000 
1934 21,000 420,000 3,500 210,000 630,000 
1935 15,000 270,000 2,500 210,000 480,000 
Source: Mantetsu, Report of Rural Industries, 29. 
Like mulberry twig exporting, paper making and exporting was in decline after 
Manchuguo set up the tariff wall in 1933. To improve paper quality and to increase the 
paper selling, Li Xianting and other paper manufacturers established a paper marketing 
cooperation. But this organization could not reverse the declining trend of paper 
making in Qian-an. 
Seizing the opportunity; Straw braiding and bristle processing 
The traditional rural industries, such as reed weaving, basket and paper making, 
have a long history, and were highly dependent on local resources and domestic 
markets. Another two industries, straw braiding and bristle processing, rose to 
importance in the late nineteenth century primarily in response to the international 
market 
Before China was opened to the outside world, the Chinese had already used 
wheat straw to braid, particularly to make straw hats. At that time, it was a family 
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sideline production and served a limited market. In the 1880s, as foreign demand 
increased and the price rose, more people were attracted into this industry. In Yutian 
county, formerly straw braid was made into hats and used locally, but in the 1880s, 
straw braid was sold to exporting merchants and few hats were made any more. 
Around Linnancang, in the south of the county, many village girls and peasant wives 
engaged in this industry."® 
In China, straw braid was mainly produced in the three provinces of Hebei, 
Shandong and HenaiL In the 58 years from 1880 to 1937, the total value of straw braid 
exported was about 211,793,600 HK Taels [Maritime Custom tael]."' On average, each 
year straw braid brought about 3,650,000 HK Taels, or about 5 million silver dollars 
into China."® There are no statistics of how many peasants braided wheat straw in 
Eastern Hebei, but for those who engaged in this industry the income was impressive. 
As wheat straw had little value except for use as fuel material in the winter, the returns 
from straw braid can be considered as net income for the peasants. 
The Maritime Custom statistics show that both the quantity and value of straw 
braid exports increased from 1880 to 1910, but from 1911 on, the quantity and value 
were in decline."' Table 4-12 shows the quantity of straw braid exported from Tianjin 
from 1900 to 1909. 
Wei Hongyun, ed.. Investigation and Research on Eastern Hebei Villages, 253. 
For each year's exporting quantity and value, see Cong Hanxiang, ed.. Rural Ji-Lu-Yu in Modem 
Period, 397-99. 
1 silver dollar equals 0.72 HK tael. 
 ^Cong Hanxiang, ed.. Rural Ji-Lu-Yu in Modem Period, 397-99. 
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Table 4-12, Straw braid exported from Tianjin, 1900-1909 (unit picul) 
Year Colored Mottled White Total 
1900 2,172 19,927 8,774 30,873 
1901 1,168 26,621 11,978 39,767 
1902 2,140 20,744 9,137 32,021 
1903 1,425 24,143 9,206 34,774 
1904 767 15,636 9,895 26,298 
1905 1,033 11,875 8,390 21,298 
1906 859 18,418 9,438 28,715 
1907 1.124 16,972 6,348 24,444 
1908 920 4,218 6,240 11,378 
1909 348 5,279 8,761 14,388 
Source: C.IM.C., Returns of Trade cmd Trade Reports (1909), 140. 
After 1911, although straw braid exports were in decline, domestic straw braid 
demand and hat-making grew. In Yutian county, many people re-engaged in straw 
braid hat making. In the late 1920s, about 1,350,000 pieces of straw braid hats were 
made in that county."*® In Baodi county, "around Xin-an market town, wheat was 
planted and many residents there braided the straw. They sold the products to local hat-
making families or to the local merchants who transported them to Tianjin for 
exporting.'"*' 
Compared with straw braid making, pig bristle processing was more important 
for Eastern Hebei, especially for the peasants of Fengrun county. According to the 
investigation, this industry originated in a village near Tangshan. In the first half of the 
 ^Ibid., 400. 
Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1072. 
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1880s, Zhao Xin, a native of Fengrun but employed by a British trading company in 
Tianjin, returned to his village to collect and process horse and then pig bristles. In a 
few years, Zhao made a fortune in this industry, and more and more people imitated 
him and this industry spread quickly in the surrounding villages. By late 1880s, taking 
advantage of water and transportation, the processing industry moved to Hetou (which 
means "head of the river") and Xugezhuang, the latter was the starting point of the 
canal dug for transporting Kaiping coal. From there the processed bristle could be 
transported by boat (later by train) to Tianjin for exporting. Xugezhuang (including 
Hetou, the two merged into one in later years) became the bristle processing center in 
north China. The Custom officials at Tianjin reported that "it is worthy of note that a 
great many of the goods for which outward transit passes are taken out, and more 
especially skins, wool, and bristles, do not arrive at this port in their original condition, 
but have undergone a greater or less degree of tanning or cleaning... .The same 
[processing] happens in the case of bristles, which are brought down—principally from 
Manchuria—in their crude state to Fengjunshsien [Fengrun county], near Tangshan, to 
be cleaned, sorted, repacked and sent to Tientsin.'"" 
As the bristle processing industry developed, the raw material (crude bristle) 
collected from the local area was not enough for the processors, outside crude bristle 
had to be brought in. In the twentieth century, there were four important sources for 
this industry. The first one was the area along the Great Wall. The raw bristles from 
C.I.M.C., Decennial Reports. 1902-11, 202-203. 
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this area was called " north pass bristles." They were sent down the Luan River and 
then transported by train to Xugezhuang. The quality from this area was medium.^" 
The second supply was the area located west of the Beijing-Tianjin railway, the bristles 
were called "west pass goods." In the 1930s, about one and half million jin of raw 
bristles were brought to Xugezhuang through Beijing-Suiyuan and Beijing-Hankou 
railways each year, the quality, however, was low.""* The third and most important 
source area was Manchuria, the raw bristles coming from there were called "eastern 
bristle" because Manchuria is located northeast of Xugezhuang, the quality was high. 
In 1934, a total of about 600 tons of raw bristles was transported to Xugezhuang by 
railway from this direction.^^ The last source was the nearby counties of Luan, Yutian 
and Leting. The quality was medium.^® Before the development of the bristle 
processing industry, there was little use of the pig hair except for use as fertilizer. So, 
the price for raw bristle in the villages was very low. But in Xugezhuang, the price for 
medium quality raw bristles was 0.9 to 1.5 yuan per jin."*^ The high price might be the 
result of long distance involved in transportation and the labor costs of the peddlers and 
merchants traveling to villages. 
In Xugezhuang, the raw bristle was first cleaned by employed women—most of 
them were peasant wives from the surrounding villages, the task was to separate fine 






hairs and real bristles. Then, the male workers sorted the bristle into 17 categories 
according to its length. The last process was binding and packing. In 1935, although 
the bristle processing industry was already in decline, there were still more than 50 
workshops in Xugezhuang and Hetou, each employing several dozen or even one 
hundred workers. Including those engaged in temporary or supplementary work, more 
than 5,000 people depended upon bristle processing to make a living. In the early 
1930s, about 320 tons of processed bristle was transported from Xugezhuang to Tianjin 
for exporting. The local price was about 1.5 million yuan. In Tianjin, the price was 
about 2.2 million. Table 4-13 shows the quantity and value of bristles exported from 
Tianjin for the decade from 1900 to 1909. 
Table 4-13, Quantity and value of bristle exported from Tianjin, 1900-1909 
Year Quantity (picul) Value (HK tael) Value (silver dollar) 
1900 8,032 706,816 981,689 
1901 11,020 969,760 1,346.889 
1902 14,815 1,303,720 1,810,722 
1903 15,323 1,348,424 1,872,811 
1904 14,954 1,315,952 1,827,711 
1905 11,326 996,688 1,384,289 
1906 15,859 1,395,592 1,938,322 
1907 18,719 1,647,272 2,287,878 
1908 18,173 1,599,224 2,221,14 
1909 18,386 1,617,968 4,247,178 
Source; Returns of Trade and Trade Reports (1909), 140. 
Note: I use the price of 1909 (88 HK taels per picul) for the whole decade to calculate the values. 
" Ibid., 1374. 
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At this time, it is difiRcult to find how the income from bristle processing was 
distributed among the merchants who collected raw materials, the workshop owners 
who organized the processing production and the workers \^^o cleaned, sorted and 
packed the bristles. But, it is obvious that this industry brought huge amounts of silver 
dollars to Eastern Hebei. 
From sideline to main production: Handicraft weaving in Baodi area 
As a grain shortage area. Eastern Hebei had a long history of exporting cloth for 
importing grains. The local gazetteer showed that spinning and weaving were 
important parts of the peasant economy. Before foreign cotton goods were imported 
into north China on a large scale, in both Leting and Luan counties, hand spirming and 
weaving were very popular among the peasant families. A local official in Luan praised 
the weaving custom in a poem: "The rural women weave cloth to help their husbands 
who work on the fields. Before the western wind blows, the warp and weft had already 
been prepared. It is past mid-m'ght, the moon is high over the trees, in the deep lane of 
the village, the wooden loom still sounds here and there."^' 
Besides providing cloth for local use, Leting and Luan also exported surplus 
cloth to other places. The Leting Gazetteer compiled in the Qianglong period (1736-
1795) reported that of the cloth produced in Leting, only "10 or 20 percent was used 
inside the county, 80 or 90 percent was transported to other places.... Trading cloth 
Yongpingfuzhi (Yongping prefecture gazetteer) (1876), vol.25, customs. 
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for millet was actually one way the poor people manage to keep themselves fed." The 
same pattem of trade was noted by the Luan Gazetteer for the Jiaqing period (1796-
1820).''® The Dalian cloth woven by Leting people was very famous. In the Jiaqing 
period, it had already been transported to Heilongjiang area where it was in much 
demand.'*' When discussing the main products in Yongping prefecture, the Custom 
officials at Qinghuangdao said that 
Loting [Leting] is well known in this part of Chihii for its cotton cloth, which was 
formeriy woven from native-grown cotton. The imported yam was, however, found so 
much cheaper and better, that the spinning of the native cotton was, in consequence, 
given up. The febric, known as tao-pu, had won a name for itself in Manchuria, but it 
appears to have been, in recent years, replaced there by nankeens imported from the 
South."*  ^
Besides cloth. Eastern Hebei also exported cotton threads to the area beyond the 
Great Wall. In Guangxu period (1875-1908), the cotton thread spun in Linyu county 
was sold in Manchuria. Those spim in Baodi and Xianghe were transported to 
Zhangjiakow, even to Mongolia.^^ But around the turn of the twentieth century, as 
more and more machine made cotton yam and cloth were imported into north China, 
handicraft spinning and weaving declined in some counties. In Yutian and Fengrun, 
many spiimers and weavers lost out to the competition and gave up spinning and 
weaving.hi Changli county, the number of people who engaged in spiiming and 
weaving decreased dramatically.'*^ But for other peasants, the low priced machine 
Huang, The Peasant Economy, 119. 
Cong Elanxiang, ed.. Rural M-LM-YU in Modem Period, 341. 
C.IM.C., Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 183. 
Cong Hanxiang, ed.. Rural Ji-Lu-Yu in Modem Period, 350. 
'"Ibid., 351. 
Changli xiarahi (Changli Gazetteer) (1933), vol.4. 
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made cotton yam provided an opportunity to develop a weaving industry. In the early 
twentieth century, in Xianghe county, there were several thousand households engaged 
in commercialized weaving. Each year, they produced more than one million pieces of 
cloth."*^ Most of the products were sold beyond the Great Wall, a small part of them 
was transported to Beijing and Tianjin. According to the same source, there were more 
people engaged in weaving in Baodi county than those in Xianghe. The local people 
said that "Baodi is a large harbor of cloth and Xianghe is a small one." Most of Baodi's 
products also sold beyond the Great Wall."*^ By the 1920s, Baodi became one of the 
three handicraft weaving centers in north China, the other two were Gaoyang in Hebei 
and Weixian in Shandong. 
Several local factors stimulated the handicraft weaving industry in Baodi area. 
The first one was the insufficiency of agriculture as a source of livelihood. Compared 
with other counties in Eastern Hebei, Baodi had a lower population density and on 
average each household had about 28 mu of land (see Table 2-4). But, the land was 
poor and was always waterlogged in the simimer. In this county, out of2,750,000 mu 
of cultivable land, no less than 1,357,000 mu, or 50 percent, were flooded in 1917. 
1,262,000 mu, or 46 percent, in 1931, and 743,000 mu, or 27 percent in 1932, were 
 ^Generally speaking, the length of one piece of hand woven cloth was about 10 meters and the width was 
about 0.33 meter. 
Tianjin dang-an guan, ed.. Archive Materials of Tianjin Chamber of Commerce, I; 971. 
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flooded again . Figure 4-1 shows the enormous part of the county which was often 
visited by flood. 
The second factor was the improvement of the weaving handlooms. In the early 
twentieth century, an improved type of loom, (the Chinese called it the "iron gear 
loom") was introduced into north China from Japan. It was imitated and manufactured 
in Tianjin. The new type loom could increase a weaver's productivity fourfold 
compared with using the old wooden loom. 
The third factor was the nearness to Tianjin and the sponsorship of the officials. 
In 1906, the Zhili governor. Yuan Shikai, introduced a textile department in his Institute 
for Techmcal Training in Tianjin. Students who came from Baodi and attended this 
department soon spread the new Japanese style loom and weaving technology in their 
home districts.**' Another source said that the spread of weaving was encouraged by 
another high official, Xong Xiling, as a means of flood relief.^® The Jiyun River which 
coimected Baodi with Tianjin made the importation of cotton yam very easy and cheap. 
The last factor was the opening of the middle road to Jehol. Traditionally, there 
were two important roads which penetrated into Jehol. The west road started from 
Beijing, went through Gubeikou and arrived in Chengde, the capital of Jehol. The east 
road paralleled the Luan River and passed through the Great Wall at Xifengkou. When 
H. D. Fong [Fang Xianting], ""The growth and decline of rural industry enterprise in North China: a 
case stucfy of the cotton handloom weaving industry in Paoti [Baodi]," Bulletin ofNankai Institute of 
Economics, Industrial series, no.8, (1934) (here after cited as A Case Study of Baodi), 5-6. 
Ibid., 8. 
Mantetsu, Report on Rural Industries!. Xong at that time was the conunissioner of flood relief. He 
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Figure 4-1, Map showing often flooded areas and distribution of cotton 
handlooms in Baodi county (Adapted from the map in Pong, 
A Case Study of Baodi, p.6.) 
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Tianjin was opened as a treaty port after 1860, it soon became the commercial and 
industrial center of north China. To cut the time traveling from Jehol to Tianjin, a 
central road was opened. The road started from Tianjin, stopped at Linnancang in 
Yutian and reached Xifengkou. Commodities were transported by mule, donkey and 
camel (see Figure 4-2). As Baodi was located between Tianjin and Yutian, it was easy 
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Figure 4-2, Map showing trade routes for Baodi fabrics 
(Adapted from the map in Fong, A Case Study ofBaodU P-35.) 
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During the First World War, as Western Powers were engaged in fighting and 
reduced their exports of cotton goods, the handicraft weaving took advantage of the 
opportunity and occupied the large market beyond the Great Wall. By 1923, Baodi 
handicraft weaving reached its highest level of development According to H. D. Fong 
and his colleagues' investigation, in that year, 10,649 peasant households engaged in 
handloom weaving industry. Among them, 2,999 were independent craftsmen 
operating 3,207 looms, and 7,650 were outweavers for merchant employers operating 
8,180 looms.^' The marketing area, quantity and value of the cloth exported from 
Baodi county is shown in Table 4-14. 
It is difficult to determine how much money the handicraft weaving industry 
brought into Baodi county because there is no information about the returns for the 
cloth merchants' investments. But it is obvious that weaving income was important for 
the tenants and small scale owner-peasants. According to the same study, the average 
labor income for the independent weaver was a h'ttle higher than that for the out-
Table 4-14, Distribution of Baodi cotton cloth by provinces, 1923 
Province Piece Percent Value (yuan) Percent 
Jehol 3,303,000 72% 7,392,000 61% 
Manchuria 680,000 15 1,734,000 14 
Northwest 246,000 5 792,000 7 
Hebei 360,000 8 2,226,000 18 
Total 4,589,000 100 12,144,000 100 
Source; Fong, A Case Stuefy of Baodi, 11. 
Fong, A Case Stuefy of Bao<U, 46. 
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Table 4-15, Amount of cloth woven and wages earned in Baodi county, 1923 
Kind of cloth No. of pieces Wage per piece (yuan) Total wage (yuan) 
Woven by the out-weavers 
Yung-chi 1,150,150 0.356 409,453 
Ta-cWh 460,450 0.368 169,446 
K'uan-mian 221,500 0.907 178,751 
Pung-cW 1,390,820 0.356 495,132 
Sub-total 3,222,920 0.388 1,252,781 
Woven by the independent weavers 
Yung-chi 928,850 0.399 370,611 
Ta-chih 364,550 0.413 150,559 
K'uan-mian 174,500 0.906 158,097 
Pung-cfai 91,780 0.399 36,620 
Sub-total 1,559,680 0.458 715,887 
Total 4,782,600 0.423 1,928,668 
Source: Fong, A Case Study of Baodi, ^ 6-Al, Tables I la and I lb. 
weavers employed by the merchant employers (see Table 4-15). 
The net income for the weavers might be a little lower than 1,968,668 yuan if 
the cost for sizing the yam and depreciation charge on the looms used by the weavers 
are deducted from the total wages.^^ But if the interest earned by the merchants who 
employed out-weavers and those who just bought and sold clothes is added, the total 
income brought by weaving and marketing to Baodi county appears to be around 2 
million yuan in 1923. 
Fong deducted 543,303 yuan and 68,222 yuan respectively for the sizing and loom depreciation. He did 
not explain how he calculated the costs. Ibid., 47. 
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Table 4-16, Cotton yam consumed and cloth woven in Baodi, 1923-1933 
Year Number of looms Cotton yam consumed (yuan) Cloth woven (piece) 
1923 11,367 11,239,000 4,783,000 
1928 10,158 7,417,000 3,200,000 
1929 9,841 7,629,000 3,100,000 
1930 8412 5,963,000 2,650,000 
1931 7,646 5,100,000 2,141,000 
1932 6,402 3,756,000 1,810,000 
1933 4,825 2,464,000 1,351,000 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on Rural Industries, 8, Table 4. 
From 1924 on, the handicraft weaving in Baodi declined, but until the mid-
1930s, it was still an important part of Baodi's economy. Table 4-16 shows the number 
of looms, the value of cotton yam consimied and the amount of cloth produced. 
The weaving industry was not limited in Baodi county only. In the adjacent 
Sanhe, Xianghe and Yutian counties, commercialized weaving also developed. In both 
Sanhe and Yutian, the merchant employers distributed cotton yam among the out-
weavers and collected the completed products, then paid wages for the weavers.^^ As in 
Baodi county, the products were mainly exported to Jehol and Manchuria. In Yutian, 
Woluoku and Lirmancang were two centers for handicraft weaving and cloth marketing. 
The cloth assembled in Woluoku was mainly sold beyond the north and west passes of 
the Great Wall (in Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan). Those assembled in Lirmancang were 
marketed in Manchuria. In the most prosperous period, each year more than 60,000 
Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 526-27, 1328. 
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packs (each pack had 30 to 40 pieces) were exported. In the mid-1930s, the cloth was 
mainly sold to western provinces, such as Suiyuan and Shanxi, each year only 20,000 to 
30,000 packs were exported.^ 
It is a pity that the investigation result of Xifanzhuang in Baodi county—^the 
village chosen as a representative for handcraft weaving in 1937—was considered 
unsatisfactory and was not published along with other three investigation reports. The 
source materials may have been lost in the war because they were never mentioned by 
the investigators or researchers in the later years. Here, the investigation findings of 
Longwo and other six villages in Yutian county will be cited to show the relationship of 
land-holding and cloth weaving (see Table 4-17). 
Table 4-17, Land-holding and cloth-weaving in Longwo and other 
six villages in Yutian county 
Household E^d per household Landloom Household weaving 
Village in 1936 in 1936 (mu) owned in 1936 
Longwo 29 18.06 8 7 
Xiaowangzhuang 58 12.09 21 15 
Dongxiaochenzhuang 12 6.50 6 5 
Xixiaochenzhuang 9 7.38 n j 3 
Xiaojiangzhuang 17 4.91 3 j 
Mengxinzhuang 91 1.18 55 34 
Zhimafeng 90 7.51 50 26 
Total/average 306 7.31 164 93 
Source; Mantetsu, Report on the 25 villages in Eastern Hebei, 2: 41-42. 
" Ibid., 1328-29. 
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As Table 4-17 shows, in 1936, there were a total 306 households in Longwo and 
other six villages. These households owned 164 handlooms (some of them were not in 
operation in 1936), that means more than half of the households had engaged in cloth 
weaving in the previous years. In Mengxinzhuang, among the 91 households, there 
were 55 handlooms, which means about 60 percent of the households were engaged in 
the weaving industry. The reason for such a high percentage is that: on average, each 
household only had 1.18 mu of land. Obviously, they could not be expected to make a 
living on fanning alone. As in Baodi county, handicraft weaving industry was in 
decline in the 1930s, but even as late as 1936, about 30 percent of the households (93 
out of 306) were still engaged in weaving. Among them four households made weaving 
as their sole occupation. The investigator talked about the weaving industry in these 
villages as follows; 
The weavers were men and women from the ages of 16 to 40. In the [weaving industry] 
prosperous years, the weavers worked from 5 am to 9 pm on the looms and did not stop 
weaving even in the agricultiual busy seasons. They hired Arming laborers to work on the 
farms. At that time, weaving became their main occupations. Now [in 1936], the weaving 
industry was in decline and the return from fanning is higher than that from weaving. Few 
of those who had enough land to ferni or those who had a permanent job engaged in 
weaving any loiter. Those who had no land, no skill to find other jobs had to continue to 
weave on the handlooms.'  ^
To appreciate the relative importance of the income of weaving industry, it must 
be compared with the income derived ft^om farming. Table 4-18 shows the average 
farming income for the five farming related classes. 
The following discussion assumes there were no changes in the number of 
" Mantetsu, Report on the 25 villages in Eastern Hebei, 41-42. 
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Table 4-18, Land utilization and fanning income in Baodi, 1933 
Land-owned Land-&rmed Average farm Average &rming 
Farming class Households (mu) (rau) size(mu) income (yuan) 
Landlord 770 385,000 832.50 
Richpeasam 4,364 687,500 687,500 134.67 217.65 
Owner peasant 23,102 1,377,500 1,377,500 59.62 144.76 
Owner tenant 12,835 300,000 500,000 38.95 86.62 
Tenant 10,268 185,000 18.01 26.38 
Source: Fong, A Case Study of Baodi, 7, Table 2a. 
households, land holding and farming income between 1923 and 1933. In 1923, there 
were 10,649 households, or 20 percent of the total, engaged in commercialized weaving 
industry. On average, the weaving income for each family was about 105 yuan.^^ It 
was much higher than the farming income for the owner-tenants and tenants. For many 
families in Baodi county in the 1920s, weaving became a main occupation and farming 
became a sideline production. In fact, as commercialized weaving developed, adult 
males, not women, became the main participants as weavers. 
In the 1930s, although weaving was in decline, the percentage of weaving 
households was still very high in some villages in Baodi county. Xiaojiazhuang, a 
village located 8 li north of the county seat, had 250 households in 1936, among them 
170, or 68 percent, engaged in weaving. In these 170 weaving households, 50 had no 
land at all. On average, each weaving household had two looms, but some had as many 
The average income is calculated as followings: Total wage income (1,968,668 5aian) minus cost for 
sizing (543,303 yuan), the depreciation of the looms (68,322 yuan) and the pay for hired laborers. The net 
wage income was 1,119,287 yuan, which is divided by the total number of weaving households number. 
See Fong, A Case Study of Baodi  ^47-38. 
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as four. Most of the weavers worked in the agricultural slack season and stopped for 
farming in the busy season. A weaver who worked 11 hours a day could weave 2 
pieces. Around 1923, each piece could bring 30 to 50 cents. Meaning a day's weaving 
could bring 0.6 to I yuan. It was much higher than that paid to the fanning day-laborer. 
But in 1936, a piece of cloth could only bring 0.1 yuan.^ In another village named 
Zhaoxiazhuang (located 5 li west of the county seat), among the 220 households, 210 
households, or 95 percent, engaged in weaving. Each household had one or four looms, 
most of them had two or three. The most capable weaver could weave three pieces a 
day, but on average, a weaver could weave one piece a day. In 1936, the whole village 
produced 150,000 pieces of cloth. Even though one piece only brought 0.1 yuan net 
income, the total income from weaving for the 210 households was 15,000 yuan, or 71 
yuan for each. It was still much higher than farming income for the tenants.^^ 
The importance of the weaving industry in Sanhe county's economy was 
confirmed by the local gazetteer which was compiled in the 1930s: 
Around Huangzhuang market town in southern part of the county, half of the women 
engaged in weaving, the sound of looms could be heard every where. On the market 
day, many people took the cloth to trade for the cotton yam. The southern part of the 
county was always flooded—in ten years, the flood might visit this area nine times, the 
reason that the people there could still be fed and clothed was the income fi'om weaving. 
The merchants bought the cloth and sold it outside of Gubeikou [in Jehol], they made a 
fortune and the people became richer. According to a village he  ^there was about 
2,000 mu of cultivable land in his village. On average, each mu of land could produce 3 
yuan net income a year, the 2,000 mu could bring 10,000 yuan. But in this village, there 
were 200 handicraft looms. The weavers said that if all femily members who could not 
work on the field, such as women, elders and children, work  ^with one loom, after the 
expending for boarding, in one month they could earn 10 yuan net income. Even though 
" Mantetsu, Report on Rural Industries, 9. 
Mantetsu, Report on the imestigation of general conditions of the sixteen counties in Eastern Hebei, 
141. 
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they only work ten months a year, the mcome for one loom was 100 yuan. For 200 
looms, the income was 20,000 yuan, rt was double the income from the 2,000 mu of 
land. The land located south of Huangzhuang was always waterlogged by 6ood, by 
promoting weaving, the people could improve their livelihood. Without &nning they 
could still have some income, it is mother nature that forces people to make a living by 
other means. 
In 1931, the Hebei provincial government made a census about the agricultural 
and industrial production in its counties. According to these statistics, in Baodi county, 
the industrial income was 45.8 percent of the peasants' total income. In Yutian county, 
it was 36.7 percent For the whole Eastem Hebei area, the value of industrial products 
was about 13 percent of the total production.^ Thirteen percent is much lower than 
what industrial production holds in today's rural economy in China, but for the peasants 
of the 1930s, this industrial income made the difference between living or dying. 
Sanhe xiamhi (Sanhe Gazetteer) (1935), vol. 15. 
Coi  ^Haxvxiang, ed.. Rural Ji-Lu-Yu in Modem Period, 440-45, Table 4.9. 
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CHAPTERS. LOOKING BEYOND THE VnXAGE; 
WORKING IN THE CITIES OR GOING TO MANCHURIA 
As Ramon Myers pointed out, Chinese peasants never kept tidy accounts of their 
income and expenditure, but "this is not to say they were not interested in increasing 
their income for they used their land for crops which commanded the highest price and 
carefully allocated labor between farming and working outside the village to earn 
whichever income was greatest."' In Eastern Hebei, as the transportation was improved 
and the new industrial centers rose after 1870, more and more peasants took the 
opportunity to produce more cash crops for the markets or leave the villages to find jobs 
in commerce and industry. The proximity of both the biggest cities in north China 
(Beijing and Tianjin) and the last frontier of China (Manchuria) made the non-farming 
opportunity increasingly attractive to the Eastern Hebei peasants. 
The improvement of transportation and the rise of the new industrial cities 
Before the 1870s, there were no modem transportation facilities in China. The 
so-called imperial road (from Beijing to Chengde, capital of Jehol, and to Mukden, the 
old capital of Manchuria) was only a primitive dirt road without paving. The road was 
not even open the full year because the summer floods always washed away the wooden 
bridges across several of the rivers, such as Bei, Jiyun and Luan. The fare for 
' Myers, The Chinese Peasant Econon^ , 53. 
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transportation was high and the journey for the travelers was difficult This situation 
began to change in the 1880s. 
In 1877, under Chili governor Li Hongzhang's order. Tang Tingshu hired British 
engineers to open a coal mine near Kaiping village in Luan county. Officially, the 
mine was named the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company. As it was located 
south of Tangshan, or Tang Mountain, it was also called Tangshan Coal Mine by the 
local people. To make the transportation of coal from Kaiping to the seapwrt of Tanggu 
cheaper—in the late nineteenth century, the coal was mainly used as a power source for 
steam ships—the "government supervised and merchant managed" Chinese 
Engineering and Mining Compary began to dig a canal from Hetou (in Fengrun county) 
to Lutai (in Ninghe county). But from Hetou to the main shaft at Kaiping there was still 
several miles distance. To mitigate the conservatives' opposition to railway 
construction, the company appealed to the Emperor and obtained permission to cormect 
Kaiping with Xugezhuang (near Hetou) by a tramway. "The track to be of standard 
railway gauge, and the cars to be drawn by mules, and this line was begun in 1880 and 
completed in 1881."^ In fact, this was the first railroad constructed in China with the 
Chinese government's permission.^ Soon, the mules were replaced by a real steam 
locomotive under Li Hongzhang's support. By 1882, two locomotives were bought to 
work the seven-mile length of railway to the canal, which had been completed at the 
 ^Hosea. B. Morse, The Trade and Administration of China (third revised edition), (New York: Hussell & 
Russell, 1967), 434. 
 ^Before the Kaiping-Xugezhuang railroad, foreigners built a short railroad in Shanghai in 1876. It was 
bought and dismantled by Chinese government the next year. 
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same period'' In 1886, the Kaiping steam tramway was extended to Lutai. Although 
the advantage of railway transportation was obvious, the expansion was based on the 
strategic argument of facilitating the movement of troops and the transport of war 
material. These issues made the extension of the railway possible. By August of 1888, 
the railway line was completed to Tianjin. But once again, some high officials opposed 
extending the railway westward to Beijing. This time, they also based their arguments 
on strategic grounds. They argued that the railway might be used by foreigners to 
attack Beijing. The extension to Beijing was temporarily delayed. But Li Hongzhang 
proceeded the extension eastward to Shanhaihuan. The line to this point was completed 
in 1894. Overriding an objection made by Russia to the surveying in Manchuria, Li 
Hongzhang pushed the line further eastward, reaching Zhonghusuo, forty miles from 
Shanhaiguan, on the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1895. The result of the war 
demonstrated the strategic value of railways, and the western extension was taken in 
hand. Beijing was reached at the end of 1896.^ By the early twentieth century, the 
railroad was extended to Mukden. The Jingfeng Railway (Beijing-Mukden, later called 
Beining Railway as Fengtian was renamed Liaoning Province) was the only railway 
coimecting China proper and Manchuria and was under Chinese government control 
and Chinese management. This railroad not only lowered the transportation costs but 
also stimulated emigration to Manchuria (see Figure 5-1). 
* Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, 434. 
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Figure, 5-1, Railroad, canal and cities in Eastern Hebei 
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One of the main motivations for the railway construction was to transport coal 
from Kaiping to the sea ports, a short branch line was built fr^om Tanghe (in Linyu 
county) to Qinhuangdao, a comparatively ice-free port on a frozen coast, which 
afforded an outlet when Tianjin (December to February) and Niuzhuang (a sea port in 
Fengtian province, frozen from November to March) were iced-over. In 1910, the 
Jingfeng Railway moved a little south from Tanghe and made Qinhuangdao a main 
station on the road. The improvement of transportation made the increase of coal 
production and profit possible. In 1908, a new coal mine was opened in Luanzhou 
(later named Luan county) by Chili bureaucrats, it was called The Luanzhou Mining 
Company. Three years later, it was amalgamated with the Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Company and renamed Kailan Mining Administratioru By the 1930s, the 
Kailan Mining Administration had five shafts and employed about 20,000 workers. It 
produced about 530 million tons a year.^ To speed the coal transportation and avoid the 
delay by civil or military interference with the railway administration, a second line 
(doubled the old one) was built from Tangshan (formerly named Kaiping town) to 
Qinhuangdao. More than half of the Tangshan coal was exported from Qinhuangdao, it 
was opened to foreign trade and a custom office was established there in 1902.' 
As coal provided a cheap power source and the railroad made transportation 
cheaper, new industries were developed in Tianjin, Tangshan and Qinhuangdao. 
 ^About the opening of the Lanzhow Vfining Company, its amalgamation whh the Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Compary, the five shafts and the worker numbers for each shait, see Utan xianzhi (Luan 
Gazetteer) (1937), vol.14. Industries. 
' Morse, The Trade and Acbnmistration of China, 238. 
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Tianjin was not only the trading but also the machine manufacturing and textile 
industry center in north China. Around the turn of the twentieth century, the Chee Hsin 
Cement Company was capitalized in Tangshan. Soon, it became the largest cement 
producer in China. By the 1930s, it employed more than 4,000 workers and produced 
about 1.6 million bags (each bag contained about 180 kilograms) a year.^ Like the 
Kailuan coal mines, the Chee Hsin Cement Co. made a huge profit in a short period and 
in 1918, it provided part of the capital for the opening of Huaxin Textile Co. in 
Tangshart In 1921, it extended its business to chinaware production and established the 
Chee Hsin Chinaware Factory. As a coal producing and exporting station, Tangshan 
also became the center for railway car building and repairing center. By the early 
1930s, it was estimated that there were about 100,000 people living in TangsharL^ 
Obviously, Tangshan was a new industrial center, but it did not obtain the status as a 
city until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. 
The railway made traveling comfortable and more and more foreigners and 
Chinese bureaucrats and businessmen came to Beidaihe, a famous summer resort beach 
in China, which was a few miles south of Qinhuangdao. In the 1920s, the Yaohua 
Glass Factory was established in Qinhuangdao. By 1931, according to the Customs 
statistics, there were 20,020 residents in Qinhuangdao. That means in about three 
decades, Qinhuangdao developed from a small fishing village to a small size trading 
and manufacturing city. 
 ^ Luan Gazetteer (1937), vol.14, indusdres. 
' Cressey, China's Geographic Foundation, 174. 
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There are no statistics for the origin of the industrial workers in Tianjin, 
Tangshan and Qinhuangdao, thus it is impossible to calculate how many Eastern Hebei 
peasants were employed by the new industries. One source claims that most of the coal 
mine workers came from central Hebei (around Baoding, capital for Hebei province) 
and Shandong Province, but most of the employees in the railway related work shops, 
Huaxin textile and Chee Hsin cement factories were local people.The Japanese 
investigation material showed several adult males from Lujiazhai village, Zunhua 
County, worked in Tangshan.'' 
Besides providing employment opportunities, the construction of the railroad 
and the rise of new industry provided new markets for local products. In the mountain 
county such as Funing, the land was poor for crop production, but the mountain 
produced lumber and other inferior trees which could be sent to Tangshan for use as 
shaft pillars in the coal mines.In Fengrun county, the vegetables produced in 
Michang and other villages were transported to Tangshan and sold to the workers and 
their families. In fact, as Tangshan rose as an industrial center, more and more 
foodstuffs and other living necessities were imported from surrounding counties. A 
local proverb said that "it is impossible to carry away all goods in Jianchangying (a 
market town in Qian-an county located south of the Great Wall), it is difficult to feed 
Mantetsu, Report on the investigation of general conditions of the sixteen counties in Eastern Hebei, 
258. 
" Mantetsu, Report on Lujiazhai, 169. 
Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1640. 
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the demand of Kaiping city (Tangshan)."'' Peasants sold all kinds of goods to 
Tangshan, from a few eggs to a fat pig, from vegetables to fruits, from grain to grain-
processed products such as sesame oil and sorghum distilled wine. For an individual 
family, the income might be a little pocket money, but for the whole region, the total 
income was substantial. 
Finding jobs in the cities: Peasant workers in Beijing, Tianjin and other market towns 
For the five centuries from 1421 to 1928, Beijing was the capital of China for 
three different regimes: Ming, Qing and the Republic China. As the political and 
cultural center of the whole country, Beijing was the largest city in imperial China. 
According to G. William Skinner, in the 1840s, the population in Beijing was about 
850,000.''* The 1932 census reported the population in Beijing was 1,467,537.'^ Most 
of the residents were governmental officials, garrison troops, traveling scholars, 
merchants and their families. In imperial times, most of the grain consumed in Beijing 
was provided by the South through the rice tribute system,'^ but other necessities, such 
as vegetables, meats and other services were provided by the peasants in the 
surrounding counties. 
Wei Hongyun, ed.. Investigation and Research on Eastern Hebei Villages, 281. 
" G. William Skinner ed., The City in Late Imperial China, (Stanford: Stanford University E»ress, 1977), 
29. 
Cressey, China's Geographic Foundation, 174. 
During the Qing period, about 3.5 million piculs or 280,000 tons of grain (mainly rice) was transported 
to the capital through the grain tnbute system each year. See Harold C. Hinton, The Grain Tribute System 
of China (1845-1911) (Cambridge: Harwd University Press, 1956), 2. 
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For a long time, the peasants in the western part of Eastern Hebei, especially in 
Ji, Sanhe, Xianghe, Baodi and Tong counties, took advantage of nearness of the capital 
to find work opportimities there. In the four special service businesses. Eastern Hebei 
provided most of the service men and women in three of them. Most of the service men 
in the brothels came from Ji county, they were called the men who bring the teapots. 
Most of the domestic service women came from Sanhe county, they were called 
Laomazi, or "old mama," who looked after rich men's children and cooked for their 
families. The people from Baodi and Xianghe almost monopolized the barbering 
industry in Beijing—in the Qing Dynasty, haircutting was an important business 
because every male must have his hair cut periodically if he did not want to get into 
trouble. UndertheManchu'srule, the slogan was "cut the hair or lose your head." The 
only special profession which was not filled by Eastern Hebei peasants was eunuch—a 
small group but a powerfixl class in imperial times. Most of the eunuchs came from 
Qinghai and other counties located west of Tianjin.'^ The overthrow of the Qing 
Dynasty in 1912 ended the recruitment of new eunuchs, but it had little effect on other 
three professionals. 
As transportation improved and new cultural institutes and industries developed 
in Beijing and Tianjin, more and more people from Eastern Hebei found permanent or 
temporary employment there. In the 1930s, the Beining Railway Economic Survey 
Team reported that in Sanhe county, many people (male and female) went to Beiping 
Interview with Zhang Baonian by the author in the summer of 1993. Zhang was the chief compiler of 
new Baodi Gazetteer at that time. 
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(Beijing was renamed Beiping after the Nationalists established the capital in Nanjing 
in 1928) to work there, "the income was important for the county's economy."'^ Wang 
Yaowu, a journalist, wrote in 1934 that "most of the female domestic servants 
[laomazi] in Beiping came from Sanhe county. They came to Beiping to escape the 
hardness of village life. In the city, the boarding is better and it is easier to make 
money. If they are employed by the rich families and could win the confidence of the 
femily heads and their wives, they could steal some power and act as managers of the 
households. By cheating and practicing crafts, in several years, they could save some 
money and then return home to enjoy the leisure life."'' Another journalist who had a 
tour of Hebei counties reported that while he visited Sanhe county seat, he had not seen 
any females there. The reason was that "most of the females work in Beijing and 
Tianjin as domestic servants." He claimed that service income was the main pillar for 
Sanhe's economy."® 
Shajing village of Shunyi county provided a good example of how the peasants 
took advantage of nearness to Beijing to increase their incomes. Shunyi, a small rural 
county measuring nine miles east to west and seven miles north to south, lay about 25 
miles north of Beijing on the Beijing-Gubeikou road. Shajing village lay half mile west 
of the county seat. The village population was 191 in 1895, 280 in 1912,340 in 1931, 
and by 1941 when the Japanese made the village survey, there were about 75 
Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 518. 
" Wang Yaowu, Laobcaxing dqyoushi (Ragged Verses), "Domestic female servants (1934)." 
Ta Kong Pao, 21 December 1930, p.4. 
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households with dsout 400 residents in the village. This means the population doubled 
in the village in about a half century. There was II 78.6 mu of cultivable land in the 
village green circle, among them 215.6 mu, or 18 percent of the total, was owned by 
outside landlords. On average, the family farm size was about 16 mu and was too small 
for a family of 5 persons. To make the situation worse, the limited land was poor for 
crop production because most of it was either sandy or highly alkaline. According to 
the survey, among the 75 households, 10 households survived solely on their farm 
income, 6 depended completely on non-farm income, and 6 derived their income from 
wages and what they produced on rented land. 53 households, or 71 percent of the 
total, supplemented their farm income by working outside the village. As Ramon 
Myers pointed out, "these data suggest that the village found it increasingly difficult to 
depend solely on farming.""' Most of the peasants turned to Beijing to find non-
farming employment. 
In each winter, many peasants from Shajing went to Beijing to work at 
Zhengmingzai to make migong—a kind of sweet cake for religious ceremonies. Zhang 
Wendong, father of the deputy village head Zhang Rui, was the leader of the peasant 
workers. In 1941, he led 53 peasants to work in Beijing. Among them 14 came from 
his home village." Liu Fu, another Shajing villager, was a team leader too, but he 
Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy, 47. 
 ^Chugolcu nosoa kanko chosa kankokai, Chugoku noson kanko chosa (Investigations of customary 
practices in rural China) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1952-1958) (here after cited as CN, CN), 2: 56. 
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worked in another shop to make migong in Beijing.^ The peasants worked in Beijing 
for about three months from the tenth to begirming of the first month of Chinese 
calendar. Besides free boarding, the peasant workers could receive different payments 
according to their skills—mostly depending on how many years they worked in this 
industry. In 1941, the wage for the begirmers was 5 or 6 yuan a working season (about 
three months). For those who worked a second year and became a skilled worker, the 
payment was 30-40 yuan. For the bosses, Zhang Wendong and his son Zhang Rui, the 
payments were 50 and 75 yuan respectively. Another source said Zhang Wendong's 
income from migong making was 300 yuan a year.""* 
Besides working as migong makers in winter, some peasants sent their sons to 
work in Beijing or the county seat as apprentices or clerks, others engaged in small 
businesses such as incense making and selling. A summary of the kinds of non-farming 
activities and numbers of persons engaged in them appears in Table 5-1. Those who 
had no special skills went to the coimty seat to look for odd jobs. There was a daily 
labor market there. The poor peasants went there in the early morning to wait for the 
prospective employers. 
In 1941, the Japanese investigators made a detailed investigation about family 
income and expense of seventeen households from different social and economic 
classes in Shajing village. They thought these samples could represent the whole 
village. To evaluate the importance of non-farming income on peasants' budgets, one 
 ^Ibid., 2: 5. 
" Ibid., 2: 23. 
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Table 5-1, Non-fanning engagements in Shajing village, 1941 
Non-fkming business description Engaged persons 
Doctors and teachers, working in the surrounding villages and towns 4 
Apprenticing or working in grocery stores in Beijing 14 
Bone carving in Beijing 4 
Transporting goods in Beijing, Tongzhou or the county seat 5 
Apprenticing or working in grocery stores in other towns 14 
Making and peddling incense, candy, sesame seed cakes and others 12 
Blacksmith and carpenter 2 
Total 55 
Source; CN, GV| 2:1-24. 
must first change the agricultural harvesting and family consumption into cash income 
and expense. The Japanese investigators introduced a unit called "adult equivalent" to 
calculate how much grain was needed to feed a family. According to their definition, 
individuals between 12 and 60 years of age were counted as 1.0 adult equivalent; 
between 8 and 11 and above 61 counted as 0.8 adult equivalent; children between 3 and 
7 years were 0.5 and those under 2 as 0. A household was scored according to its adult 
equivalent. They also decided to make 6 dou of wheat and millet of grain and seven 
dou of sorghum equivalent to 1 shi of grain. It was then estimated that 1.0 adult 
equivalent should consume at least 3 shi of grain per year. With these units the annual 
households consumption requirements were obtained for the seventeen sample 
households. The amount of farm output produced by each household was also 
calculated and standardized according to the above food units. The actual annual 
farming harvests and calculated aimual consumption are shown in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2, Grain production and consumption for 17 households 
in Shajing village, 1941 (unit: shi) 
Household Annual production Annual consumption Deficit or surplus 
YangZe 15.1 10.5 4.6 
Ren Zhengang 15.6 12.0 3.6 
Du Xiang 4.3 19.8 -15.5 
Li Ruyuan 36.2 40.5 -4.3 
Zhang Cheng 11.2 16.2 -5.0 
Zhao Tingkui 18.8 24.0 -5.2 
Jing Defli 11.2 10.5 0.7 
Du Shoudan 9.3 19.5 -10.2 
Zhang Linrong 12.0 19.5 -7.5 
Zhang Shoujun 18.9 12.0 6.9 
Lt Shulin 5.3 14.4 -9.1 
Fu Ju 7.7 11.4 -3.7 
Li ^ Gu^g 14.3 17.7 -3.4 
Zhang Yongren 12.3 30.6 -18.3 
Chong Wenqi 1.0 13.5 -12.5 
Zhang Shouren 8.2 12.0 -3.8 
Yang Run 7.6 14.4 -6.8 
Total 209.0 298.5 -89.5 
Source: CN, CM 2;270-291. 
Table 5-2 reveals that only 24 percent of the sample households (4 of 17) 
produced enough grain to meet their annual consiraiption needs. The remainder had to 
purchase grain with income earned from marketing vegetables, working outside the 
village, or borrowing. Table 5-3 shows the 17 households' money-equivalent incomes 
and expenses. 
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Table 5-3, Household budget for 17 households in Shajing, 1941 (unit: yuan) 
Household Total income Fanning income Non-famring income Expenditure Balance 
Li Ruyuan 2,084 1,884 200 1,983 101 
Li ^ u&ng 962 867 95 1,045 -83 
Chong Wenqi 405 25 380 456 -51 
Zhang Shoujun 745 535 210 715 30 
RenZhengai  ^ 570 570 0 815 -245 
Li Shulin 417 192 225 417 0 
Zhang Yongrin 1,208 1,138 70 1,276 -68 
Du Shoutian 802 532 270 928 -126 
Du Xiang 742 542 100 945 -203 
Jing Defu 924 664 260 1,055 -131 
YangZe 980 935 45 1,042 -62 
Yang Run 542 245 297 1,057 -515 
Zhang Cheng 683 443 240 708 -25 
Zhao Tinglcui 1,399 1,199 200 1.439 -40 
FuJu 587 337 250 559 28 
Zhang Shouren 563 283 280 1,233 -670 
Zhang Linrong 676 676 0 759 -63 
Total 14,289 11,067 3,122 16,432 -2,143 
Source; CN, CN, 2: 270-291. 
It should be pointed out that in Table 5-3, the "non-farming income" was a little 
lower than the actual amount the peasants earned because it only coimted the cash or 
wage income but did not include the boarding expense paid by the employers. Even 
under this calculation, among the 17 households, only 2 depended solely on agricultural 
income, 3 had more non-farming income than farming income. On average, about one 
quarter (22 percent) of the total income came from non-farming sector. As the grain 
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harvest was already short for the peasants own needs (see Table 5-2), the peasants were 
unable to sell much of their grain to pay taxes or to buy other living necessities. 
Obviously, without working outside of farming, it was impossible for the peasants to 
make a living. 
Another Japanese investigated village, Xiaojie in Tong county, provided 
detailed information about the importance of non-farming income in peasant life. Tong 
county is located about 24 li east of Beijing and less than 200 li northwest of Tianjin. 
The North Canal connected Tong county seat with Beijing and Tianjin. In the Qing 
Dynasty, Tongzhou, the administrative seat of Tong county, was the terminal of the 
Grand Canal and the deposit site of the tribute rice. Many people made a living on 
grain trading there. 
Like Shajing village in Shunyi county, Xiaojie lay near the county seat (about 6 
li southeast). In 1935, among the 164 households which resided in the village, 19 
households, or 12 percent, totally lived on non-farming income. Only 45 households, or 
27 percent, lived solely on farming. More than half of the residents (90 households or 
55 percent of the total) supplemented their income by working in non-farming 
industries. The remaining 10 households, or 6 percent, made their living as farming 
laborers.^ Table 5-4 shows the kinds of industries and the incomes for the 90 
households which worked in other industries besides farming on their own farms. For 
~ Mantetsu, Report on Xiaojie, 27. 
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Table 5-4, Non-farming engagement and income for 90 households 
in Xiaojie village, 1935 
Description of the non-fanning works Households Non-fkming income (yuan) 
Working as merchants or peddlers 26 3,209 
Working as fectory workers 22 1,096 
Working as merchant and faaory workers 9 690 
Working as Arming laborers on other farms 21 906 
Working as non-farming day-laborers 8 200 
Working as tomb guard 4 125 
Total 90 6.226 
Source: Mamexsa, Report on Xiaojie^  142-143. 
Table 5-5, Non-farming occupations and incomes for 19 households 
in Xiaojie, 1935 
Kinds of business Households Income (yuan) 
Commerce 12 1,100 
Factory workers 4 290 
Non-farming laborers 160 
Total 19 1,550 
Source: Mzntetsii, Report on Xiaojie, 142-143 
the 19 households which did no farming work, most were engaged in commerce. Their 
occupations and incomes are shown Table 5-5. 
According to the same investigation, Xiaojie village had 983 residents (499 
males and 484 females),^® among them 156 persons, or 16 percent of the total village 
Ibid., 26. 
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population (31 percent of the male population), worked outside of the village. Besides 
one or two students and another one who worked in Manchuria, all others worked in the 
cities. Among them more than half worked in Beijing, and the second largest number 
worked in Tongzhou. The investigators made it clear that there were five reasons for 
the people to leave the village and work in the cities. The first one was that the family 
farm was too small to absorb the surplus labor. The second was there were few proper 
sideline industries in the village. The third was that the village was near to the cities, 
such as Beijing and Tongzhou. The fourth reason was that it was easier to earn and 
save money by working outside than in the village. The last one was that people were 
tired of the hard work of farming and desired the urbanite living style. 
In 1935, the gross agricultural income for Xiaojie village was about 27,167 
yuan." If we deduct 10 percent of the gross income as expense for seeds and feed for 
domestic animals, the net farming income was about 24,450 yuan. In the same year, the 
income firom outside village working was 6.161 yuan. It was 25 percent of the net 
farming income or 20 percent of the total village income. 
As Tianjin developed quickly as a commercial and industrial center, many 
people in the villages of Baodi and Ninghe found jobs there. According to the Beining 
Railway Economic Survey Team's report, Baodi county was divided into ten wards. 
Most of those who went to Tianjin to work there as masons came fi-om the eighth ward. 
" Ibid., 144-45. 
119. 
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those who worked in Manchuria as bathing-house runners and barbers came from sixth 
and seventh wards, and those who went to Beiping and Tianjin to run shoe and hat 
shops mostly were residents of the fourth ward. In the county seat, many people went 
to Shanxi, Inner-Mongolia, Ganshu, Beiping and Tianjin to sell locally produced 
cloth."' For the whole county, the percentage of adult males employed in each main 
industry is shown in Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6, Occupations engaged by adult males in Baodi county, 1935 
Industry or occupation Employed numbers Percentage 
Civil and military service men 7,060 4.86% 
Farmers and farming related laborers 105,459 72.55 
Merchants and commercial employees 15,667 10.78 
Industnal and transportation workers 9,378 6.45 
Teachers, lawyers, doctors and journalists 1,079 0.74 
Others 6,717 4.62 
Total 145,360 100.00 
Source: Report of the Beining Railway Economic Sttrvey Team, 1061 -62. 
Note: The 14,620 students are excluded from the source table because studying is not a professional 
occupation. Also, the wrong total figures in the source table are corrected. 
Table 5-6 shows that in Baodi county, a little less than three quarters of the work 
force (assuming women only provided supplementary work in all businesses) engaged 
in farming. The other one quarter found work out of agriculture—most of them doing 
business in commerce or working in the factories. In Zhaoxiazhuang, a village famous 
 ^Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1062. 
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for its handicraft weaving, even in the farming busy season, in addition to the 40 day-
laborers who worked outside the village, 35 others still worked in the shops or factories 
in Tianjin.^° 
There was no case study of the villages around Tangshan, such as the Japanese 
did in Shajing and Xiaojie. But the few interviews with the village or town headmen 
reveal that the villages in or near Tangshan were transformed into a semi-urban area 
quickly. Chengzizhuang, a village located inside the Tangshan city administrative limit 
but 3 li out of the city center, had 960 households in 1941. Among them only 300, or 
31 percent, were old residents and engaged in farming, the others were new comers. 
The number of the households tripled but the amount of cropping land was reduced 
two-thirds as the textile, electric and cement companies bought the land for industrial 
use. Even the old residents had to work in the factories, they only worked on the farms 
in the busy season.''' 
Songxiezhuang, a small village which only had 50 households in the early 
twentieth century, had 350 households but only 300 mu of farming land in 1941. Like 
Chengzizhuang, farming became a sideline activity and most of the residents worked in 
the factories of cement or textile, or worked on the railway or in stone quarries."" 
Comparing the wages, it is clear that an industrial worker eamed a little higher than the 
farming laborer. For an ordinary worker, the daily payment was 1.5 yuan without 
Mantetsu, Report on the Investigcaion of General Conditions of the Sixteen Eastern Hebei Counties, 
141. 
" CN, CN, 4; 5-6. 
Ibid., 6-7. 
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boarding, the skilled worker could earn as much as 2.5 yuan. But for the farming 
laborers, even in the busy season, the payment was 1.0 or a little more plus two meals a 
day."^ 
From the examples of Shajing, Xiaojie and other three villages, it is clear that in 
western part of Eastern Hebei, about 25 percent of the villagers had permanent or 
temporary outside village work and the income from these work composed about 25 
percent of the total income for the peasants there. 
Going to Manchuria and the rise of the merchant-landlord class 
Besides going to Beijing, Tianjin and Tangshan to work in the commerce or 
industrial factories, some of the peasants in Eastern Hebei went beyond the Great Wall 
as peddlers, businessmen or laborers. Those who went through the passes, such as 
Nankou, Gubeikou and Xifengkou (see Figure 5-1), to Chahar and Jehol were called 
going "outside the passes" {koicwai). Besides the merchants who did business there, 
such as exporting locally produced cloth in Chengde and Chifeng or importing grain, 
hides and fiirs on return, most of those who went beyond the passes were poor peasants. 
In the slack season, they took several pieces of native cloth or other manufactured 
goods beyond the Great Wall to exchange for raw pig bristle, hides, furs and other 
products from the semi-agricultural residents. The Beim'ng Economic Survey Team 
found that in Zunhua county, some peasants always collected native cloth, candy, paper 
" Ibid., 6. 
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and other miscellaneous goods and sold them along the Great Wall. On return, they 
brought in all kinds of hides and furs and resold them at the county seat market""* 
There were also some peasants who had litde or had lost all their land in their 
native villages who went beyond the Great Wall to make a new living. In Dabeiguan 
village, Pinggu county, four people, Zhang Yulou, Zhang Hailou, Zhang Yuchen and 
Zhang Yuting, moved to Jehol. The last two were brothers (there were four sons in the 
family), each of them had only 1 mu of land, obviously, they could not make a living on 
such small parcel and were forced to leave the village. Their lands were returned to 
their father for cultivating. Zhang Yulou and Zhang Hailou inherited 12 mu and 22 mu 
of land respectively, after they went to Jehol, their lands were managed by their 
relatives in other villages (see Figure 3-1)."^ 
The report did not explain what these four people did in Jehol. Presumably they 
worked there first as farming laborers and eventually opened or bought lands for 
themselves and settled there. As Philip Huang pointed out in the Qing Dynasty, Jehol 
was developed for crop production. Compared with other developed [for farming] area, 
this new firontier had more managerial farmers and farming laborers."'^ In the early 
twentieth century, as not all of the land was developed beyond the Great Wall, people 
still could find opportunities there. 
" Report of the Beining Raitway Economic Survey Team  ^ 1305. 
Mantetsu, Report on Dabeiguan, 10. 
 ^Huang, The Peasant Economy, 100, Table 5.4. In the total 18 cases of landlord and tenant law-subs in 
Hebei and Shandong (1736-1796), 4 cases (22 percent of the total) happened beyond the Great Wall. This 
high percentage means in that area there were more landlords and fanning laborers. 
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Considering all those who went beyond the Great Wall, more peasants in 
Eastern Hebei went through Shanhaiguan and other small passes in Linyu county to 
Manchuria. People called this population movement as "going to Manchuria.""' 
Before 1900, part of Manchuria was forbidden to Han-Chinese emigrants and those who 
went to Manchuria must get a license from the local goverrmient which stated their 
purposes of traveling, they also paid a little fee."*^ By the twentieth century, all of 
Manchuria was opened for emigrants and as the Jingfeng Railway (also called Beining 
Railway) was completed, more people, especially those in Leting, Luan, Changli, 
Funing and Linyu, went to Manchuria to work there. The Custom Officials at 
Qinhuangdao reported in 1911 that 
Many of the natives of this prefecture [Yongping Prefecture] are engaged in trade at 
Moulcden, Changchun, Kirin, Harbin, and other Manchurian trade centers, and on 
questioning people regarding their absent relatives, the reply invariably given is that they 
are away in the 'Three Eastern Provinces'[Manchuria] trading. There is, however, no 
record of the number of people who have left.^ ' 
In the 1930s, as Manchuria was cut off from China proper, fewer people went 
there to do business than in the earlier decades, but the absolute number was till very 
high. Incomplete statistics reveal the numbers of people in Eastern Hebei who went to 
Manchuria in the nine months in 1935 (see Table 5-7). 
 ^The native people called "going to Manchuria" as ""chuang guandong,^  guandong" "•zou 
guandon  ^or "/wo guandong."" "Guandon  ^means "east of Shanhaiguan" or Manchuria. Chuang means 
forcing one's way in or braving the Journey, this word indicated the diflBculties in the early days of going to 
Manchuria. Xia, zou and pao all mean going. 
Linyu xianzhi (Linyu Gazetteer) (1929), vol. 11. 
C.I.M.C., Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 190 
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Table 5-7, Emigrants from Eastern Hebei to Manchuria, April to December, 1935 
County Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Chai^ 1,402 2,436 22 1,842 17 779 24 20 9 6,551 
Leting 482 1,770 17 1,250 2 862 108 40 92 4,623 
Funing 664 1,328 I 1,011 505 90 77 170 3,846 
Ninghe 480 602 139 482 207 340 88 52 45 2,435 
Baodi 899 582 85 244 94 202 55 52 41 2,254 
Luan 695 100 51 584 31 356 15 83 58 1,973 
Yud'an 552 350 3 201 141 296 84 • 114 39 1,780 
Fengrun 578 607 4 6 28 306 II 76 II 1,627 
Linyu 407 696 2 I 240 82 59 79 1,566 
Qian-an 366 244 2 105 35 108 30 32 9 931 
Lulong 290 293 152 I 114 20 12 39 921 
Ti 175 171 83 19 78 22 14 22 584 
Zunhua 119 54 I 41 10 9 16 17 15 282 
JQanghe 129 13 61 22 10 20 10 6 5 276 
Tong 52 47 3 49 16 16 12 7 10 212 
Sanhe 44 13 13 9 18 14 5 1 2 119 
Shunyi 10 12 11 j 4 14 3 18 75 
Miyun 1 2 11 4 j 7 9 37 
Pinggu 6 13 5 I 5 2 4 36 
Changping 5 6 2 5 1 1 20 
Huairou 3 I 4 
Total 7,353 9,326 417 6,114 640 4,262 696 666 678 30,152 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on the Investigation of General Conditions of the Sixteen Counties in Eastern 
Hebei, 218-219. 
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As Table 5-7 shows, about half of those who went to Manchuria came from the 
three counties of Changli, Leting and Funing (15,020 out of30,152). Regarding the 
time of going to Manchuria, most of the emigrants went there in the spring (April and 
May). This accorded with Li Dazhao's observation. Li was a native of Leting county, 
he was a pioneer of the Chinese coirmiunist movement and one of the founders of 
Chinese Communist Party. In early May of 1917, when Li returned to his home village, 
he stopped at a hotel in Changli county seat, he met many hometown people (including 
some females) who stopped there while going to Manchuria. Li commented that time 
(May) was the season for those merchants who came home to return to Manchuria. Li 
also stated that most of the merchants in Manchuria came from the seven counties of 
former Yongping Prefecture, among them Changli, Leting, Linyu and Funing provided 
the largest. 
The local gazetteers make it clear that going to Manchuria on a large scale was a 
twentieth century development. The Changli Gazetteer compiled in Tongzhi Period 
(1862-1874) described the commerce in Changli in the nineteenth century as follows; 
Chang]] has no rich merchants and entrepreneurs because it is not a center of trading and 
manufacturing. The grains [selling in Changb'] are imported from Manchuria and the silk 
and satin are brought from Souzhou, Hangzhou and Beijing. Most of the residems are 
native people and have lived here for many generations. There are few new comers. 
Although there are periodic markets in several big towns, the markets are opened for a 
limited time—from sun rise to sun set. There are no luxuries but only everyday needed 
goods in the periodic maiicets, such as cotton cloth, fish and salt. Almost all people 
lived on ferming and are satisfied with the simple rural life.^' 
 ^Li Daozhaoyu guxiang (Li Daozhao and his home town) (Beijing; Zhongyang wenxian, 1994), 339. 
•*' Changli xicmzhi (Chaii^ Gazetteer), compiled in Tongzhi period (1862-1874). 
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In the 1933, the compilers of the new Changli Gazetteer had a different story 
about the commercial activity in Changii county: 
As the Beining Railway runs from west to east across the county and railway stations 
have been built at the south gate of the county seat, Anshan and Shimen, it is easier to 
transport domestic and foreign made goods. The business of commerce became 
prosperous. The young boys who can read a Uttle always leave the villages and engage 
in business when they reach 14 or 15 years old. Even the illiterates also enter all kinds 
of stores as apprentices to leam to do business in commerce. Among those who left the 
villages to do business in the outside world, about 20 percent of them had busmess in the 
home county, 80 to 90 percent of them went to Manchuria, and very few of them wem 
west to Beijing or Tianjin. As these boys grow up, they could save a little money and 
some of them become rich.'*^ 
According to legend and the investigation materials, Leting peasants went to 
Manchuria in large numbers first. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a poor 
man named Liu Xinting went to Manchuria. He found that the farming tools, especially 
hoes, were in demand on a large scale in Manchuria. He also observed that the price of 
cotton and cloth which Manchuria did not produce were higher than those inside of the 
Great Wall. He borrowed a little capital fi^om his relatives to begin his business of 
transporting hoes, cotton and cloth to Manchuria and brought back grains, beans, 
tobacco and indigo to sell in his home area. He made a fortune from this business. His 
descendants continued his business and opened branch stores all over Manchuria and 
Eastern Hebei. In the twentieth century, Lius were famous for their wealth and were 
called "the number one rich family in Eastern Hebei."^^ 
Changli xicmzhi (Changli Gazetteer), (1933), vol. 4. 
Wei Hongyun, Investigation and Research on Eastern Hebei Villages, 345. 
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Few people could be so lucky and successful as the Liu family was, but a lot of 
those who went to Manchuria did make some money and improved their social and 
economic statues. The family of Li Dazhao provides another example. 
Li was a native of Daheituo, a village in Leting county. According to the 
genealogy of the Li family, Li Dazhao's ancestors settled in Daheituo in the early Ming 
Dynasty under the government's calling [to settle around the Capital]. By 1811, as the 
harvest was poor that year, the Li clan had no money to maintain its ancestors' tombs 
and keep normal sacrifice for their ancestors. In 1863, the Li clan seemed to recover 
from the natural disaster and under Li Weiwo's [Daozhao's great grandfather] 
suggestion, the Lis renewed their lineage organization and activity of sacrificing for 
their ancestors. They bouglit "sacrificing" land (the income from that land was used for 
the ceremony), built a tomb-guarding house and planted trees around the tombs."" We 
don't know how the Li family made a recovery and whether Li Weimo went to 
Manchuria, but it is certain that Li Ruzhen (1827-1907), Dazhao's grandfather, went to 
Manchuria and made a fortune. He ran grocery stores in Changchun, Wanbaoshan and 
other places in Manchuria when he was young. In 1881, he rebuilt the family residence. 
The new house-compound had three courts and about 20 rooms. Because Li Dazhao 
was bom in this building, the house is still kept in good conditions and is open for 
visitors. As the local people said, this house represents a typical merchant-landlord 
residence in Eastern Hebei. Even by today's standards, the residence was well designed 
^ See "the introduction to the genealogy of Li &inily of Daheituo," a broken stone stele which was 
established in 1863. Cited from Li Dazhao and His Home Town, 11. 
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and built Obviously, Da;diao's grandfather was a successful business man. A stone 
stele established before the village temple indicated that Li Ruzhen had the title of 
"quasi-ninth rank"—^the lowest bureaucratic rank in Qing Dynasty/^ As the family 
genealogy did not note an official post for Li Ruzhen, it can be assumed that he bought 
the title for himself Like most retired merchants in old China, Li Ruzhen bought 
several dozen mu of land and increased the family holding to about 100 mu.^ He 
became a merchant-landlord. At the same time, he encouraged his adopted son (Li 
Renrong, Dazhao's father who died seven months before Dazhao's birth in 1889) and 
grandson to study for the civil service exams. 
Li was not the richest or only family who made a fortune by going to Manchuria 
in Daheituo. The other big names in the village were Gu and Zhao. Dazhao's wife 
came from the Zhao family. Like Dazhao's grandfather, her grandfather also once 
worked in Manchuria. Her father—^Zhao Wendong (1847-1903)—^went to Manchuria 
too and had two wives. According to the investigation, Zhao's home also had more 
than twenty rooms and more than 100 mu of land."*^ Zhao's family was a little richer 
than, or at least as rich as the Li family. From occupation to family wealth, both the Li 
and Zhao families were good matches for a marriage contract. The Lis and Zhaos in 
Daheituo represented those who went to Manchuria in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, it appears that it was easier to make money at that time. 
Ibid., 13. The stone stele was established in 1887. 
Li Dazhao guju (Li Dazhao's former residence), (Shijiazhiiang, Hebei renmin, 1996), 15. 
Li Dazhao and His Home Town, 28. 
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By the twentieth century, going to Manchuria became a fad in Eastern Hebei. 
Both poor and rich people went there to fulfill their dreams of moving up the social and 
economic ladder. In Xinkaikou, a small village located in the southern part of Leting 
county, among the 146 residents, 39, or 27 percent of the total, worked in Manchuria in 
the 1930s. One family had more than 40 mu of land, which for the standard of that time 
meant it was a middle-class family, at least, they had enough land to cultivate. But all 
three sons of the family went to Manchuria at the age of about twenty. The family land 
was cultivated by two hired year-laborers. The eldest son worked in a grocery store in 
Changchun, the second worked in a grain-trading shop in Zhaodong, the youngest 
began to work as an apprentice at a woolen mill in Harbin. In the 1930s and early 
1940s, it was more difficult to do business in Manchuria because the Japanese began to 
tighten their control over the economy there, especially over commercial activity. Few 
of the emigrants could make any money and remit it to their families at home. When 
asked why they went to Manchuria instead of working on the family farm, they 
answered that it was the fad: people thought working in Manchuria as clerks or 
managers not only could bring in more money but also improve the family social 
status."*^ 
As so many people firom Eastern Hebei worked in Manchuria, they almost 
monopolized the grocery and other small businesses there. They became a unique 
social and economic class and were called laotan-er bang {bang means gang or clique). 
Interview made in Xinkaikou in 1996 by the author. 
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Qi Changting, a native of Changli county, who worked in Manchuria from 1902 to 
1926, explained that laotan-er meant "honest people.'^' But another explanation might 
be more believable: laotan-er was the mispronunciation of leting because the local 
people called leting as laoting, it was the nickname for those emigrants who came from 
Leting, Changli and Luan. In Manchuria, people called those who came from Linyu and 
Funing as hua-laotan-er, hua means quasi or somewhat alike. Qi Changting boasted to 
the Japanese investigators that "wherever the sparrow could reach, there was a laotan-
er [in Manchuria]." According to him, most of the laotan-er engaged in grocery stores 
or the grain trading business, the hua-laotan-er engaged in cash-shops and the buying 
and selling second-hand clothes.^" 
Going to Manchuria not only alleviated the population pressure to some degree, 
but also brought huge amount of cash to Eastern Hebei. According to one investigation, 
before 1931, the emigrant workers remitted about 9,000,000 yvian to Leting county 
alone. In 1936. although fewer people went to Manchuria and it was more difficult to 
make money there under the Japanese occupation, the emigrant workers still remitted 
about 4,000,000 yuan a year to their home county.^' 
Houjiaying, a village in Changli county surveyed in detail by the Japanese, 
provided a case for the study of going to Manchuria. Houjiaying is located 10 
kilometers south of the county seat, or 70 kilometers from the Manchuria border. When 
cn, CN, 5; 252. 
Ibid., 5: 252. 
Mantetsu, Report on the Investigation of General Conditions of the Sixteen Counties in Eastern Hebei, 
239. 
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the investigation was made in 1942, there were 117 households with approximately 704 
residents in the village. The total cultivable land was 2,979 mu in 1941. Among the 
108 households which held some land, 75 households, or nearly 70 percent of total, had 
less than 30 mu. On average, each person held 4.23 mu, it was a little higher than the 
average size in Hebei province, but was still not enough to make a living—^the villagers 
said they needed 6 mu to support one person.'" Going to Manchuria became an 
important part of the village economy. The statistics show that about 50 adult males 
from about 34 households worked in Manchuria in the first four decades of twentieth 
century.^" The following examples show who went and what they did in Manchuria. 
In the nineteenth century, some peasants in Houjiaying had already left the 
village and gone beyond Shanhaiguan to do business in Manchuria. Hou Dingqi, father 
of the former village head, ran a grocery store in Sm'zhong county as early as in the 
1880s. Suizhong was located in the southern part of Fengtian Province. It was an 
important passing stop along the corridor of going to Manchuria. Hou Dingqi not only 
gave aid, such as providing food and lodging, to his home villagers passing through 
Suizhong, but also actively searched and located jobs for these people. The 
beneficiaries of Hou's help dedicated a plaque praising Dingqi as a philanthropist^ 
The recollections showed that Hou Shupan, Liu Hui, Hou Huangsheng and Hou 
Yuanzhen also worked in Nfenchuria in the late mneteenth century. 
" cn, CN, 5: 5. 
This is my caiculatioa according to the household survey made by the Japanese investigators in 1941. 
As the peasants' recollection was not accurate, the resultmg calculation might not be 100 percent accurate. 
CN, CN, 5: 37. 
160 
It is easy to imagine that the poorest people—^those who lost their lands and 
could not make a living in the home village—went to Manchuria to make a new 
beginning. This is correct but not complete. The investigation material showed that 
people from all social and economic classes went to Manchuria and they held a 
common hope—to make money and return home to buy land. 
Most of the sons of the big but poor families went to Manchuria. For example, 
Hou Shupan had three brothers, the family had only 19 mu of poor land. As the eldest 
one of the brothers, Shupan had to go to Manchuria when he was 17 years old. He 
worked in a business of grain trade in Suizhong for more than 40 years. His two 
brothers, the second and the fourth, also worked in Manchuria, one was in Harbin and 
the other was in Mukden, both of them worked as cooks. The third brother, who 
cultivated the family land and supported their parents at home, also went to Manchuria 
in 1937 after the parents died. The family land was sold to pay the cost of the funerals. 
The third brother worked as an accountant in a hat shop in Shenyang. Hou Shupan 
returned to the village at age of 65 in 1937, but his only son still worked in Manchuria. 
When the investigation was made in 1942, Hou Shupan, his wife, his daughter-in-law 
and two grandsons lived in the village. He did not mention that he bought any land, 
perhaps he lived on his savings or the remittances from his son.^^ 
Hou Yuanzhen also had three brothers. When the household was divided among 
the four brothers in 1920, the family had only 7 mu land. Although the land was 
" Ibid., 5: 69. 
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inherited by the third brother to support the parents, all four brothers went to Manchuria 
to make a living. Three of them worked in the grain business as clerks or manual 
laborers, the other one worked in a money-shop {qianpu, a business of currency 
exchange and money lending). Like Hou Shupan, Hou Yuan/hen returned to the village 
in 1937 to spend his remaining years. 
Hou Yongkuan and his two brothers divided the household in 1890. Each of 
them received 3 mu of land. Yongkxian had four sons, except for the second son, the 
other three worked in Manchuria (in Shenyang). The eldest one was a merchant with 
little capital. Both the third and the fourth sons ran hemp bag shops. In 1942, the 
family still was very poor, Yongkuan had to rent land from other villagers, which he 
worked with his second son. As Yongkuan said, the family was so poor that the four 
sons did not divide the household—there was nothing to be divided. 
Middle class people also went to Manchuria. Hou Jinduo and Hou Jinsheng 
were brothers. Jinsheng was adopted by his aunt. Both Jinduo and Jinsheng inherited 
about 40 mu land. It was enough for each family to cultivate without needing to rent 
other land. But neither Jinduo nor Jinsheng stayed at home to cultivate their own lands, 
both of them went to Manchuria to make their fortunes. They worked in different 
grocery stores in Xi-an, a town located south of Shipingjie. Because there were no male 
" Ibid., 5:91-92. 
" Ibid., 5: 244-245. 
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adults at home, Jinduo had to lease half of his land to other villagers and Jinsheng had 
his land farmed by his brother-in-law without collecting rent^^ 
Hou Baotian, a upper-middle class man with 70 mu of land when he served as 
the village head and village school supervisor in the 1920s, went to Manchuria too and 
did not return until the investigation was made. The villagers did not explain how Hou 
Baotian lost half of his land in the 1930s, but it is clear that he was not forced to leave 
the village due to economic need because by 1942 he still had 35 mu which was enough 
to support his family. Obviously, Hou Baotian went to Manchuria to look for new 
opportunities.^' 
Among the villagers who went to Manchuria, quite a few of them were 
landlords or sons of landlords. Liu Wanju was adopted by his uncle and inherited about 
170 mu land. He had four sons, the eldest was Liu Binkui. Although Binkui was one of 
the sons of the richest landlords in the village, he was not satisfied with working as a 
farmer. From 1918 to 1929, he worked in Shenyang and Fushun as a clerk in grocery 
stores. Binkui's second brother was a school teacher, the third brother also worked in 
Manchuria for a period. After Liu Wanju died, Binkui had to return to the village to run 
the family farm, but his fourth brother still worked in Manchuria as a forestry bureau 
employee.*^ 
The investigation material shows that population pressure or natural disaster— 
Ibid., 5; 85, 296. 
Ibid., 5:42. 
Ibid., 5: 243-45. 
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Houjiaying was always being flooded in the summer—was not the main or only reason 
for going to Manchuria. Looking for new opportunity and making money were the 
main cause. Kong Ziming, who worked in Manchuria from 1915 to 1935 and served as 
deputy village head in 1942, made it clear that everyone went to Manchuria in the hope 
of making money to buy more land. Kong himself added 6 mu to the 10.5 mu he 
inherited from his father after he returned to the village.^' Of course, not everyone 
could make money and retum home gloriously. Hou Rm'wen said that he could only 
earn enough to keep himself from starving when he worked in Manchuria as a peddler. 
His brother did not save any money in Manchuria either.^" All villagers admitted that it 
was harder to do business in Manchuria after the Japanese invasion, but most of them 
claimed that it was easier to make money by doing business than working in the fields. 
Only Hou Changrong did not think so. He said that it was better to rent land or 
sharecrop with the landlord than to work in Manchuria, but, his condition was "if you 
have money or seed."^"* 
As the examples show, all the emigrants worked in non-farming industries. 
Most of them worked in grocery stores as managers, clerks or apprentices. Other 
worked as tanners, blacksmiths or cooks. Only one person, Hou Baoshan's brother, 
managed a farm of600 mu in Dalai County. Some of the emigrants did not stay in one 
place or one industry while they worked in Manchuria. Hou Yuangong, the fourth son 
" Ibid., 5: 239. 
Ibid., 5; 63-64. 
" Ibid., 5; 193. 
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from a middle class family, worked in Manchuria from 1910 to 1935. He began to 
work in a pawn shop in Suizhong county when he was 16 years old in 1910. Two years 
later, he worked in a grocery store in Hailong county, working there for four years. 
Then, he transferred to a hotel in Tongliao and worked there for only two years and 
moved agaiiL This time he worked in a jewelry shop in Shenyang for another two 
years. His last stop was Changling, where he worked in a money shop for nine years. 
While he worked in Manchuria, 11 mu of his land was rented to other villagers and his 
family (wife and children) only cultivated the remaining 4.5 mu.^ 
As managers or clerks of a grocery store or other business, most emigrants from 
Houjiaying could read and write. In fact, almost all of them received several years 
education at the private or village schools. While their illiterate fathers and brother 
worked on the fields, these "educated" emigrants worked in non-farming industries in 
Manchuria. 
There is no record of how much money these emigrants earned outside of the 
village but all materials indicate that the remittances from Manchuria were huge in the 
early twentieth century. The effect of this "outside earned money" on the village 
economy was obvious. In 1942, among the nine richest families in Houjiaying, six of 
them became rich in their own generation through working in Manchuria. Hou 
Qingchang's father held only 16.5 mu land in the late nineteenth century. From 1897 
on, Qingchang had worked in Shenyang. At the beginning, he worked in a Chinese fan 
" Ibid., 5: 94. 
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shop as an apprentice, then, he became the clerk and manager of the shop. Eventually, 
he was able to buy more than 100 mu of land in the home village and become one of the 
biggest landlords.According to the villagers' story, Hou Baolian's family had to live 
on begging in his father's generation. Baolian and his brother worked in Manchuria for 
thirty years and saved enough money to buy 110 mu land, they became new landlords in 
the village.^ Hou Yuanlai and Hou Yuanjin were brothers, at the beginning, they were 
landless peddlers in the village. As the living was so hard they had to ask their friends 
and relatives to introduce them to work in Manchuria. They worked as apprentices 
first, after several years, they saved some money to open their own hemp bag shops. 
The two brothers bought 110 mu land also and both of them became absentee 
landlords.®^ In Houjiaying, only one of the richest villagers—Liu Wande—did not go to 
Manchuria. He inherited his property from his father. But he did not depend on 
farming alone, he ran a chinaware shop in the village and taught in a primary school at 
t 6s the county seat 
As many adult males went to Manchuria and some of them brought money back 
to buy land, the land was amassed in several landlords' hands and farming by hired 
laborers developed in this area. Li Dazhao noted that in Leting county, most landlords 
" Ibid., 5; 153, 181. 
Ibid., 5; 89-90, 151, 175. 
Ibid., 5; 152-53. 
Ibid., 5; 42,151. 
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Table 5-8, Land distribution in Sangyuan village, Leting county, 1936 
Land holding Households Percent Land-held (mu) Percent 
No land 17 33.33% 0 0.00% 
<10 mu 8 15.69 46 2.85 
10-19.99 mu 4 7.84 52 3.22 
20-29.99 mu 4 7.84 86.5 5.36 
30-39.99 mu 4 7.84 133 8.24 
40-49.99 mu 3 5.88 126 7.81 
50-59.99 mu 2 3.92 106 6.57 
60-69.99 mu I 1.96 60 3.72 
70-79.99 mu 3 5.88 212 13.14 
80-89.99 mu 1 1.96 80 4.96 
>90 mu 4 7.84 712 44.13 
Total 51 100.00 1.613.5 100.00 
Source: Mantetsu, Tenshin jimusho chosaka, Kahokusho noson Jittai chosa shrryo (Investigation 
Materials Regarding Actual Conditions of Villages in Hefaei Province: Dongyangqiu Village in Wangdu 
County and other 18 Villages) (Tianjin, 1936), 94. 
went to Manchuria to do business and hired year-laborers to farm the land.^' Sangyun, 
another village in Leting county, provided an example. In 1936, there were 51 
households in Sangyuan village. The land distribution is shown in Table 5-8. 
As Table 5-8 shows, among the 51 households, one third of them had no land at 
all. On the other extreme, four households (8 percent of the total) held 44 percent of 
the total land in the village. The investigator made it clear that the main reason of land-
holding polarization was the result of going to Manchuria. All four big landlords in the 
Li Dazhao and His Home Town, 363. A note to a proverb which said "the weak horse lowers his head, 
a chafiffed laborer does poor work." According to Li Dazhao, this proverb warned the landlords to not 
treat their hired laborers too poorly. 
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village accumulated their wealth first by doing business in Manchuria and then bought 
land at home. The other way of amassing land was through money-lending. The poor 
peasants always had to borrow a little from those who made some money in Manchuria. 
As a condition, they put up their lands as a guarantee for the loan. When they failed to 
repay the debts, the lands were confiscated by the money-lenders.^° 
As in the case in Xinkaikou, because the adult males went to Manchuria, most 
of the farming work was done by hired laborers in Sangyuan village. The middle 
peasants who had 25 to 60 mu of land hired one or two year-laborers. For those who 
held 70 mu or more, three or four year-laborers were hired. In the busy seasons, day-
laborers were also needed. As a result, a day-laborer market was developed in the 
neaity town of Tangjiahe. In the early morning (4-5 am.), the laborers assembled there 
to wait for hiring. They brought hoes or sickles with them and bargained with the 
employers. After the agreement was reached, the laborer followed the employer to their 
home to work. They always worked from 6 am to 7 pm with three or four periods of 
rest. The employers provided three meals and after the dinner the daily wage was paid. 
At the same time, the day-laborer made sure if he was needed the next day. After that, 
he took his tools to go home. In Sangyuan, most day laborers were hired by the home 
villagers, few of them went to wait for employment at the Tangjiahe labor market.^" 
™ Mantetsu, Tenshin jimusho chosalca. Investigation Materials Regarding Actual Conditions of Villages 
in Hebei Province, 101. 
•" Ibid., 101. 
" Ibid., 109. 
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As noted earlier, on average, per household or per person land holding in 
Eastern Hebei was a little higher than the provincial average. But the land was poorer 
and the productivity was lower. Use the same calculating format the Japanese 
investigators used in Shajing village, it can be seen that none of the 11 sample 
households in Houjiaying village could produced enough grain for their own 
consumption. All of them had to buy some grain to support their families (see Table 5-
9). Thus, without the non-farming income form the outside world, it was impossible for 
these peasants to keep themselves from starvation. 
Table 5-9, Grain production and consumption for the 11 sample households 
in Houjiaying, 1942 (grain unit: shi) 
Household Adult equivalent Grain produced Grain needed Surplus or deficit 
Hou Yongqin 7.60 15.40 22.80 -7.40 
Hou Zhiping 7.10 3.27 2L30 -18.03 
Kong Ziming 3.60 2.65 10.80 -8.15 
Hou Zhenshan 7.40 3.40 22.20 -18.80 
Hou Baoshan 3.00 3.00 9.00 -6.00 
Yie Jinrui 13.90 7.95 41.70 -33.75 
Hou Yongfeng 2.60 1.57 7.80 -6.23 
Hou Yuanhui 3.60 1.65 10.80 -9.15 
Hou Zhilong 8.30 4.74 24.90 -20.16 
Liu He 1.80 1.71 5.40 -3.69 
Liu Shukai 7.60 2.69 22.80 -20.11 
Total 66.50 48.03 199.50 -151.47 
Source: CN, CN, 5: 280-296. 
Note: The total sample households were 13,1 exclude two absentee landlords. 
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Compared with the Europeans who ventured all over the world in the eighteenth 
centuiy and the Americans who settled the West of the United States in the nineteenth 
century, Chinese people were well known for their conservative psychology and 
Chinese peasants were often portrayed as bound to both earth and home/^ It is true that 
in pre-Iiberation China, most Chinese peasants thought land was the only real property 
and farming was the main or proper occupation, but either attracted by the non-farming 
opportunity or forced by the deterioration of land-man ratio, since the late m'neteenth 
century, more and more peasants left their villages and found work in the outside world. 
This tendency is obvious in Eastern Hebei. The decline of rural industry and decrease 
of outside working opportunities contributed to the hardship of peasant economy in the 
1930s, this will be discussed in next chapter. 
^ Walter H. Mallory pointed out that "the adventurous spirit that settled the western part of North. 
America is entirely lacking in China.... the great factor against Chinese emigration is that innate 
conservatism of the race coupled with a lack of proper governmental encouragement and support." 
Mallory, China: Land of Famine (New York: American Geographical Society, 1928), 119. 
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CHAPTER 6. mS HARDER TO MAKE A LIVING; 
STATE INVOLUTION, IMPERIALISM AND PEASANTS' LIVELIHOOD 
IN THE 1930S 
The fonner chapters have described how the peasants of Eastern Hebei made a 
living by engaging in agriculture, industry, commerce, or some combination of all these 
industries. This chapter will focus on the changes in peasant life during the 1930s and 
answer the following questions; was it easier or harder to make a living for the peasant 
in the 1930s? If it was harder than before, what were the causes? To answer these 
questions, an analysis of the peasant's obligations to the state (the taxes and levies) 
must be undertaken. 
State involution and increasing taxation 
Compared with what the peasant had to pay in the later years, the tax burden in 
the nineteenth century in Eastern Hebei was not heavy. There were two kinds of 
burdens, one was the land tax {tianfu), the other was the levy {laoyi or bingcai). The 
former was collected from the land ovraers, those who rented land were excepted. The 
later was levied on the whole community (village) on special occasions, such as the 
emperor visiting the Eastern Tombs (in Zunhua county) and imperial troops passing 
through this area. The rate of land tax varied according to the degrees of land fertility. 
The tax rate and the acres of taxed land were fixed with little change since the early 
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eighteenth century.' The government also levied a small tax or fee on land and house 
deeds, and on the licenses for marketing brokers. But as Li Ling and Feng Huade 
pointed out, in the nineteenth century, the deed tax viras only a registration fee with the 
purpose to protect people's ownership of the properties, the tax on the licenses for the 
brokers was meant to limit the number of brokers to protect the merchants." Table 6-1 
shows the land taxes in Sanhe county. 
Table 6-1, Land taxes in Sanhe county in 1935 
Land description Taxed land (mu) Land tax (sil. tael) Tax rate (tael/mu) 
Private land 638,691 15,131 0.023690462 
Bannerland 193,436 14,802 0.076521433 
Governmental land 14,670 553 0.037695978 
Source; Sanhe xianzhi (Sanhe Gazetteer) (1935), vol. 5. 
As we have little information about the peasant's production in the nineteenth 
century, it is difficult to get a percentage which was paid to the goverrunent as taxes, 
but the available materials clearly show that the peasant's burden from all kinds of 
taxes increased in the later years. This increase of taxation began around 1900 and was 
accompam'ed with the procession of the so-called "state building" which Prasenjit 
' "In 1712 the ofBcial rates for the most important imperial revenue, the land tax, were fixed in perpetuity 
by the K'ang-xi emperor; the provincial quotas due to Peking were to be raised only as new land was 
opened to cultivation and added to the tax rolls, increments which the provinces rarely recorded in their 
reports to the capital." Albert Feuwerker, "Economic Trends in the Late Ch'ing Empire, 1870-1911," in 
John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu, ed.. The Cambridge History of China, vol. 11; Late Ch 'ing, 
1800-1911, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 60. 
• Li Ling, "A research on the deed tax in Hebei Province;" Feng Huade, The evolution of the brokerage 
tax in Hebei Province;" See Fang Xianting, ed., Zhongffio jingjiyanjiu (Studies of the Chinese Economy) 
(Changsha; Shangwu, 1938), 1081-1094; 1067-1080. 
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Duara characterized as a procession of "state invoIutioiL"'' There were two main ways 
to increase the taxation. One was surcharges on the normal taxes, 
the other was "periodical levies" {tankuan). According to Feng Huade's study, the tax 
increase originated directly from the payment of the Boxer Indenmity. He observed that 
"after the Boxer Rebellion [in 1900], to pay the indemnity and to finance all kinds of 
aftermath works, the expenditure increased dramatically and the budget was in crisis. 
The government had to open new revenues."^ The new revenues included surcharges 
on old taxes and legalization of the new taxes. 
In the Qing Dynasty, there was no distinction between central and local 
revenues. Except the small part used to pay the administrative expenses at the county 
level, all tax incomes in the county were transmitted to the central government through 
the provincial treasurer. Beginning in the Republic period (after 1912), both provincial 
and county governments developed their own revenues and competed with the central 
government to hold on to the tax income (mainly the land tax) for its own use. No 
matter who controlled or used the incomes, all taxes were paid by the peasants and 
small merchants. Table 6-2 shows the growth of real revenue incomes and 
expenditures of Hebei Province in the Republic period. 
As Prasenjit Duara noted, the most striking feature about Table 6-2 is the timing 
of the increases in provincial revenues. There is a clear cascading pattern that occurs 
^ Presenjit Duara, Culture, Fewer, cmd the State: Rural North Chirta, 1900-1942 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), chapter 3. 
Fang Xianting ed.. Studies of the Chinese Economy, 1069. 
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Table 6-2, Real incomes and expenditures of Hebei Privince and 
yearly percentage change, 1913-1934 (unit: yuan) 
Year Real income Percentage change Real expenditure Percentage change 
1913 1,625,484 8,255,433 
I9I4 5,776,648 255% 3,220,212 -60% 
1916 2,644,561 -54 2,131,015 -34 
1919 10,899,222 312 19,438,756 343 
1925 9,603,207 -12 11,267,475 19 
1931 31,131,782 224 31,132,598 176 
1932 20,576,769 -34 20,576,769 -34 
1933 25,517,821 24 25,517,821 24 
1934 16,056,000 -37 15,735.023 -38 
Source: Zhang Ylfen, "An investigation of local finances in Hebei province," Fuxing Yuekan 4.4. Cited 
from Duara, Culture, Power, and the State, 69, Table 1. 
Note: All real values in the table have been convened from nominal figures by utilizing an in index of 
purchasing power for North China, compiled by a Nankai University team, based on wholesale prices in 
Tianjin. 
over three distinct periods in the province corresponding to three different 
political regimes in Republic China: the early Republic under Yuan Shikai (represented 
by the years 1913, 1914, and 1916); the warlord period (1919 and 1925); and the 
period of Nationalist rule (the remaining years). Within this configuration, it becomes 
particularly clear that although there was a rather slow rate of growth in provincial 
income with periodic declines within each period, there were rather startling increases 
in provincial income from one period to the next/ This means from Yuan Shikai to the 
Nationalist government, the peasants' burden was not lowered but increased. 
^ Duara, Culture, Power, and the State, 67. 
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How did the provincial government increase its revenues? Table 6-3 shows that 
from 1916 to 1934, the land revenue (land tax) did not increase but decreased in Hebei 
Province in real value. But other revenues increased several times in the same period. 
The "other revenues" included deed taxes, brokerage taxes and excise taxes. 
Table 6-3, Real income of Hebei Province and yearly percentage 
1916-1934 (um"t: yuan) 
Year Land revenue Change Other revenue Change Total income Change 
1916 8,181,696 2,644,561 10,826,257 
1919 7,165,412 -12% 3,733,810 41% 10,899,222 0.60% 
1925 5,971,422 -16 3,631,785 -j 9,603,207 -12 
1931 3,971,440 -33 27,160,342 648 31,131,782 224 
1932 5,632,143 42 14,944,626 -45 20,576,769 -34 
1933 6,306,931 12 19,210,890 28 25,517,821 24 
1934 5,446,864 -13 10,609,136 -45 16,056,000 -37 
Source; Ehiara, Culture, Power, and the State^  69, Table 2. 
At first glance, the provincial government did not increase the land tax rate, but 
in fact the peasants' burden was doubled or tripled because they had to pay higher taxes 
on land bought or sold, on marketing the products or paying higher prices for non-
agricultural products as the government levied higher taxes on the merchants and the 
merchants transferred part of the taxes to the buyers (peasants). 
Compared with the provincial revenue, almost all county incomes were new 
taxes put on the peasants—surcharges and periodic levies {mujiian and tankuan). The 
tax names were not new, before 1900, the peasants had already paid a surcharge on the 
175 
land tax called a "melting fee" and paid a crop watching fee according to the mu of 
land. But the amount was small and the later was paid to the village for community 
use. In the Republic period, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, the surcharges and the 
levies were collected by the county government and became new taxes. Table 6-4 
shows that about 80 percent of the income of Qinghai county (located outside but near 
Eastern Hebei) came from surcharges and mujuan. In fact, only the income from 
"county property" might be old income which existed before 1900. 
Table 6-4, Distribution of income sources in Qinghai county, 1928-1933 
Land tax Deed tax County Mujium Brokerage tax 
Year surcharge surcharge property {periodic levies) surcharge Total 
1928 57% 12% 15% 5% 89% 
1929 30 7 8 47% 3 95 
1930 31 14 7 40 4 96 
1932 45 19 14 3 9 90 
1933 36 17 II 17 9 90 
1934 39 11 7 30 5 92 
Source: Feng Hiiada, "The financial foundation of county administration," cited fi-om Duara, Culture, 
Power, and the State, 80, Table 4. 
Note: The remaining 4 to 11 percent is made up of a multitude miscellaneous duties. 
Tax increases are not necessarily bad for the peasants if the taxes are used for 
the benefit of the tax payers. Unfortunately for Eastern Hebei peasants, little of the 
taxes paid to all governmental agencies directly benefited the peasants, most were 
wasted as wages to governmental employees (including hired policemen and self-
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defense forces). Once again, Qinghai county will be used as an example to show the 
distribution of expenditures in the county level. 
Table 6-5 shows that about 50 percent of the total expenditure was used to 
maintain the police and security forces which did not exist before 1900. Another 
important expenditure was education which might benefit of peasants but the education 
percentage was decreasing during this period. From the warlord era to the Nationalist 
government era, the expenditure for modernization projects (such as road building) saw 
little change, except for two years, the expenditures were below 10 percent of the total 
expenditure. As most of the county revenue went to pay wages and there was little left 
over to provide for projects, the system of local finances ended up as a system 
supporting the livelihood of an increasing number of state employees. The local 
government became an "employment contraption." Feng Huade, a specialist on local 
government and its finances in the 1930s, summed up the situation succinctly: "This 
disproportional distribution of expenditures [on salaries], especially for such items as 
industrial development (such as water control), which by its very nature requires greater 
outlays on equipment than on salaries, results in the creation of a nominal staff whose 
function is actually not to function. Under such circumstances, money spent is 
equivalent to money wasted, although the burden on the peasant is not in the least 
alleviated."^ 
® Feng Huade, '*An analysis of county expenditure in Hebei Province," Cited from Duara, Culture, Power, 
cavl the State, 83. 
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Table 6-5, Distributioii of expenditure in Qinghai county, 1919-1933 
Function 1919-23 1924-28 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Education 41% 43% 48% 24% 22% 38% 31% 22% 
Police 49 37 49 27 19 33 21 24 
Security 47 40 3 17 30 
Modernization projects 7 J 2 2 10 18 13 8 
Ward government 12 9 8 15 16 
Other 2 4 1 •> J 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Feng Huade, "The financial foundation of county administratioa," cited from Duara, Culture, 
Power, and the State, 82, Table 6. 
Note; 1919-23 and 1924-28 were annual average. 
The provincial and county taxes were not the only burden the peasants had to 
bear. As the state tried to reach into the villages and enlarge its revenue income, the 
former sub-county informal administrative organizations (such as Li or Bao in the Qing 
Dynasty) were bureaucratized and more and more "state brokers" (Duara's terminology, 
such as tax collectors) were employed. These state brokers were not paid by the 
government revenue, they lived on "surcharges" from the tax payers. In Eastern Hebei, 
as in other parts of the province, almost all taxes were contracted to the tax-farmers. 
These tax farmers charged a fee on what they collected. The peasants paid much more 
than what the govenunent received. 
For a long time, the north China villages developed un-ofBcial organizations to 
supervise village wide activities, such as watching and protecting the crops grown on 
the fields, maintaining the village temples and renting temple lands, and giving plays to 
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honor the gods and entertain the villagers. These organizations raised the money 
needed for their activities by assessing the village famihes, often according to the 
amount of land they owned or operated. The money was called "green crop money" 
{qingmiaotian or mujuan). Before 1900, this "village tax" was very small and almost 
all was used directly for the villagers. But after 1900, under the government demand or 
pressure, the village had to develop its budget and the village tax became a heavy 
burden to the peasants, especially in times of war. Perhaps more unbearable for the 
peasants was that the expenditures of these taxes were not related with their benefits. 
Table 6-6 and Table 6-7 show the village income and expenditures in Xiaoying, Pinggu 
county and Lujiazhai, Zunhua county. 
According to the investigation, Xiaoying had about 3,169 mu of land. As the 
total mujuan was 1,000 yuan, the mujuan rate was about 0.31 yuan per mu. At the same 
time, the peasants paid land tax (including surcharge) and levies to the county 
government, the rate was about 0.36 yuan per mu. The total state taxes and \allage fees 
per mu in Xiaoying was 0.67 yuan.^ In Lujiazhai, among the total 726.14 yuan 
expenditure, 511.33 yuan, or 70 percent, was paid for self-defending public safety 
(defense corps and police), only 168.42 yuan, or 23 percent, was used directly or 
indirectly in the village for peasants' benefit, such as for village meeting, road and dyke 
repairing, crop watching and entertainment. In the total village income, mujitan was 
^ Mantetsu, Report on Xiaoying, 23. 
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Table 6-6, Village income and expenditure in Xiaoying, Miyun county, 1934-35 
Income source or eqienditure description Amount (yuan) Percentage 
Income 
Rent form public land 168 14% 
Mujuan 1,000 86 
Total 1,168 100 
Expenditure 
Village school 280 25 
Village defense 246.64 22 
village administration 167 15 
Road and bridge repairing 50 5 
Sacrificing to the gods and entertainment 40 4 
Interest paid for borrowed money 90 8 
Others 228.20 21 
Total 1.101.84 100 
Source; Mantetsu, Repon on Xiaoying  ^ 21 -22. 
Table 6-7, Village expenditure in Lujiazhai, Zunhua county, 1934-35 
Description Amount (yuan) Percerrtage 
Village meeting 20.74 3% 
• Paid to the defense corps 132.77 32 
Paid to the headquarters of defense corps 230.56 32 
Road and dike repairing 77.50 11 
Crop watchii^ and night patrol 31.74 4 
Entertainment 38.44 5 
Telephone fee 22.90 
Police fee 49.00 7 
Others 23.49 •> j 
Total 726.14 100 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on Lujiadiai, 57. 
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768.89 yuan, as the village had only 1,708.6 mu land, the mujuan rate was 0.45 yuan 
per ma It was about six times the land tax (not including the surcharges) paid to the 
state. What did this 0.45 yuan mean to the peasants? According to the same 
investigation, in the 1930s, the harvest per mu (including the stalks) was valued about 
4.62 yuan, that means about 10 percent of the income from the land was paid as the 
village fees.® 
Besides the state tax and village fees, the villagers had to pay taxes when 
marketing their products. Yi Fuqing, a gentleman-farmer in Lujiazai, complained to the 
investigators that taxation was one of the main reasons which caused the village 
economic difficulties. Among the marketing taxes, the most important ones were taxes 
on domestic am'mals, grains and timbers. According to the regulations, the tax rate for 
animal selling was 6 percent of the selling price. As pigs were boi^t and sold at least 
two times before being butchered (bought as a piglet and sold as a fat pig), the peasants 
had to pay more than once for the pigs. When the pigs were butchered, there were 
butchering taxes and other fees. Yi Fuqing cynically noted that when raising and selling 
pigs only the waste of the pigs was tax-free.' 
Heavy taxes aroused the peasants' resistance. It was one of the important causes 
for the so-called "Xianghe Incident" or "Xianghe Rebellion." A journalist sent to 
investigate the incident provided a detailed report: 
* Mametsu, Report on Lujiazhai, 56,65, 57. 
'ibid., 201. 
The investigation was made by a journalist sent by Ta Kong Pao, The report was published on Ta Kong 
Pao, 27 Oaober 1935. 
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In Xianghe county, the levy (not including the land tax) rate was 0.051 yuan per 
mu, the income was used for education, policing and construction. If there were other 
needs, the county would have emergency levies. In 1935, the county government 
decided to simplify the levying procedure and increase the levy rate to 0.171 yuan (the 
former 0.051 yuan plus another 0.120 yuan). They submitted their levy increasing 
proposal to the provincial government and got its approval. On August 13, 1935, the 
magistrate, Zhao Zhongpu, announced the levy increase decision which was posted on 
the street. The post declared that from the second tax collecting season of 1935 on, 
each taxed mu should pay another 0.12 yuan to pay the ward public security forces, 
local defense forces, provincial and county telephone communications, and other 
facilities. Plus the former surcharge of 0.051 yuan per mu, the total surcharge would be 
0.171 yuan per mu. Other permanent levies should be canceled, but a special levy 
could be issued if there was an emergency. 
Hearing the news of the levy increase, some local leaders began to urge the 
peasants to resist They argued that the government had already levied a surcharge of 
0.051 yuan per mu. Now, they were levying another 0.12 yuan, plus the formal land 
tax, the total tax on each mu would be more than 0.3 yuan. It was too much for the 
peasant to bear. The leaders urged the peasants to go to the county seat to protest on 
October 20 and demand the magistrate to denounce the new levy. On the appointed 
day, more than 2,000 peasants from all villages assembled. The result was the blood 
violence (one death, two wounded) and the fleeing of the magistrate. The rebellious 
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peasants occupied the county seat and declared the establishment of self-government 
This might set the precedent for the so-called Eastern Hebei Autonomous Federation 
government" 
Was the new levy really too heavy for the peasants to bear? The magistrate 
argued that it was not too heavy because the sum of the land tax and surcharge did not 
surpass the I percent of average land price (the average land price in Xianghe was 30 
yuan per mu). But compared with the old levy rate (0.051 yuan per mu), the new levy 
rate (0.171 yuan per mu) tripled the old one. The magistrate still kept the right to have 
special levies "if there was a emergency." Undoubtedly, the sudden and dramatic 
increase of taxation on the land was unbearable for the peasant 
Civil war, banditry and peasant losses 
The overthrow of Qing Dynasty and establishment of the Republic brought only 
unrest to China. From 1920 on, the civil wars and Japanese invasions brought heavy 
taxes and losses to Eastern Hebei peasants. The most important wars during this period 
Under the "Tanggu Truce" regulation, the Chinese army could not enter the so-called "de-militarized 
zone." So the Chinese government could not send troops to Xianghe to restore order there. It was also 
reported that two Japanese ronin participated in the demonstration and led the charge to break in the city 
gates. The Japanese involvement made the incident complicated. About this incident, TIME 
newsmagazine had the following report under the title of "New &ngled Ronin:" "Last week the Chinese 
military commander of Hopei [Hebei] Province, General Shang Chen, charged that 'modem Japanese 
ronin' are sneaking about in his province stirring up Chinese &rmers to revolt. Sure enough, embattled 
farmers rose last week, capturing Hsiangho pGan^e] 40 mi. from Peiping,... When General Shang 
dispatched two companies of Chinese soldiers to quell the rebels, Japanese offidals flew into a rage, 
thundered that the rebels were in the official 'demXtarized zone' set up afier the Tangku Truce and 
therefore could not be touched by Chinese soldiers who must not enter it. Down sat the two companies of 
Chinese on the opposite bank of a canal from the demilitarized zone, within sound of the shooting rebels & 
ronin." TIME, 4 November 1935, 28. 
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(1920-1937) included the Chili-Fengtian war (between the warlords), the northern 
expedition, and the resistance to the Japanese along the Great Wall. In pre-1949 China, 
when war broke out, the peasants of the area where troops passed or were stationed 
must supply draft animals, carts, forage and other services. These were called "war 
related levies and corvees" {bingcai). Once again, Lujiazhai village in Zunhua county 
will serve as an example. During the ten years from 1924 to 1933, war and banditry 
related losses are shown in Table 6-8. The losses were several times of the state taxes 
and village fees levied for the same years (about the village income and expenditure see 
Table 6-7 and the related explanation). 
Table 6-8, War and banditry related losses in Lujiazhai, 1924-1933 
Year Losses (yuan) Causes 
1924 10,000 Chili-Fengtian war, drafted mules, carts and labores 
1927 ? Mounted bandits robbery 
1928 3,000 Chili-Chandong war, robbery 
1933 6,000 Resistance Japanese war along the Great Wall 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on Lujiazhai, 65. 
Among those war related taxes and losses in Eastern Hebei, the heaviest one 
was that related with the resistance to the Japanese. In 1933, the Japanese invaded 
north China from Manchuria and Jehol, the Chinese troops resisted this invasion along 
the Great Wall. Eastern Hebei was declared as "war zone" or "war area" {zhanqu). As 
a large number troops moved through or were stationed in this zone, it bore heavy taxes 
and suffered great losses. In Ji county, the war related levies were 600,000 yuan that 
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year. In Tong county, according to the Nationalist Party's investigation, the direct 
governmental drafts, such as carts, mules, firewood, fodder, quilts, bags, ropes and 
grain, equaled about 476,000 yuan. Besides this, the peasants' losses [due to the illegal 
draft in the forms of mules, carts, domestic-animals, grain, furniture, clothes, trees and 
tools] were estimated at about 805,000 yuan. The total damage was more than one 
million jruan. One researcher stated that the total losses in Eastern Hebei during the 
war in 1933 was near 100,000,000 yuait'^ 
The temporary armistice from 1934 to 1936 did not bring relief to the peasants. 
Under the Tanggu Truce signed by the Nationalist Government and the Japanese, 
Eastern Hebei had been marked as a "demilitarized zone." After the Chinese troops 
withdrew from this area, bandits rose everywhere, especially along the Great Wall. 
Some of these bandits were supported by the Japanese troops. To fight the bandits and 
to protect the community, self-defense corps were organized at the county, the ward and 
the village levels. In Zunhua county, provincial guard forces were stationed along the 
Great Wall, in addition, there was county defense corps, county security forces and 
police. The peasants had to bear the cost for all these forces. Heavy taxes aroused 
more tax-resistance and more peasants were forced to participate with the bandit group 
to rob others. The Japanese investigators found that in some parts of Zunhua county, it 
Mantetsu, Report on the Investigation of General Conditions of the Sixteen Counties in Eastern Hebei, 
119. 
Fang Wanting, ed.. Studies of the Chinese Economy, 1095. 
Mantetsu, Report on the Investigation of General Conditions of the Sixteen Counties in Eastern Hebei, 
188. 
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was difficult to distingiush between law-abiding peasants and bandits. 
In Funing county, the bandits even occupied the county seat for about two 
months, robbing most merchants and rich families. In Luan county, there were about 
seventeen gangs of bandits and more than one thousand armed bandits. The direct 
cause of the increasing banditry was the effort to resist the Japanese invasion. While 
the fighting occurred along the Great Wall, Chinese troops stationed in or moving 
through Luan county (to Xifengkou) had already caused much trouble to the peasants, 
the estimated loss was about 17,000,000 yuan. After signing the Tanggu Truce, the 
Chinese troops withdrew from Eastern Hebei, but the dismissed soldiers joined with 
local bullies and others to organize the so-called "self-defense corps." They forced the 
peasants to pay protection fees to them. In early siramier of 1933, seventeen gangs 
controlled three to four hundred villages. Besides causing the spread of banditry 
indirectly by the invasion, some Japanese instigated or supported the banditry directly. 
As early as 1930, it was reported that Japanese ronin supplied arms to Bai Long, a 
notorious bandit looting along the Great Wall. The arms and munitions were brought in 
from Qinghuangdao, Beidaihe and Shanhaiguan and transported to the bandits through 
land road by the Japanese disguised as merchants. After the Chinese troops v^thdrew, 
Japanese troops and their vanguards—the Japanese and Korean merchants and drug 
Ibid., 318. 
About the banditry in Luan County, see Zhang Tmchen, Luanxian jiaofei Jilue (Record of Suppressing 
the Bandits in Luan County). 
" Ta Kong Pao, 12 December 1930, p. 4. 
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dealers—moved into Eastern Hebei. In Luan county, when a Chinese drug dealer was 
arrested, the head of the Association of Japanese Sojourners went to the county seat and 
demanded the magistrate to free the drug dealer. After this unreasonable demand had 
been declined, the Japanese troops quartered at the railway station threatened the 
magistrate by force. The Japanese troops also blocked the railway cars which carried 
the provincial security forces who were sent to suppress the bandits that occupied the 
• 18 Funing county seat As noted earlier, in Xianghe county, Japanese ronin participated 
in an attack on the county seat.'' 
The money and material losses were not the only damage caused by the war and 
the banditry. The loss of labor animals delayed planting and the loss of pigs caused 
fertilizer shortages. Some people simply abandoned their lands and houses to flee to 
the big cities, such as Beijing and Tianjin. Wang Yaowu, a native of Zunhua county, 
noted that "my hometown is located near the Great Wall. My family had several 
thatched cottages and 50 mu of poor land. The income is not great but enough to keep 
my family from starvation. For decades, I worked outside the village [as soldier, 
policeman and journalist] and did not worry about their survival. But suddenly, the 
Japanese invaded into the Great Wall and the hometown became unsafe. My family 
had to leave the home village and come to Beiping to live with me." He wrote in a 
poem entitled "My family came to Beiping as refugees." "My home village backs on 
the mountain and faces the river, the rural scenery is beautiful. But the war broke out, 
" Zhaag Jinchen, Record of Duppressing the Bcmdits in Luan County, 22-23. 
" TaKongPao, 27 October 1935. 
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[the enemy is coming] my family could not live there any longer. Do not want to leave 
the hens and dogs behind, they bring all of them with the tables and chairs to 
Beiping.''^^ Those who still lived in the villages were so poor even the bandits could 
not extort any more from them. In another poem titled "Talking with my hometown 
people," Wang Yaowu recorded that "it is a great pleasure to meet hometown people, 
but talking about those who lived under the war, the sadness took over us. Fleeing from 
the invaders from the north but facing the bandits in the south, how difficult it is to live 
under the two sides attack! The people were so poor that the bandits only requested one 
hundred copper coins [less than one yuan] plus three packs of cigarettes for a hostage." 
He noted at the end of the poem that after the Tanggu Truce in May, 1933, the central 
army withdrew and the bandits took over his hometown area. They set fire to the 
houses, killed and robbed the people every day. Under this situation, it was difficult for 
the people to make a hving. Even such a "good news" about the low ransom made 
people cry for those poor peasants."' 
The door is closed: The arrival of the Japanese 
hi the 1930s, the most important event which affected both Eastem Hebei's 
economy and the peasants' livelihood was not the resistance war and the banditry but 
the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the establishment of Manchuguo in the next 
^ Wang Yaowu, Ragged Verses, (April 13, 1933). 
Ibid., (March 27, 1935). 
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year.^ The war and banditry only affected parts of Eastern Hebei temporarily, the 
establishment of Manchuguo and the high tariff wall set by the Japanese puppet 
government cut off Manchuria from China proper and closed this important market for 
Eastern Hebei products, such as native cloth woven in the Baodi area and paper 
manufactured in Qian-an county. Under the new regulations, fewer people could go to 
Manchuria in the 1930s, and those who already worked there had to return to their 
home villages.^ The Manchurian Incident and the establishment of Manchuguo caused 
an economic crisis in Eastern Hebei. 
In September, 1931, Japanese troops launched an attack on Mukden and 
occupied Manchuria in the following months. In early 1932, Japanese troops attacked 
Shanhaiguan and controlled the railway from Shanhaiguan to Mukden, which they 
renamed the "Feng-shan railway." The railway communication between China prop)er 
and Manchuria was disconnected. Japanese troops did not stop at Shanhaiguan. In 
1933. the Japanese and Manchuguo troops launched another attack on Jehol and moved 
towards the Great Wall. From Shanhaiguan, the Japanese reached as far as Tangshan, 
~ About Manchurian Incident and the establishment of Manchuguo, see the reports on TIME, 28 
September 1931, p. 22-23; 21 March 1932, p. 15. 
^ In March, 1935, the Headquarters of Japanese Troops in Manchuria {guandongfuri) and the Manchuguo 
government both issued "the regulations banning the entrance of foreign laborers." The main purpose was 
to restrict the Chinese but encourage Japanese and Koreans to emigrate to Manchuria. Zhang Youyi, ed.. 
Source Materials on Agricultural History, 3:520. The eSect of these changes was obvious in Leting 
county. According to the Japanese investigation, before the Manchuria Incident, more than 100 people 
from Baizhuang (124 households) went o Manchuria, but in 1936, only 20 to 30 people still worked there. 
In Damiaozhuang (60 households) and Matouj^g (400 households), ^fore 1931, about 80 percent of the 
households had &mily members working in Manchuria, in 1936, only about half of the households sdll had 
family members worked there. See Mametsu, Report on the 25 Villages in Eastern Hebei, 2: 227-228, 
245. 
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the important industrial city in Eastern Hebei. After the Tanggu Truce of 1933, the 
Beining Railway was re-opened but was controlled by two different companies. After 
the establishment of Manchuguo, Manchuria (including Jehol) was cut off from China 
and the Great Wall became the new line between the two hostile states. Wang Yaowu, 
the popular poet, lamented in a poem titled "the so-called Great Wall line:" "The Great 
Wall became the new board line of the country, my family lived there for a long time; 
going to north several steps, you become a foreigner, there is no traveling cost for going 
and returning from abroad. The river and the mountain were divided into two parts and 
belonged to two countries [China and ^fanchuguo], just like a person whose arms and 
legs were cut off, I wonder when the body could be re-united. 
Beginning in 1933, Manchuguo established custom offices at Shanhaiguan and 
other important passes along the Great Wall, such as at Lengkou, Xifengkou and 
Gubeikou. They treated the products from China proper as foreign goods and levied a 
heavy duty. But on the other side, the Chinese Nationalist Government did not 
recognize the independence of Manchuguo and still treated the products imported from 
Manchuria as domestic goods. Only the overseas products (mainly Japanese goods) 
imported through the Great Wall passes were levied import duties plus 10 percent 
surcharges for the relief of natural disasters. The exported goods (from China proper to 
Manchuria) were duty free.^ Under this situation, the importing business (from 
Wang Yaowu, Ragged Verses, (August 4, 1933). 
^ Mantetsu, Tenshin jimusho chosaka, Kito kuiki no boeki gaikyo to kazei jijyo (Report on the actual 
conditions of trade and tariff in Eastern Hebei), 86-87. 
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Manchuria to China proper) slackened and the exporting (from China proper to 
Manchuria) was almost stopped. Baodi cloth and Qian-an paper lost their main market 
and the production and exporting declined dramatically. 
According to Fang Xianting's study, "the Manchuguo government, at the end of 
1932, imposed a new tariff on Paoti [Baodi] cloth, with a rate of $ 17.55 per bale of 
from 34 to 40 pieces, and in Kuan-cheng an additional stamp tax of $4.00 per bale. 
This meant that each piece before it reached the consumer in the area controlled by that 
government was weighted with an extra cost of 52 cents. The old competitors had now 
become superseded by the Japanese weaver who was exempt from these taxes and was 
not slow to produce a good imitation of ta-ch'ih cloth which he hurries to place on the 
Manchurian market Table 6-9 shows the dramatic decline of Baodi cloth selling in 
Manchuria and Jehol. 
Table 6-9, Volume of cloth sold in principal market areas for Baodi cloth, 
1923 and 1933 (unit: piece) 
Province 1923 1933 Percentage of decrease or increase 
Jehol 3,302,693 706,610 -79% 
Manchuria 680,000 20,400 -97 
Northwest 246,000 792,000 +222 
Hebei 360,000 90,000 -75 
Total 4,588,693 1,609,000 -65 
Source; Fong, A Case Stucfy of Baodi^  54, Table 15. 
Note; Northwest includes Suiyuan, Shanxi, Ningxia and Shenxi. 
^ Fong, A Case Study of Baodi, 62-63. 
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In 1934, Manchi^o established custom offices at Lengkou, Xifengkou, Cayazi 
and Baiyanglou to levy duties on imported Qian-an produced papers. The domestic tax 
before 1924 was 4.25 yuan per bale (for hongcaozhi, an imitation of Korean paper), the 
new duty rates were 5.1 yuan per bale in 1935 and 7.65 yuan in 1936.^^ The decline of 
exports to Manchuria is shown in table 6-10. 
Table 6-10, Qian-an paper exported to Manchuria, 1931-35 
Year Amount (bale) Value (yuan) 
1931 42,000 1,410,000 
1932 30,100 1,350,000 
1933 24,800 788,000 
1934 24,500 630,000 
1935 17,500 480,000 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on Rural Industries, 29. 
While the Japanese invasion and the establishment of Manchuguo interrupted 
the normal trade between China proper and Manchuria, smuggling became prosperous 
fO 
in Eastern Hebei. This illegal business became a large scale operation by 1933." 
Obviously, this was due to the loss of Chinese sovereignty in Eastern Hebei and the 
Japanese army's protection of the smugglers. But the Japanese investigators put the 
main cause on Chinese Nationalist Government's increase of the rate of importing 
^ Mantetsu, Report on Rural Industries, 29. 
^ The Japanese smuggling not only hurt the Chinese domestic market, but also threatened the international 
trade between China and other countries. This led to the British protest to Japan. TIME, 11 May 1936, 
25-26. 
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duties.^' After the Tanggu Truce and the withdrawal of Chinese troops and armed 
custom patrol forces from Eastern Hebei, Japanese and Koreans smuggled Japanese 
made artificial silk fross and yam, sugar, cigarette papers and other products into north 
China. They first transported these products from Dalian or Korea to Wanjiatxm, a 
small station along the former Beining Railway in the Manchuria side. From there the 
smugglers hired Chinese laborers to carry the products to China, they crossed the Great 
Wall at Shanhaiguan and transported the goods to Tianjin and other places by railway 
again. A Japanese investigator (Takami Nobuo) who visited Shanhaiguan recorded 
what he saw and heard there. 
The artificial silk fi-oss and yam, cigarettes paper and other miscellaneous goods 
unloaded at Wanjiatun railway station were first transported to Dongluocheng, a small 
village near Shanhaiguan in Manchuria side. There, the big bales were opened and the 
artifidal silk was repacked for the Chinese coolies, there were about 2,000 coolies 
waiting there. Each coolie took 30 to 40 pieces and 50, 100 even 200 coolies were 
organized into one gang, and 10 to 20 Japanese or Koreans took sticks to supervise [the 
coolies]. In the afternoon, the smuggling gangs started off one after another, the 
marches are magnificent. They crossed the Great Wall at Dongshuiwen (east water 
gate), Nanshuimen (south water gate), or hai-an (sea coast) and entered Eastern Hebei. 
If they were stopped by Chinese custom inspectors [in China proper side], the Koreans 
and Japanese who took sticks [they were called "violence corps"] would fight their way 
out and led the smuggling gangs forward. Reaching Qinhuangdao, the artifidal silks 
were put into big gunny sacks (each contained about 120 pieces) again. The Koreans 
and Japanese took these sacks on the railway cars and sold them in Tianjin. There were 
four schedules fi-om Qinhuangdao to Jianjin each day." 
Besides smuggling by crossing the Great Wall, the Japanese also smuggled 
through sea routes. They called it the "secret trade" or "junk trade." The small steam 
boats and junks took Japanese products from Dalian or Lushun and landed on the coast 
^ Mantetsu, Tenshin jimusho chosaka, Kito kuiki tokusyu boki no jijyo (Repon on the Actual Conditions 
of the "Spedal Trade" in Eastern Hebei), 2-5. 
" Mantetsu, Report on the Actual Conditions of Trade and Tariff in Eastern Hebei, 97-98. 
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of Eastern Hebei. As Chinese custom armed inspecting boats were banned jfrom 
cruising near the Eastern Hebei coast, the junk smuggling quickly increased. After the 
establishment of the Eastern Hebei Autonomous Federation for Joint Defense Against 
Communism at the end of 1935, this junk smuggling became open transportation. In 
February, 1936, the Eastern Hebei government legalized the smuggling and opened five 
custom inspection offices along the coast [at Qinhuangdao, Nandasi, Beidaihe, 
Liushouying and Changli repectively], but the duty was only a quarter of what the 
Nationalist Government normally levied. All directors and inspectors at the inspection 
offices were Japanese and the Japanese investigator admitted that the Japanese 
inspectors controlled the inspection offices."' The Eastern Hebei government gave 
monopoly import rights to several Japanese companies and designated different ports 
for them to land. Among the smuggling firms, half of them were Japanese, Korean and 
Chinese composed 30 percent and 20 percent respectively. Many first class Japanese 
enterprises, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, participated in this notorious smuggling. To 
protect their reputation, the above two Japanese enterprises used pseudonyms in the 
business.^^ 
Besides artificial silks, the Japanese also smuggled sugar, cigarette papers and 
other products, even drugs, into Eastern Hebei. It is difficult to know how much 
Japanese products were smuggled intD north China and how much silver coins were 
smuggled out as there are no statistics. One estimate said that the total value of 
Mantetsu, Report on the Actual Conditions of the "Special Trade " in Eastern Hebei, 15. 
Ibid., 38. 
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Table 6-11, Values of goods smuggled in Eastern Hebei by sea route, 
1933-34, (unit: yuan) 
Year Artificial silks Sugar Others Total 
1933 9,000,000 7,000,000 4,000,000 20,000,000 
1934 6,000,000 7,200,000 2,000,000 15,200,000 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on the Actual Conditions of Trade and Tariff in Eastern Hebei, 112. 
smuggled goods before 1936 was 60-70 million yuan, or more than 100 million yuan/" 
Another estimate made by a certain organization which the Japanese investigator 
claimed to be more reliable gave the following figures (see Table 6-11). 
Until the 1930s, silver coins were the main currency in rural China. As the 
paper money issued by different banks, especially by different warlords, devalued very 
fast, peasants still preferred to use silver coins for important transactions, such as in 
land and house buying and selling. Under the United States' silver purchasing policy, 
the world silver price rose dramatically after 1934. Adding to the problem, the 
Japanese smuggled silver out of Eastern Hebei. One estimate said that in the eight 
months from October, 1934 to August, 1935, no less than 30,000,000 silver coins (silver 
yuan) were smuggled out of China through Shanhaiguan.^"* 
Compared with artificial silk and other smuggled products, drug smuggling not 
only hurt the economy but also the health of the people. In the early 1920s, both the 
Custom Officials at Tianjin and Qinhuangdao noted that Manchuria was the main 
" Mantetsu, Import on the Actual Conditions of Trade and Tariff in Eastern Hebei, 112. 
'^Ibid., 113. 
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opium producer and Japanese were the main cocaine supplier. The Tianjin Custom 
Office reported that "opium is smuggled via the Peking-Moukden Railway [the Seining 
Railway] from Manchuria, where it has been grown during the last four or five years, 
while morphia and cocaine arrive from Japan in ever-increasing quatities."^^ 
Qinhuangdao Customs confirmed that "there runs parallel with the traffic of opium that 
of morphia, which has a particularly strong hold on the lower-class Chinese. The ease 
with which this drug is handled and the simplicity of the instrument employed in its 
injection invite many persons to fall victim to its use. The source of supply is traced to 
Dairen [Dalian, in South Manchuria which was controlled by Japan at that time] 
through Shanhaikuan [Shanhaiguan]. The principal dealers are Japanese, who are 
found disguised as ordinary druggists or photographers in nearly every town."^^ In 
1930, a Chinese reporter found that in Tangshan city, there were many drug-users 
[baimianke]. The head of the public security bureau hated the drug dealings but he 
could not destroy it because most of the drug dealers were Japanese and punishing them 
might cause intemational dispute."^ 
The Japanese investigators estimated that Jehol produced about 14,000,000 
ounces of opium each year, the total value was about 17,800,000 yuan. Among the total 
38 product, about 3,000,000 ounces, or 21 percent, were smuggled into Eastern Hebei. 
When Eastem Hebei Anti-communist Government legalized the smuggling business, 
C.IM.C., Decennial Reports, 1912-21, 145. 
^ Ibid., 120. 
" Ta Kong Pao, 2 December 1930, p. 4. 
Mantetsu, Report on the Actual Conditions of Trade and Tariff in Eastem Hebei, 115. 
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drug importing was also legalized. The new regulation stated those who imported 
opium, morphine, cocaine and other drugs or similar products should have certificates 
provided by doctors, pharmacists or chemical business related merchants.^' It is easy to 
find that most of the so-called doctors, pharmacists and chemical-specialists were 
Japanese or Korean drug dealers. Drug dealing not only drew precious silver coins out 
of Eastern Hebei but also created new bandits. A Chinese journalist who visited 
Eastern Hebei in October, 1933, reported that "banditry in Luandong area (including 
Luan, Leting, Changli, Funing and Linyu) is the cause of disaster at present, but it could 
be suppressed. The most difficult problem to deal with is not the banditry but the 
Chinese traitors. In Changli county, there are traitors everywhere. It is difficult to 
suppress them because they have the protection fi'om the Japanese. The headquarters of 
these bandits and traitors were the drug-houses (jbaimianguan) opened by the Japanese. 
There are 40 to 50 such drug-houses selling opium, heroin and other drugs. They also 
opened pawn shops which charged high interest to exploit the local people. Besides all 
the above evil deeds, the drug house is a front organization to recruit bandits. Those 
who are addicted to drugs always participated in the gangs and openly robbed and 
received the protection from the Japanese."^" According to the Japanese information, 
there were 147 Japanese and Korean in Changli county, among them 74 engaged in 
Ibid., 17. 
^ Wei Hongyun, ed.. Investigation omd Research on EastemHebei Village, 25. 
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opium and heroin dealing, 48 managed gambling and drug houses, another 12 ran pawn 
shops which sold opium at the same time/^ 
War, banditry, high tariffs and the disconnection of the Beining Railway 
obstructed the commumcation between China proper and Manchuria. From the railway 
company's statistics it is clear that fewer people traveled and fewer commodities were 
transported in 1933 because the communication links at Shanhaiguan were totally 
blocked- Table 6-12 shows the changes of passenger numbers and the freight tonnage 
in three years. The railway investigators reported clearly that the main reason for the 
decline of passenger numbers in 1933 was that after the Manchuria Incident, fewer 
merchants in Changli, Leting and Funing went to Manchuria because they worried 
about the social unrest in and outside of Shanhaiguan.'*" 
Table 6-12, Passenger numbers and freight tonnage in Shanhaiguan 
section, Beining Railway, 1932-1934 










Source: Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1700. 
Ibid., 25. 
Report of the Beining Railway Economic Survey Team, 1700. 
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The loss of outside working opportunities and market made it harder for the 
Eastern Hebei peasants to make a living. One observer described the hardship brought 
by these changes in Yutian county: 
Just as in other districts of China, most land in Yutian county was held by the landlords... 
. About half of the peasams had not enough land to support their families and they often 
lived at the edge of starvation. But is has been in recent years that the situation became 
more serious and pressing. In the former years, these peasants who had little land and 
lived under the threat of starvation had three choices to supplement their incomes. First, 
they could become industrial workers. The opening of Kailuan Coal Mines, Chin Hsin 
Cemem Factory, Hsin Cotton Mill and the Beining Railroad could absorb a large 
number of rural surplus laborers. The second choices was "going to Manchuria." They 
could to as &r as Taonan, Kuanchengzi, Chuanchang and Harbin to open land or work as 
laborers. They stayed there three to five years and did not return home during this period, 
h was a safe way to keep one fi-om starvatiotL If the peasants did not like to go so &r 
away, they could take the third choice—^"going beyond the passes [on the Great Wall] 
ipaokouwai)." They could go to BCailu area in Jehol province to open land or pool money 
together to buy camels to transport in and out the Great Wall. They sold reed mats and 
handicraft made cloth beyond the Wall and made a living as merchants. [As all peasants 
could make a living at that time], it was a comparatively peacefiil and prosperous period: 
there were no armed bandits, or even thieves. But, the good time had gone and the 
prosperity became memories. The Beining Railway, Chin Hsin Cement Factory, Kailuan 
Coal VCnes and other industries are in depression, they recruit no new workers but lay off 
many employees. Even if they employ several new ones to fill the jobs left by the retired 
ones, [the pay is less and] the living conditions [for the new workers] are lower than 
before. The road of "going to Manchuria" was closed by the Manchuguo government, the 
regulations of banning entrance of Chinese laborers declared the door was closed. Going 
beyond the passes is also as restricted as going to Manchuria, and Jehol always have war 
there. It is not worth to enter a fighting area and die there. To make the situation worse, 
the native products [handicraft made cloth] could not compete with the machine made 
Japanese goods and the peasant-merchants could not compete with the organized 
"Japanese goods marketing company." Thus, all three supplementary occupations were 
cut off [and it is harder for the peasants to make a living]."*^ 
World economic depression and Eastern Hebei economy 
David Faure and Loren Brandt argued that commercialization and international 
trade brought benefits to Chinese peasants and improved their livelihood. 
Zhi Ming, "Yutian villages under the Eastern Hebei Autonomous Federation," (written in 1937). Zhang 
Youyi, Source Materials on Agricultural History, 3; 520. 
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but we should not neglect the negative impact brought by commercialization and 
international trade in some periods, especially during the world economic depressioiL 
The economy of Eastem Hebei experienced a crisis in the early 1930s due to the 
depression, the Japanese invasion and the loss of outside working opportunities and 
market Both Chinese and Japanese investigators' descriptions about the economic 
situation provide some information about this crisis. 
In Miyun county, the Beining Economic Survey Team observed in 1935, that 
"under the present situation, the bankruptcy of the rural economy is the general trend. 
The livelihood of the peasant is going from bad to worse.'^ An important indication of 
economic depression was the trade decline at Gubeikou, a trading post between Eastem 
Hebei and Jehol located in Miyun county. The Chinese investigators reported that 
"after the Jehol Incident (when Japanese and Manchuguo troops invaded Jehol and 
fought with Chinese troops along the Great Wall in 1933), Japanese opened many 
businesses [at Gubeikou], such as wine-shops, restaurants and department stores to sell 
foreign goods, they were ambitious and worked very hard. On the other hand, the 
Chinese enterprises [in the town] made little progress. Because of the high tariff and 
other regulations, such as banning the export of silver coins, the outside market was 
almost lost. On the inside market, as it was too far away to the main markets and the 
transportation fees were high, there were fewer buyers and the business declined. There 
were three restrictions on business; First, the custom duty which was 30 percent of the 
** Report of the Beining Railway Economic Sttrvey Team, 416. 
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commodity value, but sometimes it was increased to 50 percent For example, the duty 
on one hundred jin of plain native cloth was 14.65 yuan, on one hundred jin of dyed 
cloth it was 16 yuan. On average, the duty for one piece cloth (4y7«, price is 2 yuan) 
was more than 0.6 joian. Second, the high cost of remitting. If merchants wanted to 
send money from outside the Great Wall to other places insides the Wall, the fee for 
one hundred yuan is 40 yuan. Third, the policy of banning silver exporting. If the 
merchants bring less than 50 silver coins from Jehol into the Great Wall, the silver 
dollars would be changed into Manchuguo paper money. If a merchant tries to 
transport more than 50 silver coins, the silver coins would be confiscated.'*^ 
For Ji county, the report said that "after the Jehol Incident in 1933, the losses 
were heavy. To make the situation worse, natural and human made disasters made the 
agricultural harvests poor for the consecutive years. People's livelihood was very 
hard." One indication of agricultural crisis was the decline of land price. 'Tive or six 
years ago (before 1930), the price for one mu of land was 80 to 90 yuan. Now, it is only 
worth about 30 yuan. On the other side, the taxes and levies [on the land] have been 
increased, the labor wage is higher but the grain price is lower. The income from the 
harvest is not enough to pay the cost As there was little or no return from farming, 
fewer and fewer people want to farm the land and this made the land price lower and 
lower."^ 
Ibid., 435-436. 
'^Ibid., 1144, 1148. 
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In Fengrun county, the investigators found the same thing as they did in Ji 
county. "In recent years, the rural economy is in depression. The land price is 
declining. On average, the price for the first grade land is about 10 yuan lower"^^ In 
Luan county, they also found that "in recent years, as the levy for local defense and 
police use on each mu of land is as high as 1.5 yuan or more—^the regular land tax and 
surcharge were not included, the cost was so high that at the end of a year's hard work, 
there was little left for consuming. The peasant's livelihood is harder and harder. On 
average, the living cost is only 0.1 yuan per day. Even for the rich peasants, they could 
only have dress made of native cloth and eat sorghum and other coarse grain."^^ 
The Japanese investigators drew similar conclusions. They reported that rural 
bankruptcy was not an isolated phenomenon in one village or in a specific year. It was 
the result of general and lasting poverty."*' They recorded that the peasant's livelihood 
in Pinggu county could be described in two Chinese characters—beican—that means 
miserable or tragic. They listed three causes for rural economic depression: poor soil, 
the price scissors between agricultural and industrial products, and tariff wall set up by 
Manchuguo. The peasants were so poor and desperate that they lost hope for the future 
and became insensitive to the changing outside world. For them, the transition from the 
Qing Dynasty to Republic and to Eastern Hebei Anti-communist Government had little 
meaning. They did not care who took the power and had no confidence in nor 
"Ibid., 1359. 
Ibid., 1429. 
Mantetsu, Report on the Investigation of General Conditions of the Sixteen Counties in Eastern Hebei, 
102. 
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expectation from the government They just prayed to the Gods for rain and a good 
harvest/® 
In Ji county, the peasants told the Japanese investigators that compared with the 
conditions of ten years ago, the situation became worse. One reason for this was the 
decline of grain prices and decrease of production because flood, plague of insects, hail 
and drought^' The Ji Gazetteer, compiled in the early 1940s, kept a record of the 
prices for grains, manufactured goods, and labor wages. This is the only complete price 
record for the early decades of the twentieth century. Here, wheat, maize, sorghum, 
cloth {daji) and year-laborer wage will be used to show the price changes in the 
Republic period (see Table 6-13). 
From Table 6-13 we find that in the 1910s and the 1920s, the prices for grains, 
cloth, and year-laborer had little change. From 1930 on, the prices rose first and then 
dropped. As most peasants sold more than they brought in, so the rise and fall of grain 
prices were more important to them than other price changes. For the grain prices, 
1917,1924 and 1931 represented the high prices, 1928 and 1934 recorded the lowest 
prices. The Japanese investigators revealed a somewhat different numbers. According 
to the Japanese investigation, the grain prices were high around 1928 and low around 
1933 in Ji county (see Table 6-14). 
^ Ibid., 78-80. 
Ibid., 132-133. 
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Table 6-13, Prices for grains, cloth and year-laborer in Ji county, 1912-1937 
(unit: yuan/dou for grains, yuan/piece for cloth, and yuan for year-laborer) 
Year Wheat Maize Sorghum Cloth (dmgjt) Year-laborer 
1912 0.56 0.28 0.25 1.80 10 
1913 0.53 0.28 0.23 1.80 9 
1914 0.48 0.25 0.20 1.90 11 
1915 0.45 0.23 0.21 2.00 9 
1916 0.57 0.30 0.27 1.55 10 
1917 0.79 0.47 0.44 2.30 12 
1918 0.60 0.34 0.30 2.74 12 
1919 0.65 0.37 0.37 2.81 12 
1920 0.64 0.44 0.40 2.50 11 
1921 0.67 0.48 0.41 2.45 11 
1922 0.67 0.53 0.50 2.32 13 
1923 0.67 0.52 0.48 2.58 11 
1924 0.78 0.61 0.54 2.60 11 
1925 0.66 0.51 0.43 3.00 10 
1926 0.70 0.40 0.38 2.76 10 
1927 0.70 0.40 0.38 2.80 10 
1928 0.60 0.38 0.30 3.00 9 
1929 0.70 0.40 0.35 3.00 14 
1930 0.80 0.50 0.45 2.80 20 
1931 1.10 0.70 0.66 3.00 30 
1932 1.08 0.65 0.60 3.10 34 
1933 0.10 0.60 0.59 2.85 40 
1934 0.90 0.58 0.55 2.60 38 
1935 0.90 0.66 0.65 2.50 38 
1936 1.20 0.76 0.62 2.80 44 
1937 1.50 0.84 0.79 3.30 60 
Source: Jixianzhi (Ji Gazetteer) (1944), vol. 13. 
Note: The prices in copper coins are converted to yuan according to the change rate recorded in the same 
gazetteer. 
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Table 6-14, Grain prices in Ji county, 1928-1936 (unit: yuan/dou) 
Year Sorghum Wheat Millet Maize 
Around 1928 1.0 1.4 1.4 0.8-0.9 
Around 1933 0.5-0.6 1.0 0.8 0.5-0.6 
1936 0.8 1.3 1.3 0.8-0.9 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on the Investigation of General Conditions of the Sixteen Counties in Eastern 
Hebei^ 132. 
The Japanese investigators had the same finding in Ninghe county. There, they 
found the highest price for grain was in 1927 and the lowest was in 1933 (see Table 
6-15). Another Mantetsu researcher (Mitsuno Kaoru) who made a detailed 
investigation of the cotton growing Xiaojie village in Tong county, recorded the prices 
for agricultural products in the ten years from 1925 to 1935 (see Table 6-16). 
According to his findings, the prices were higher in the late 1920s than that in the early 
1930s. 
It is difficult to determine which record (the Chinese gazetteer or the Japanese 
investigation) is more reliable. But both records showed that around 1933 the grain 
Table 6-15, Grain prices in Ninghe county, 1927 and 1933 (unit: yuan/shi?) 
Grains 1927 1933 Price lowered 
Sorghum (red) 13.0 4.0 -9.0 
Sorghum (white) 15.0 7.8 -7.2 
Millet 18.0 11.0 -7.0 
Rice 26.0 16.0 -10.0 
Wheat 15.0 8.0 -7.0 
Source: Mantetsu, Report on the Investigation of General Conditiorts of the Sixteen Counties in Eastern 
Hebei, 216. 
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Table 6-16, Prices for agricultural products in Tong county, 1925-1935 
(unit; yuan/dou for grains, yuan/100 jin for cotton) 
Year Maize Millet Sorghum Wheat Soybean Cotton 
1925 0.640 0.540 0.516 0.705 0.655 
1926 0.530 0.445 0.475 0.610 0.590 
1927 0.520 0.475 0.505 0.700 0.600 
1928 0.520 0.560 0.510 0.715 0.590 
1929 0.780 0.530 0.660 0.785 0.735 16.500 
1930 0.700 0.462 0.452 0.717 0.525 18.670 
1931 0.484 0.430 0.423 0.547 0.450 19.330 
1932 0.470 0.417 0.427 0.583 0.495 17.670 
1933 0.473 0.433 0.423 0.580 0.495 15.500 
1934 0.370 0.348 0.407 0.595 0.458 14.690 
1935 0.511 0.490 0.423 0.755 0.599 13.500 
Average 0.497 0.457 0.474 0.663 0.562 16.551 
Source: MziA&sa, Report on Xiaojie, 119-120. 
prices were lower than before and then the prices began to rise. A former ward head 
explained the relation between low grain prices and peasant economy to the Japanese 
investigators. "At present (April, 1936), the grain prices rose a little. In 1933 and 1934, 
the sorghum price fell to such low [0.5 yuan per dou] that many landlords and middle 
class peasants were bankrupted. Until now, the bankrupting tendency had not been 
stopped. The fall of grain prices did not bring good fortunes for the fanning laborers 
and other workers (as some people thought). In fact, as most rural laborers were hired 
by the landlords, the hardship for the employers affected the laborers." He also 
discussed the reasons for lower grain prices. 
The rise and M of grain prices were controlled by Tianjin market. On the other hand, the 
establishment of Manchuguo and the loss of Manchuria maricet also affected the prices [in 
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Ji county]. The decrease of grain merchants in the county seat reflected the effects of low 
grain prices. Now [in 1936], there are only two grain merchants who do other business at 
the same time. In fonner years, when grain prices were higli, grain merchants exported 
wheat to Hanjin and imported millet for local people's consuming. Now, American wheat 
flour won [the competition in Ilanjin market] and the merchants made no profit [in 
exporting local wheat]. Contrary to the &11 of grain prices, except a few goods, the prices 
of manu&ctured products were rising. Most peasants had a deficit in their budgets. 
There is no reliable information about how much American wheat flour was 
imported into Tianjin and how much was sold at the county level. But it is true that 
more and more machine milled wheat flour in the Shanghai area was imported into 
Qinghuangdao and Tianjin, some of it was sold in the surrounding counties, even 
beyond the Great Wall. In the depression years, the importing of outside grains lowered 
the local grain prices and brought hardship to the peasants. 
Peasants' livelihood in the 1930s: An analysis of peasants' budget 
Without detailed narratives or consecutive statistical materials about peasant 
consumption, it is difficult to assess the improvement or decline of the peasant's living 
standard. But the following analysis of peasants' budgets in four Eastern Hebei villages 
shows that in the 1930s, most peasants still lived a hard life and many of them had to 
borrow to keep them out of starvation or freezing to death. 
The first village is Xiaojie in Tong county. Table 6-17 shows that among the 11 
sample households, only one had a positive balance in 1935. An analysis of the 
expenditures reveals that 95 percent of the expenses was used for feeding, clothing. 
" Ibid., 133. 
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Table 6-17, Income and expenditures for the 11 sample 
households in Xiaojie, 1935 
Total income Total expenditure Spending for (percentage) Balance 
Household (yuan) (yuan) Food Clothing Light & heating (yuan) 
#1 531.16 687.70 71% 5% 15% -156.54 
#2 234.12 257.78 77 5 16 -23.60 
#3 138.00 207.88 82 5 12 -69.88 
#4 7.39 180.22 86 6 8 -172.83 
#5 64.86 176.61 82 5 9 -111.75 
#6 208.78 333.19 83 5 8 -124.41 
W1 47.84 195.16 84 5 10 -147.32 
m 46.42 95.50 74 6 12 -49.08 
#9 89.34 90.80 76 10 12 -1.46 
#10 153.53 133.53 80 7 12 20.00 
#11 16.65 113.25 84 4 10 96.60 
Total 1.538.09 2,471.62 78 5 12 -933.53 
Source; Mantetsu, Report on Xaojie, 207, 223,227-228. 
lighting and heating, only 5 percent was used for furniture, education, and other 
miscellaneous expenditures. 
The second village is Michang in Fengrun county. The total income and 
expenditures for the 18 investigated households are shown in Table 6-18. It should be 
noted that these 18 households were the well-off in the village because most of them 
had a larger farm than the village average farm size (there were 103 households 
engaged in farming in Michang, the total famiing land was 2,754.08 mu, on average, 
each household farmed only 26.74 mu).^^ But even for these 18 well-to-do, 8 
" Mantetsu, Report on Michang for 1938, 80-81. 
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households (44 percent of the total) had a negative balance in their budgets at the end of 
the year. Compared with Xiaojie village, the percentage of expenditures for feeding, 
clothing and housing was a little lower, but it still composed 90 percent of the total 
expenditure. 
Table 6-18, Income an expenditures for the 18 investigated 
households in Michang, 1938 
Farm size Income Expenditure Spending for (percentage) Balance 
Household (mu) (joian) ^uan) Feeding Housing Gothing (yuan) 
#I 122.91 1,352.13 1,428.08 59% 25% 8% -75.95 
#2 66.14 529.60 452.50 78 16 1 77.10 
#3 62.53 999.63 626.66 73 21 4 372.97 
#4 59.75 1,039.78 1,225.55 46 37 2 -185.77 
#5 32.75 • 464.52 606.95 54 25 12 -142.43 
#6 32.99 419.86 468.92 60 29 9 -49.06 
#7 19.20 315.28 225.94 68 19 7 89.34 
#8 56.20 219.51 364.41 57 32 3 -144.90 
#9 46.20 443.82 324.15 71 17 4 119.67 
#10 41.80 431.54 390.83 59 28 6 40.71 
#11 37.20 491.50 344.17 63 16 9 147.34 
#12 38.29 638.14 401.78 68 19 4 236.37 
#13 32.00 447.20 546.11 67 11 3 -98.91 
#14 15.50 364.14 348.00 71 17 4 16.14 
#15 21.00 223.20 235.70 71 17 2 -12.49 
#16 15.00 379.53 271.97 73 14 8 107.56 
#17 10.00 379.03 250.14 77 17 5 128.89 
#18 6.80 204.39 214.67 64 16 4 -10.28 
Average 40.35 519.05 484.73 62 23 5 34.32 
Source: Mwtetsu, Report on Michang for 1938, Table 6 and Table 11. 
Note: The expenditure for housing includes house building, repairing, ftimishing, lighting and heating. 
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The third village is Dabeiguan in Pinggu county. In 1936, the cash expenditure 
in the whole village was 2,622.677 yuaa The percentage of each item is shown in 
Table 6-19. In this village, about 84 percent of the cash expenditure was used for the 
basic living necessities, such as for housing, feeding, clothing, lighting and heating. 
The other important expenditure was education and luxuries, but only few of the rich 
residents could enjoy such things. For most of the peasants, the percentage of that for 
necessities should be higher than 84 percent 
According to Engel's law, an increase in the percentage of income spent for 
food indicates a lowering of the standard of living.^ As we do not have information 
Table 6-19, Cash expenditure in Dabeiguan, Pinggu county, 1936 




Gifts for weddings and funerals 




















Source; Mantetsu, Report on Dabeiguan, 104-107, Table 14. 
" Hsiao-tung Fei, Earthbomd China, 253. 
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about the percentage of peasants' expenditures in the earlier years, it is impossible to 
determine if the peasants' h'ving standard was improved or lowered. But, the high 
percentage of income spending for food and other living necessities made it clear that in 
the 1930s the peasants' living standard was so low that most of them could only just 
keep their families from starvation. There was little or no money for education and 
other activities. In fact, many of them had to borrow from others to meet their families 
living demands. In Xiaojie village, among the 169 households, 15 households, or 9 
percent of the total, were in debt in 1935. The debt information is detailed in Table 6-
20. 
As Table 6-20 shows, among the 15 households in debt, only one (household 
#105) borrowed for investment, the rate of interest charge was the lowest—15 percent 
per year. Two borrowed for emergency: household # I had been robbed and household 
#108 for buying a house. The remaining 12 households (80 percent of the total) 
borrowed just for living. As the annual interest charge was so high (20-30 %), no 
person wanted to borrow money if they had other means to support their families. 
Obviously, those who borrowed because of being too poor just struggled for a living. 
In Dabeiguan, according to the investigation made in 1937, among the 98 
households, 40 lived in debt. The times and causes of the 69 recorded borrowing are 
shown in Table 6-21. 
The information provided by the peasants might not be 100 percent accurate, but 
the general trend suggested by Table 6-21 is clear the saving of the peasants was so 
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Table 6-20, Debtors in Xiaojie village, 1935 
Household Debt (yuan) Guaranty Annual interest Cause for borrowmg 
#1 2,000 Land 20% Being robbed 
#4 180 Reputation 30 Too poor 
#8 80 Land 20 Too poor 
#12 20 Reputation 20 Too poor 
#17 10 Reputation 30 Too poor 
#30 50 Land 30 Too poor 
#59 10 Land 20 Too poor 
#63 30 Reputation 30 Too poor 
#74 200 Land 30 Too poor 
#80 20 Reputation 20 Too poor 
#105 200 Land 15 Investment 
#108 210 House 25 Buying house 
#122 20 House 20 Too poor 
#127 30 Reputation 30 Too poor 
#156 15 Land 20 Too poor 
Source; MaBt&sa^  Report on JGaojie, \32-\2A. 
• Table 6-21, Money borrowing in Dabeiguan 
Borrowed money was used for 
When the money Medication Paying rent or buying other 
was borrowed and funeral Living back pawned land purposed Total 
Before 1930 2 2 1 6 11 
1931 1 4 1 1 7 
1932 j 2 I 6 
1933 9 9 
1934 2 1 1 4 
1935 5 2 2 1 10 
1936 j 10 3 6 22 
Total 25 21 8 15 69 
Source: lAaxo&lsa, Report on Dabeigitan, 108-113. 
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little that many of them could not deal with an emergency (such as family member 
illness or death) without borrowing. In the 69 cases of money borrowing, 25 (36 
percent) were used for medication and funerals, 21 were used just for living. Only 8 
cases could be classified as for productive use, such as paying rent and buying back the 
mortgaged land. 
The last sample village is Lujiazhai in Zunhua county. The cash income and 
expenditure for the whole village in 1935 in shown in Table 6-22. 
In Table 6-22, it is surprising to find that 1,204.62 yuan (17.56 percent of the 
total cash payment) was paid to the outside creditors as interest charge on the borrowed 
money. There was no information about how much money the peasants borrowed firom 
Table 6-22, Cash income and expenditure in Lujiazhai, 1935 (unit: yuan) 
Income (earning from outside world) 
Fruit sale 2,000.00 
Domestic animals and sideline products 1,000,000 
Wages from outside working 843.75 
Grain sale 972.11 
Cotton sale 244.40 
Sub-total 6,060.26 
Expenditure (paying to the outside world) 
Buying all kinds of products 5,000.00 
Paying to the ward government 557.32 
Land tax 96.33 
Paying the interest charge on borrowing 1,204.62 
Sub-total 6,858.67 
Total balance -798.41 
Source; Mantetsu, Report on Lujiazhai, 194. 
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outside the village, but the investigation provided detailed information about money 
borrowing in the western part of the village. Among the 71 households, 43 ( 61 
percent) borrowed some money in the past years and did not pay it back. The total debt 
was 8,065 yuan. On average, each household borrowed 187.56 yuan. The reasons for 
money borrowing are shown in Table 6-23. As in other villages, most of the peasants 
borrowed just for living. 
Table 6-23, Money borrowing in Western part of Lujiazhai, 1936 
Borrowed money was used for Household Percentage 
Living 21 48.84% 
Funerals and weddings 8 18.60 
Wedding, funeral, living and house-building 3 6.98 
House-buying 2 4.65 
Land-buying 2 4.65 
Bankruptcy in commerce •y j 6.98 
Education 1 2.33 
Living and investment 2 4.65 
Paying interest on borrowed money, living 1 2.33 
Total 43 100.00 
Source; Report on Lujiazhai, 159-162. 
Were there more peasant households in debt in the 1930s than in the former 
decades? The investigation did not answer this question directly. But the peasants 
stated clearly that after the Manchurian Incident and the establishment of Manchuguo, 
the living was harder than before in Lujiazhai. Three factors were the direct or main 
causes: The first factor was that the Manchurian Incident and the Japanese invasion 
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caused more war related levies (bingcai), plundering and banditry disasters. The 
second factor was the limitation set up by Manchuguo on emigrating or working in 
Manchuria. The third factor was the high tariff set up along the Great Wall which 
affected the trading business. 
For the causes of the crisis in rural economy during the 1930s, the investigators 
also provided their own observation in Lujiazhai. The permanent or historical causes 
were; too little land for each family, surplus of population, low land productivity and 
natural disaster. The special or inmiediate causes were; 1) Lower prices and smaller 
markets for agricultural products. 2) Heavier burdens for the peasants because of 
heavier taxes. 3) Shortcomings of politics [no explanation], 4) Ignorance of the 
peasants. 5) Limitation on emigrating to Manchuria (decrease of earnings from 
working outside). 6) Depression in Kailuan coal mines (decrease of earnings from 
working outside). 7) Decline of sideline production (decrease of income). 8) War and 
banditry disaster (increase of taxes, decrease in production and social unrest). 9) Lower 
productivity because of rural economic depression [no explanation]. 10) Invasion of 
foreign goods (increase on cash payments to the outside).^ 
The above analysis shows that in the 1930s, the peasants' burden to the state 
was dramatically increased, but at the same time, as outside markets and working 
opportunities were eventually closed, the income for the peasants in Eastern Hebei was 
decreasing. The world economic depression, the Japanese invasion and the spreading 
Mantetsu, Report on Lujiazhai, 195. 
 ^Ibid., 196-197. 
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of banditry also contributed to the deterioration of the situation. All these facts made it 
harder for the peasants in Eastern Hebei to make a living. As so many peasants had 
fallen into debt, it is no doubt that there was a rural economic crisis in the 1930s. 
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CHAPTER?. CONCLUSION 
As above chapters show, agriculture, industry and commerce were interlocked 
together to form the peasant economy. Undoubtedly, agriculture was the foundation, it 
employed most of the rural residents and the income from farming provided the basic 
living materials (grain) for the peasants. But, as chapter 2 and chapter 3 explained, the 
returns from agriculture was not only low, but also not enough to support the peasant 
families in Eastern Hebei. Most of the peasants had to engage in non-farming activities, 
such as working in sideline production or hiring out as a clerk in a commercial 
business. From this study the following conclusions are obtained. 
Make a living by all means 
As early as in 1932, R. H. Tawney, a famous British economic historian, had 
already found that in some districts of China, "the position of the rural population is 
that of a man standing permanently in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown 
him."' Philip Huang discovered that "a person nose deep in water would do almost 
anything to rise above the surface."" Huang's emphasis was that under the pressure of 
survival, the poor peasants would continue to put in their family labor in the limited 
land as long as the marginal product of labor remained above zero. But, the land 
production had its own limits, because, in traditional agriculture, peasants had little 
' R. H. Tawney, Land and Labor in China (New Yoiic; Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1932), 77. 
 ^Huang, The Peasant Economy, 190. 
217 
power to overcome natural disaster. When drought deprived the last drop of moisture 
in the soil or flood waterlogged the field, the peasants could do nothing to save their 
crops. In this situation, the peasants had no reason to put their labor in farming. They 
had to find other outlets for their labor and earn a living outside of fanning. In Eastern 
Hebei, the non-farming income from working in household sideline production or 
outside employment far more important for the peasant economy than the income 
fi"om hiring out as farming laborers. To return to Fei Xiaotong's question of how did 
the peasants in interior China make their living, it is clear, at least in Eastern Hebei, that 
peasants made their living by every means, they not only tilled the land, but also 
engaged in sideline production or working in other non-farming industries. 
The patterns of combination of agriculture, industry and commerce were 
different in different regions and different levels. For the whole Eastern Hebei region, 
as a grain shortage area, industry (including sideline production, rural industry and 
modem machine industry) and commerce had important roles in the economy. But 
inside the region, some counties, such as Pinggu, Ji, Zunhua and Fengrun, either 
because the average farm size was larger or the soil was more fertile, agriculture was 
the main industry and more people made a living on farming. On the other hand, the 
counties near the big cities or those prone to waterlogging, such as Shunyi, Tong, Baodi 
and Ninghe, developed outside working or household industry to supplement their 
farming income. In the several eastern counties, going to Manchuria provided a main 
outlet for the rural population and the remittance firom Manchuria became an important 
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part of the economy. At the village level, the same diversities are evident: most 
residents lived mainly on farming, but a few households were non-farming residents 
who earned their living by cottage industry or running a small grocery store. These 
farming and non-farming households depended on each other. They worked together to 
sustain the rural economy. Even inside the peasant household, agriculture, industry and 
commerce were woven together by family members who worked in different 
occupations. It is not surprising to find a peasant who worked on the field in summer 
and autumn but worked as a peddler or non-farming employee in the winter and spring. 
When discussing the peasant economy, it is certainly necessary to focus on the 
agricultural sector, but it is not correct to overlook or ignore the other sector of peasant 
life: the non-farming activity and income. 
Re-evaluating feudalism and imperialism 
For about three decades (1950-1980), the economic historians in mainland 
China focused their research on the exploitation of the peasants by landlords and 
capitalists, they condemned the negative role of feudalism and imperialism on the 
development of rural economy. Li Wenzhi and Zhang Youyi, the compilers of the three 
volumes of source materials on agricultural history, represent these historians, David 
Faure labeled their argument as the "pessimistic school.'" It might be true that there 
was some kind of bias in selecting the source materials, but no one could argue against 
 ^Faure The Rural Economy of Pre-liberation China, I. 
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the "pessimistic" facts about Chinese agriculture and peasants' life revealed by the 
three volumes. The "pessimistic" opinion was not created by the historians. Both 
Chinese and foreign scholars who visited China had already talked about the crisis of 
the rural economy and the hardship of peasant life in the 1920s and 1930s. Alfred Lin 
had a good summary of these facts and arguments about the "rural crisis:" 
If one runs through the pages of newspapers, journals and books published in the Nanjing 
Decade (1928-37), one will be overwhelmed by the sense of pessimism that pervaded the 
literature on existing rural conditions. The picture was clearly one of abject poverty for 
the bulk of the rural population. Terms such as nortgcun pochan (rural bankruptcy) and 
nongcim konghuang (panic in the countryside) gained currency in this period. 
Intellectuals unanimously agreed that rural China was in the midst of crisis. There were 
strong disagreements, however, as to the causes and nature of the crisis. Different 
solutions were thus proposed.^  
Contrary to the overwhelming facts, Loren Brandt and David Faure made an 
"optimistic" interpretation of Chinese agricultural history based on their studies of 
south China. They calculated the terms of trade and concluded that most peasants' 
income increased and their living standard improved. But neither of them gave any 
detailed statistics at the village or household level to support their "optimistic" 
Alfred H. Y. Lin, The Rural Economy of Guangdong, 1870-1937: A Stucfy of the Agrarian Crisis and 
its Origins in Southernmost China QLondon: MacNCUan Press, 1997), I. According to Lin, there were 
four primary groups proposing solutions; The first group, represemed by John L. Buck, stressed the 
backwardness of Chinese agricultural technology and &vored the modernization of Chinese agriculture and 
very minor reform of the property right. The second group, represented by Chen Hansheng, a communist 
economist, condemned the feudalism landownership and imperialism for the rural crisis, they regarded the 
radical restructuring of property rights and the elimination of imperialism as an imperative necessary in 
order to bring about &ir distribution of resources and incomes. The third group was represemed by Fei 
Xiaogong, they attributed the agrarian crisis mainly to the rtiining of rural handicrafts and the solution was 
"rural industrialization." The fourth group, represemed by Yan Yangxhu (James Y. C. Yen) and Liang 
Shuming, conceptualized the agrarian crisis in broader, culturalistic terms and sponsored the "mass 
education" and "rural re-construction" movements. 
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argument^ Undoubtedly, this study supports the "pessimistic" opinion and undermines 
the "optimistic" interpretation. 
In discussing the Western impact on Chinese economic development, neither 
Chinese nor Western scholars distingm'shed normal international trade or outside 
investment from military invasion and super-economic exploitation in the past. 
Chinese scholars condeirmed all things related with foreign countries, they ignored the 
benefit brought by development of foreign markets (such as for the straw braid and 
processed bristles) and work opportunities created by foreign investment in modern 
factories. On the other hand. Western scholars only stressed the positive role of 
international trade and foreign investment They talked little of the disaster caused by 
military invasions and the huge indemnity extorted from China by the foreign powers." 
This study shows that imperialism, especially the Japanese invasion, was one of the 
main causes for the hardship of the peasants' life in the 1930s. 
It is true that compared with the landownership in south China, especially with 
that in the Yangtze Delta, there were fewer absentee landlords in Eastern Hebei. But, 
even in Eastern Hebei, the landownership distribution was so unequal that many 
' Faure, The Rural Economy of Pre-liberation China, Brandt, Commercialization and Agricultural 
Development. 
® This argument is represented by Robert F. Demberger. See his article "The role of the foreigner in 
China's economic development," Dwight H. Perkins, ed., China's Modem Economy in Historical 
Perspective, \9-^Z. But, Albert Feuerwerker is an exceptional one. He pointed out that indemnity 
payments ^ terest and prindpal) on the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer War totaled 476,982,000 taels 
between 1895 and 1911, or more than two times the estimated total capitalization of foreign and Chinese 
modem enterprises between 1895 and 1913. Feuwerker, "Economic trends in the late Ch'ing Empire," in 
John K. Fairbank and Kuang-ching Liu, ed.. The Cambridge History of China, vol. 11: Late Ch 'ing, 1800-
1911, part 2, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980), 1-69. 
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peasants could not make a living on their own land For those peasants who worked on 
the rented land, the rent was so high (40 percent or half of the products) that few of 
them could make a reasonable return on rent famung. Contrary to the traditional 
argument that the agricultural production was so low that there was little or no 
accumulation for industrial investment, Carl Riskin demonstrated that in 1933, Chinese 
agriculture could produce a surplus (above the peasant's own consumption) which 
equaled about 24.5 percent of the Net Domestic Product This surplus was not used as 
initial capital for industrial development but wasted by the landlords and the state 
employees/ It is difficult to know how much percent of the total production in Eastem 
Hebei was paid to the landlord and state, but this study shows that no matter how much 
tax the peasants paid to the state, they got little back from the state in the form of 
service. All they paid was wasted by the state machine. Victor Lippit's study of land 
reform and its contribution to the industrial development demonstrated that feudalism 
(especially the landownership and state system) did hinder the development of 
productive forces.^ 
Rural industrialization and peasants' livelihood 
This study shows that rural industry and commerce were important parts of the 
peasant economy in Eastem Hebei and the decline of non-farming income greatly hurt 
' Carl Riskin, "Surplus and stagnation in modem China," Perkins ed., China's Modem Economy in 
Historical Perspective, 70. 
* Victor D. Lippit, Land Reform and Economic Development in China: A Study of Institutional Change 
and Development Finance (White Plains, New York: Imemational Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1974). 
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the peasant's livelihood. This conclusion accords with Fei Xiaotong's findings in south 
China and supports his general argument that treating Chinese rural economic problems 
"merely as problems of agriculture is one-sided."' 
Undoubtedly, attributing the decline of rural industry and the impoverishment of 
China's peasants mainly to the intrusion of foreign machine made goods is unfair. 
But Fei Xiaotong held neither an "impractical nostalgia for the past" as a Chinese 
student has argued nor was he an "orthodox" conservative who tried to protect the 
peasant economy by boycotting machine-made products.'' Fei Xiaotong knew it was 
useless to stick to the traditional handicraft industry and resist the coming of machine 
production, but it was impractical to tell the peasant just give up handicraft production 
and focus on farming alone. He made it clear that "it is a hopeless struggle for the 
unorganized mass of petty owner-workers. However skillftil they may be, they are 
fighting a losing battle against the machine. But they must keep on fighting, because 
otherwise.they cannot live."'" Based on this realistic analysis, Fei Xiaotong proposed 
his solution for Chinese peasant economy: rural industrialization. Hedidnotw^antjust 
' Hsiao-tung Fei, Earthbound China, 306. 
Fei argued that "the intrusion of foreign goods, which are gradually wiping out traditional industry. As 
the later disappears, the peasants lose a source of income and are the more impoverished." Earthbound 
China, 304. 
" In the 1940s, a Chinese critic named Tang Deming accused Fei as having a "sentimental attachment to 
inefficent handicraft industries doomed to extinction, of an impractical nostalgia for the past, and irrational 
hatred of machines." He ridiculed Fei's proposal for rural industrialization as a "daydream of small-scale 
production." (Arkush, Fei Xiaotong, 170, and 307, note 20.) In the 1960s, an American anthropologist. 
Jack Potter, selected Fei Xiaotong as the representative of the "orthodox" [or "pessimistic" as David Faure 
termed] interpretation of modem China's niral economic history and especially targeted Fei's argument 
that foreign goods destroyed handicraft industry and hurt peasant livelihood. (Potter, Capitalism and 
Chinese Peasant, see especially the last chapter). 
Hsiao-tung Fei, Earthbound China, 305. 
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to restore old fashioned handicrafts but to revive and develop rural industry. He 
encouraged the introduction of machine and modem technology to rural industry and 
called the petty producers [peasants] to organize into cooperatives. He maintained that 
a more diffused rural industrialization was possible because electricity and modem 
transportation had ended the necessity for the big factories of the nineteenth century to 
be built around a central source of power—the steam engine. He wamed that "if it 
[China's industrialization] develops according to the pattern of European and American 
industry of the last few centuries—that is, if it is concentrated in urban areas and in the 
hands of a few capitalists—it will only aggravate the distress of the rural population, 
because it will take away from the village all its homestead industries and thus further 
decrease the income of the peasants."'^ 
Unfortunately for Chinese peasants, the policy makers did not adopt Fei's 
proposal. After land reform in the early 1950s, the Chinese Communist Party took the 
Soviet model to collectivize the agricultural production and let the state monopolize 
industry and commerce. By state legislation, Chinese peasants were bound to the land 
as state slaves—the farming laborers. They could not change their occupation and 
move to the cities. In 1957, Fei Xiaotong had already found that focusing on 
agriculture did increase grain production but little improvement of peasant life occurred 
because the decline in or the total cancellation of non-farming incomes. Philip Huang 
" Ibid., 308. 
Fei Hsiao-tung, Rural Development in China, 2-40. Fei was criticized in the Anti-rightist movement of 
late 1957 for his finding that peasant's h'velihood had seen little improvement. 
224 
called this paradox phenomena as "[agricultural production] increase without [labor 
production] development"'^ 
After 1980, the development of rural industry (both collectively owned and 
private enterprises) was permitted by the govenmient and more and more peasants 
engaged in industry and commerce again. The dramatic development of the rural 
economy and the improvement of peasant's livelihood proved Fei Xiaotong's 
hypothesis that rural industrialization was critical to the prosperity of the peasant 
households and demonstrated indirectly the importance of industry and commerce in 
the peasant's life before the revolution. 
Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990). chapter 11 and the conclusion. 
According to the governmental statistics, in 1978, the beginning year of rural reform, the average non-
fitrmii  ^income per capita [for 6rmer] was 20.1 yuan, it composed 15 percent of the total net income. In 
1986, the average non-&rming income per capita and its percentage in the total income increased to 199.3 
yuan and 36.6 percem respectively. Dong Fureng,, Industrialization and China's RuralModemizatiort 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 68, Table 6.4. Another statistic shows that by 1992, Chinese 
peasants drew more income &om non-&rming sectors than &om farming activities. Samuel P. S. Ho, 
"Rural Non-agricultural Development in Post-reform China; Growth, Development Patterns, and Issues," 
Pacific Affairs 6i (Fall 1995), 363, Table I. 
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